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This research investigates the strategic governance choices made in commercializing new 
technologies arising from university research. 
Departing from the traditional licensing vs. start-up approach, it is proposed that there are 
three primary methods of commercializing these technologies: 1) Build – creating a new 
business based on the technology, 2) Rent – ongoing development and marketing of the 
technology to established firms that use the technology in their businesses and 3) Sell – 
disposition of the technology to an established firm. 
Using economic theories of the firm, particularly transaction cost economics, it is 
hypothesized that: 
• the build option is positively associated with firms deriving revenue primarily from 
product market activity (H1a) and expending resources on both technology 
development activities and production activities (H2a);  
• the rent and sell options are positively associated with firms deriving revenue 
primarily from technology market activity (H1b) and expending resources on 
technology development activities but not on production activities (H2b). 
• the greater the patent or other legal protection (H3), the risk of substitutes (H5) or the 
dynamism associated with the technology (H8), the greater the likelihood that the 
technology will be commercialized using the rent option; 
• the greater the tacitness and complexity (H4) or the greater the volatility associated 
with the technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will be 
commercialized using the build or sell options; and 
• the greater the importance of specialized complementary assets, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the sell option (H6). 
Three studies were conducted providing differing perspectives on the research question. 
Study #1 examines three start-ups based on new technologies arising from research 
conducted at the University of Waterloo. Study #2 analyzes the business activities of a 
number of Canadian and U.S. public start-up firms using archival data. Study #3 is a survey 
 
 iv 
of university faculty members who have had new technologies arising from their academic 
research put into commercial use. 
Hypotheses H1a/b, H2a/b and H3 are supported and Hypothesis H7 received more limited 
support. Evidence for Hypothesis H5 is in the predicted direction but failed to achieve 
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Universities perform 31 percent of Canada’s research and development activities (OECD, 
Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2001, as cited in Industry Canada, 2002). The 
economic impact of licensing activities by Canadian universities has been estimated at more 
than $500 million supporting an estimated 4,000 jobs (Gu and Whewell, 1999). In addition, 
spin-off companies based on university research employ more than 20,000 people and 
generate $2.5 billion in annual revenue (Read, 2003). Despite these successes, the 
Government of Canada’s Innovation Strategy identifies what it calls the Knowledge 
Performance Challenge, namely, that “Canadian firms do not reap enough benefits from the 
commercialization of knowledge” (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 19) and sets as a priority 
implementing initiatives to “leverage the commercialization of publicly funded academic 
research” (p. 52). In response, Canadian universities have committed to tripling their 
commercialization performance by 2010 (AUCC, 2002). While progress has been made in 
reaching these targets, much remains to be done (AUCC, 2005). Consequently, the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research is an increasingly 
important issue. 
The forms that university research commercialization take are varied and include licensing 
of patented inventions, collaborative development with industry partners and the creation of 
start-up ventures. In investigations of these forms, significant variation in the role of patents 
and the degree of interaction between the researcher and the commercializing firm have been 
found (Colyvas et al., 2002).  
Despite the growing interest in the commercialization of new technologies arising from 
university research and the suggestion that patents and other characteristics of technologies 
play a role in the methods used to commercialize these technologies, “scholarly investigation 
of this phenomenon is virtually non-existent” (Shane, 2004, p. 2). 
The research described in this thesis investigates why the transactions involved in 
commercializing university research take the form they do. Better understanding of the 
reasons for different forms of commercialization can help inventors and others involved in 
the commercialization process to select appropriate methods for commercializing new 
technologies arising from university research. 
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1.1 Scope of the research 
This research focuses on the commercialization of technological innovations arising from 
university research. “Commercialization is the production, manufacturing, packaging, 
marketing, and distribution of a product that embodies an innovation” (Rogers, 1995, p. 143). 
Technological innovation refers to new “theoretical and practical knowledge, skills, and 
artifacts that can be used to develop products and services as well as their production and 
delivery systems. Technology can be embodied in people, materials, cognitive and physical 
processes, plant, equipment, and tools” (Burgleman, Maidique and Wheelwright, 2001, p. 4). 
This research examines the governance structures used in the commercialization of 
university research. These governance structures can include various forms of licensing, 
spin-offs and partnerships. Different governance structures are theorized to be efficient in 
different circumstances. Consequently, it is expected that the choice of an appropriate 
governance structure can have a significant impact on the success of the commercialization 
effort. 
The research does not examine other issues related to the commercialization of university 
research. These include how commercializing firms locate specific innovations they wish to 
commercialize and what motivates researchers to commercialize their innovations. 
1.2 Research question 
“In a university’s attempt to commercialize a new technology, there is little empirical 
evidence to suggest which route the university should take” (Gu and Whewell, 1999, p. 73). 
The research described in this thesis addresses this lack of empirical evidence and asks the 
research question: 
How do the characteristics of technologies affect the choice of 
governance structures used to commercialize new technologies 
arising from university research? 
The phrase “characteristics of technologies” in the research question is intended to be 
interpreted broadly. It includes, for example, characteristics of the technology itself and 




The commercialization of new technologies takes different forms for many reasons. For 
example, the governance structure chosen may be a result of researcher preferences. Some 
researchers may not be interested in commercial application of their research and may not be 
willing to participate in activities to transfer the technology. In these circumstances, 
commercialization may occur through spillover from published papers or through licensing 
through a university’s technology transfer office with little involvement of the researcher. 
Researchers may have other motives as well. For example, some researchers may be more 
entrepreneurial and may have a desire to found a start-up venture to commercialize their 
research. The choice of governance structure may also be affected by financing 
considerations. For example, new technologies in the pharmaceutical industry may tend to be 
commercialized by established firms due to the significant costs involved in moving the 
innovation through the regulatory approval process. In contrast, software innovations often 
may be commercialized through start-up ventures because of the limited financial capital 
investments required by these technologies. While many reasons may exist for choosing a 
particular path to commercialization, the perspective taken in this research is that new 
technologies with certain attributes align with certain governance structures and that this 
alignment is primarily based on minimizing the costs of monitoring and managing the 
relationship between the researcher and the commercializing firm (see section 2.6, 
Transaction cost economics). 
1.3 Outline of this thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains the literature review and consists of 
two parts. The first deals with the literature related to the commercialization of new 
technologies arising from university research. The second deals with economic theories of 
the firm and, in particular, transaction cost economics. Transaction cost economics is the 
theoretical basis for the governance structures and hypotheses developed in chapters 3 and 4. 
The literature on the commercialization of university research and the literature on economic 
theories of the firm suggest a number of implications for the commercialization of new 
technologies. First, governance structures are important for the successful commercialization 
of new technologies. However, a focus on governance structures has been absent in the 
literature on the commercialization of new technologies arising from university research with 
the exception of a brief mention by Shane (2002). Second, the choice of governance 
structures is affected by transaction attributes. Under transaction cost economics theory, 
these attributes are the existence of specialized assets, uncertainty and frequency. Looking 
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more specifically at the commercialization of new technologies, key transaction attributes 
that have been identified are the ability to exclude others from using the technology and 
access to specialized complementary assets. Third, in applying transaction cost economics to 
the commercialization of new technologies, it is important to consider carefully the 
governance structures that may arise in this specific environment, the specific attributes of 
new technologies that may affect transaction costs and the ramifications of selecting specific 
governance structures in light of these specific attributes. That is, it is important to tailor the 
application of transaction cost economics to the specifics of the situation being considered 
(Williamson, 2002). 
In chapter 3, difficulties with the traditional approach to classifying the methods used to 
commercialize new technologies arising from university research (licensing vs. start-up) are 
identified and a proposal is presented for a new method of categorization that is linked to the 
concept of governance structures discussed in the preceding chapter. It is proposed that there 
are three primary methods of commercializing new technologies arising from university 
research: 1) Build – creating a new business based on the technology, 2) Rent – ongoing 
development and marketing of the technology to established firms that use the technology in 
their businesses and 3) Sell – disposition of the technology to an established firm. The 
rationale for the proposed new method is discussed and criteria for the categories are 
developed. Finally, the benefits of the proposed categorization scheme are presented. 
In chapter 4, the hypotheses that will be tested are developed. Two sets of hypotheses are 
proposed in this chapter. The first set is related to firm characteristics associated with the 
strategic governance choices of build, rent or sell. The second set of hypotheses relates to the 
link between certain characteristics of new technologies (i.e., transaction attributes) and the 
strategic governance choices made in their commercialization. 
In chapter 5, the methods used to conduct the research are described. Three studies were 
conducted in the course of this research. Each of these studies uses different methods. The 
use of multiple methods, known as triangulation, has the benefit of providing differing 
perspectives on the research question. Study #1 analyzes three start-ups based on new 
technologies arising from research conducted at the University of Waterloo. The analyses in 
this study use archival data related to the three start-ups examined. Study #2 examines the 
business activities of a number of Canadian and U.S. public start-up firms. This study uses 
two separate samples of public start-up firms that have commercialized new technologies 
arising from university research. The first sample is of Canadian companies built on National 
5 
 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (“NSERC”) funded research. The 
second sample is of U.S. companies built on research conducted at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (“MIT”). Study #3 is a survey of university faculty members who 
have had new technologies arising from their academic research put into commercial use. 
The population for the survey is faculty members who have had new technologies resulting 
from their academic research put into commercial use and who are located at one of two of 
the universities participating in the “C4” consortium of universities located in south-western 
Ontario. 
Chapter 6 contains the results of the analysis of three start-ups based on new technologies 
arising from research conducted at the University of Waterloo. The primary purpose of these 
examples is to illustrate the significant differences that exist in the governance structures 
used to commercialize new technologies. The results support the concerns raised in chapter 3 
about the licensing vs. start-up dichotomy for analyzing the commercialization of new 
technologies arising from university research that has been used in past studies. The results 
also provide some support for the build, rent and sell classification of governance structures 
proposed in chapter 3. Further, the findings of this study are consistent with the hypotheses 
related to firm characteristics associated with the strategic governance choices of build, rent 
or sell. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the examination of the nature of business activities of a 
sample of public start-up firms that have been involved in commercializing new technologies 
arising from university research. The results of this study demonstrate 1) that the criteria 
identified in chapter 3 can be applied effectively in practice to classify the method used to 
commercialize a new technology arising from university research, 2) that the build, rent and 
sell methods are all common approaches to commercialization, and 3) that there are 
substantive differences in the business activities of firms depending on the method of 
commercialization used. In doing so, this study provides evidence as to the validity of the 
build, rent and sell categorization approach. The result of this study also support the 
hypotheses related to firm characteristics associated with the strategic governance choices of 
build, rent or sell. 
Chapter 8 contains the results of the survey of academic inventors. The primary purpose of 
this study is to examine the connection between the characteristics of a new technology and 
the method used to commercialize the technology. This study results in a number of major 
findings. First, the findings from this study suggest that technology attributes may have an 
6 
 
impact on the methods used to commercialize a new technology arising from university 
research. Specifically, the findings are that, when intellectual property protection for a 
technology is weak, the build and sell approaches are likely to be more effective than the rent 
approach. The rent approach requires stronger intellectual property protection to enable the 
inventor to appropriate gains from the technology since secrecy and other methods of 
appropriate gains are unlikely to be effective when the rent option is used. Second, the 
findings help to resolve conflicts in previous research on the role of intellectual property 
protection. Specifically, the findings imply that there are differences in the importance of 
intellectual property protection when a technology is licensed to numerous established firms 
as in the rent approach compared to when a technology is licensed to a single establish firm 
as in the sell approach. Third, the findings suggest that the build, rent and sell classification 
scheme proposed in this thesis provides insights into the commercialization process that the 
licensing vs. start-up approach does not. 
Chapter 9 summarizes the key findings of the research, theoretical and managerial 
implications, limitations of the research and identifies opportunities for future research. A 
number of theoretical contributions are identified that help to advance the study of the 
commercialization of university research. First, the build, rent or sell model provides a 
theoretical basis for the classification of methods that is lacking in the licensing vs. start-up 
approach. Second, the build, rent or sell approach reflects the ideas of markets and 
hierarchies better than does the licensing vs. start-up approach. Third, the focus on 
governance structures enables researchers to draw on existing literature to study the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. Fourth, the build, 
rent or sell approach is easily reconcilable to the broader literature on commercializing 
innovations. Fifth, the build, rent or sell model captures the governance structure in place at 
the time when the invention is commercialized. The licensing vs. start-up approach focuses 
on the point in time when a technology leaves the university. However, there is evidence that 
a significant amount of time can pass between the time when a technology leaves the 
university and when it is commercialized and that different approaches may be tried before 
commercialization actually occurs. Sixth, the build, rent and sell categories capture non-
traditional forms of commercialization that are becoming more important due to the 
emergence of markets for technology. Seventh, the build, rent and sell model has the 
potential to resolve and explain inconsistent findings in previous research. 
The managerial contributions of this research include providing guidance to managers 
when deciding on a commercialization strategy for a new technology arising from university 
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research. The build, rent and sell model can also help start-up firms to prioritize the activities 
that they need to undertake in order to commercialize their technology and to avoid wasting 
valuable resources on activities that are not important to their success. In addition, the model 
and findings provide resources for individuals in university technology transfer and licensing 
offices to aid them in determining or advising on commercialization strategies and on 
development strategies. Further, the existence of novel strategies that may aid universities in 




This literature review consists of two parts. The first part deals with the literature related to 
the commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. The second part 
addresses economic theories of the firm with an emphasis on transaction cost economics. 
Transaction cost economics is the theoretical basis for the governance structures and 
hypotheses developed in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.1 The commercialization of new technologies arising from university 
research 
The academic literature on the commercialization of new technologies arising from 
university research addresses a number of topics. These topics are summarized in Figure 2.1. 
One area of the literature deals with environmental influences including differences across 
geographic locations and differences across industries. A second area of the literature deals 
with university influences including the effects of university institutions, practices and 
policies and the role of people, particularly inventors, in commercialization. The third area of 
the literature deals directly with the commercialization of new technologies including 
identification of the methods available to commercialize a particular new technology, 
identification of the processes involved, measurement of the extent of commercialization 
activity and identification of characteristics of technologies that affect the methods used to 
commercialize the technology. 
This thesis focuses on the third area of the literature and, particularly, on the literature 
related to the characteristics of technologies. The following sections provide a brief overview 
of the literature related to the environmental and university influences on commercialization 
as they relate to this thesis. A detailed analysis of the literature relating the characteristics of 
technologies to the methods used to commercialize them follows. 
2.2 Environmental influences on commercialization 
2.2.1 Differences across geographical locations 
Significant differences in the extent of commercialization between different countries have 
been observed (Unico, 2004). These differences have been attributed to differences in the 
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availability of capital to finance commercialization activities and differences in labour 
markets affecting the ability of researchers to move between universities and industry 
(Shane, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.1 Topics in the literature on commercialization of new technologies arising 













•Characteristics of technologies  
 
 
At a more local level, commercialization success has been found to decline as the 
geographic distance between the university where the technology was invented and the 
commercializing firm increases (Agrawal, 2001). This is attributed to a decline in the 
interaction between the university inventor and the commercializing firm as the distance 
between them increases. 
2.2.2 Differences in industrial environment 
Differences in the extent of commercialization related to the local industrial environment 
have also been observed. In particular, research indicates that the existence of industry 
clusters affects the extent of commercialization activities (Agrawal, 2001). This effect has 
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been attributed to the benefits of having customers, suppliers and experienced managers in 
close proximity to the source of the new technology (Shane, 2004). 
2.2.3 Implications of environmental differences 
The existence of these differences suggests that it is important to account for the effects of 
geography in research on commercialization. For example, lesser availability of capital to 
finance commercialization activities in a particular geographic area may reduce the 
propensity to commercialize new technologies using methods that require greater amounts of 
capital relative to methods that require lesser amounts of capital. Similarly, the existence of 
potential customers and suppliers in the geographic area may increase the propensity to 
commercialize new technologies by methods involving the creation of a new firm as it may 
make it easier to establish customer and supplier relationships. Section 5.4.2.1 contains a 
discussion of how environmental differences were controlled for in this research. 
2.3 University influences on commercialization 
2.3.1 Differences in institutions, practices and policies 
A significant amount of research considers the effects of differences between institutions and 
their policies and practices on the commercialization of new technologies arising from 
university research (see, for example, Agrawal, 2001; Shane 2004; and Siegel and Phan, 
2005 for reviews of this literature). Some of the differences affecting commercialization that 
have been identified include differences between institutions such as faculty quality (Thursby 
and Kemp, 2002) and levels of research funding (Carlsson and Fridh, 2002). A second area 
of identified differences is in university practices such as the size and experience of the 
university’s technology transfer office (Thursby and Kemp, 2002) and the existence of 
science parks (Link, Scott and Siegel, 2003). A third area of identified differences is in 
university policies such as whether intellectual property rights to the technology belong to 
the university or the inventor (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003; Hoye and Roe, 2003) and 
policies regarding the taking of equity in lieu of royalties, the availability of leaves of 




Differences have also been found at the department level. For example, Todorovic (2004) 
identified differences in entrepreneurial orientation between departments and found that these 
were related to the commercialization performance of the departments. 
2.3.2 Differences in people 
Differences in the commercialization of university research due to characteristics of the 
people involved, particularly researchers, have also been noted. Zucker, Darby and 
Armstrong (2002) examine the role of “star” scientists in biotechnology related research and 
found a positive relationship on research productive as measured by the number of patents 
granted, the number of products in development and the number of products on the market. A 
positive relationship between an inventor’s prior entrepreneurial experience and 
commercialization has also been found (Shane and Khurana, 2003). 
2.3.3 Implications of university differences 
The existence of these differences suggests that it is important to control for the effects of 
university differences in research on commercialization. For example, differences in the 
intellectual property policies of universities may affect the incentives to both researchers and 
universities to expend effort to commercialize new technologies. Similarly, the affiliation of 
a researcher with a particular department or faculty may affect the method chosen to 
commercialize a new technology. Section 8.2.2 contains a discussion of how university 
differences were controlled for in this research. 
2.4 Commercialization of new technologies 
2.4.1 Methods of commercialization 
Knowledge about new technologies is transferred from universities to industry in many ways. 
These include publications, conferences, consulting, conversations, recruitment of graduates, 
co-supervising, collaborative research, patents and licenses (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). 
Some of these methods involve the transfer of knowledge about new technologies to the 
economy as a public good (Gu and Whewell, 1999). These methods include publications, 
conferences, conversations, recruitment of graduates, and co-supervising. Estimates of the 
relative importance of different knowledge channels suggest that these ‘non-commercial’ 
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methods represent the majority of knowledge transferred from universities to industry 
(Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). 
Commercialization of new technologies involves the direct transfer of knowledge resulting 
in the introduction of a product in the market incorporating the new technology or the use of 
the new technology within a production process by one or more firms (Gu and Whewell, 
1999; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996). Commercialization 
of new technologies arising from university research is accomplished primarily through 
licensing or the creation of start-up firms (see, for example, Association of University 
Technology Managers, 2004; Gu and Whewell, 1999; and Read, 2003). A key feature of the 
license vs. start-up dichotomy is the focus on the legal structures used to effect the transfer of 
the technology from the research environment to the commercial environment. 
At a more detailed level, various subcategories have been used or proposed. For licensing, 
the most common subcategories are exclusive and non-exclusive licenses (see, for example, 
Association of University Technology Managers, 2004). However, other subcategories have 
been used. For example, Shane (2002) distinguishes between licensing by inventors and by 
noninventors in studying who undertakes the commercialization of university research. 
Conversely, much of the research on start-ups has failed to distinguish between different 
types of start-ups (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003a). This despite the fact that “data suggest that 
rather than representing an undifferentiated outcome driven by a universal process, there are 
varied types of university-linked new ventures and different processes or fields that give rise 
to them” (Miner et al., 2001, p. 134). Most researchers assume that start-ups are created for 
the purpose of developing and selling new products (see, for example, Shane, 2002). 
However, Wallmark (1997) in looking at start-ups out of Chalmers University of Technology 
identified a number of cases of firms “with a main interest in developing new patents for sale 
or licence and only peripheral interest in selling its own products on the market” (p. 134). 
Some researchers have proposed that different categories of start-ups exist. For example, 
Nicolaou and Birley (2003b) propose a trichotomous categorization of university spinouts 
into orthodox, hybrid and technology spinouts. Importantly, however, these categories reflect 
the relationship between the academic inventor and the firm established to commercialize the 
technology rather than the method or business model used to commercialize the technology. 
Taken together, research on the methods of commercialization suggests that: 
 knowledge generated by universities is put into practice in many ways; 
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 these ways include both spillover of knowledge and commercialization activities; 
 many methods of commercialization exist though research primarily focuses on licensing 
and start-ups; and 
 there is much variety within both licensing and start-ups. 
There are a number of unanswered questions that arise from this literature. One question is 
whether the variety within both licensing and start-ups is important. A second question is 
how to make the choice between licensing and start-ups in the decision to commercialize a 
technology. Gregory and Sheahen (1991) suggest that creation of spin-off companies is 
generally a more successful route to commercialization than licensing whereas Shane (2002) 
argues that, when possible, licensing is the preferred method of commercialization and 
creation of spin-off companies represents a ‘second-best’ approach to commercialization. 
These questions are addressed in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.4.2 Extent of commercialization 
Research on the extent of commercialization activity has shown that new technologies arising 
from university research are a significant source of innovative economic activity. Table 2.1 
summarizes certain key statistics from the 2002 survey of Canadian and U.S. universities 
conducted by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM, 2003). Research 
has also shown that returns on the new technologies are highly skewed with a small number 
of new technologies providing very large returns and a large number of new technologies 
providing modest returns (AUTM, 2003; Scherer and Harhoff, 2000). 
These statistics demonstrate that there is no predominant method of commercialization. 
Exclusive licensing, non-exclusive licensing and creation of start-ups are all common 
methods of commercialization. 
An important limitation of this research is that it focuses primarily on the point in time 
when a new technology leaves the university environment and enters the commercial one. 
However, the fact that a technology leaves the university environment does not necessarily 
mean that it was put into commercial use. Indirect evidence for this assertion is found in the 
AUTM data which show that only 47.1% of active licenses yielded any income in 2002 
(AUTM, 2003). This issue is addressed in chapter 4 which introduces a method of classifying 
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commercialization methods based on the governance structures in place when the technology 
is put into commercial use rather than at the point when it leaves the university. 
Table 2.1 Statistics on extent of commercialization activity at Canadian and U.S. 
Universities 
Statistic Canada U.S. 
Annual total licensing income C$51.5 million US$1.337 billion
Start-up companies operation at end of 2002 493 2,236
Proportion of licenses that were exclusive 53.9% 46.5%
Proportion of licenses that were non-exclusive 46.1% 53.5%
Proportion of licenses that were to start-up companies 13.9% 13.6%
Note: Adapted from AUTM Licensing Survey: FY 2002 (AUTM, 2003) 
 
2.4.3 Processes of commercialization 
New technologies arising from university research are rarely ready for immediate conversion 
into commercial products or services (Rogers, 2003). Thursby, Jensen and Thursby (2001) 
surveyed the technology transfer offices of 62 major U.S. universities. Table 2.2 reports their 
findings to a question concerning the stage of development of licensed inventions. These data 
show the early stage of development of most university inventions. Thursby et al. also found 
that 71% of licensed inventions required inventor cooperation for commercial success. 
The conversion of these embryonic technologies into products and services is a difficult 
process. A transformation process involving the integration of both scientific and market 
knowledge is needed to develop commercially viable new products and services based on 
these new technologies (Fontes, 2005). This transformation process involves a number of 
activities including technology development, product development and business development 
(Lux and Rorke, n.d.; Shane, 2004). This transformation results in significant reduction in 
both technical and market uncertainty related to the new technology (Fontes, 2005). The 
technology development activities often involve significant changes to the technology to 
improve the performance, robustness, ease of use and other characteristics of the technology 
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(Shane, 2004). Product development activities involve converting the new technology into a 
product or service. Customers generally do not buy technology; rather they buy products or 
services that provide solutions to the problems they face (Shane, 2004). Business 
development involves acquiring or developing the other capabilities and complementary 
assets needed to develop, produce and sell products or services based on the technology. 
These may include manufacturing, distribution, marketing and selling capabilities (Teece, 
1986). 
 
Table 2.2 Stage of development of licensed inventions 
 Stage of development Percentage of inventions 
Proof of concept but no prototype 45.1% 
Prototype available but only lab scale (further development needed) 37.2% 
Some animal data available 26.7% 
Some clinical data available 9.5% 
Manufacturing feasibility known 15.3% 
Ready for practical or commercial use (e.g., software or reagent quality materials) 12.3% 
Note: Adapted from Thursby et al., 2001. 
 
This research suggests that there are significant development activities needed between the 
time a new technology leaves the university setting and when it is commercialized. However, 
most of the research to date has focused on the technology at the time it leaves the university 
(either through licensing to commercial firms or the creation of start-ups). Little attention has 
been focused on the technology, product and business development activities that occur once 
the technology leaves the university setting. This issue is addressed, in part, in this thesis 
through the development of a method of classifying commercialization methods based on the 
governance structures in place when the technology is put into commercial use rather than at 
the time when it leaves the university (see chapter 4). 
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2.4.4 Characteristics of technology 
A limited amount of research has been conducted relating the characteristics of technologies 
to the methods used to commercialize them. Table 2.3 summarizes this literature. 
Colyvas et al. (2002) considered 11 inventions from Columbia University and Stanford 
University. Based on their examination of these case studies, they found that inventions that 
were ‘ready to use’ out of the laboratory did not require exclusive licenses in order to 
encourage firms to commercialize the technology and in most cases (three of four instances) 
were licensed nonexclusively to the commercializing firms. They also found that exclusive 
licenses were important to encourage firms to undertake the development risks associated 
with embryonic inventions. 
Shane (2002) examined 717 licensed patents from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and found that when patents are not effective, technologies are likely to be 
licensed back to the inventors. In another study using the same dataset, Shane (2001) 
considered the commercialization of technologies through the establishment of a new firm. 
Based on his examination of these data, Shane concluded that “more important inventions, 
more radical inventions, and inventions with a broader scope of patent protection were more 
likely to be commercialized through the creation of new firms” (p. 216). Nerkar and Shane 
(2003) built on this study by further examining the 128 new firms founded to commercialize 
new technologies. They found that technology radicalness and patent scope reduce firm 
failure but only in fragmented industries.  
Del Campo, Sparks, Hill and Keller (1999) analyzed the attempt to commercialize 
superconducting quantum interference devices. They concluded that “licensing may be the 
best strategy when the proprietary position of the intellectual property is narrow or 
unpatentable and when the capabilities of the developer are limited” (p. 294). Further, they 
concluded that start-ups need inventions that represent a core technology with a large market 
potential and, if possible, multiple product applications to compensate for the high risks 
involved in creating a start-up firm.  
Wright, Vohora and Lockett (2004) examined four high tech start-up firms from 
universities in the United Kingdom. In each of the four cases, Wright et al. found that the 
technologies involved could be considered disruptive innovations (Christensen, 1993) 
suggesting that start-ups are an appropriate method of commercializing such technologies. 
They also found that licensing was not a viable option in these four cases because potential  
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Table 2.3 Characteristics of technologies that suggest using licensing or a start-up 
firm to commercialize the technology 
Author Method and sample Licensing Start-up 
Colyvas et 
al., 2002 
Qualitative analysis of 11 
case studies from 
Columbia University and 
Stanford University 
Ready to use – 
nonexclusive licensing 
Embryonic – exclusive 
licensing 
 
Shane, 2002 Regression analysis of 717 
licensed patents from the 
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (“MIT”) 
Patents are effective Patents are ineffective 
Shane, 2001 Event history analysis of 
1,397 patents from MIT 
 More important inventions 
More radical inventions 
Inventions with a broader 
scope of patent protection 
Nerkar and 
Shane, 2003 
Event history analysis of 
128 firms founded to 
exploit new technologies 
from MIT 
 Technology radicalness 
and patent scope reduce 
firm failure but only in 
fragmented industries 
del Campo 
et al., 1999 
Qualitative analysis of a 
single case study 
Narrow IP protection and 
researcher lacks core 
competencies to develop 
the technology into 
marketable products 
Invention is a core 
technology with a large 
market potential and, if 






Qualitative analysis of 
four case studies 
 Disruptive innovations 
Technologies involving 






Survey of technology 
transfer offices of 62 U.S. 
universities 
Late stage technologies Early stage technologies 
Shane 2004 Multiple sources including 
many of the above and 
interviews of people 






Moderate customer value 
Minor technical advance 






Major technical advance 
Strong IP protection 
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licensing firms did not have the know-how or tacit knowledge to undertake the required 
technology development activities. 
Thursby, Jensen and Thursby (2001) surveyed 62 technology transfers offices at U.S. 
universities and found that 60% of the survey respondents indicated that large companies 
were more likely to take late stage technologies and that small companies were more likely to 
take early stage technologies. 
Using evidence from many of the studies described above and from semi-structured field 
interviews of people involved in the formation and development of start-ups from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Shane (2004) summarized the characteristics of 
technologies that support commercialization by creation of a start-up vs. commercialization 
by licensing to an established firm. Shane concluded that start-ups are used to commercialize 
new technologies that are radical, tacit, early stage, general-purpose, provide significant 
value to customers, involve major technical advances and have strong intellectual property 
protection. Licensing to established firms is used to commercialize new technologies that are 
incremental, codified, late stage, specific-purpose, provide moderate customer value, involve 
minor technical advance and have weaker intellectual property protection. 
Taken together, this research suggests that the characteristics of a technology do affect the 
choice of method used for commercializing the technology. However, there are important 
limitations to the evidence obtained. The primary limitation is that the evidence is derived 
from one large sample from a single university and from a small number of case studies from 
other universities. There is a need for evidence from additional studies and from universities 
other than the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
A number of important issues arise from the research on the characteristics of technology. 
The first is that there is very limited use of theory in any of these studies linking the 
characteristics of technology to the method of commercialization. Secondly, Shane’s research 
found conflicting evidence concerning the impact of the strength of intellectual property 
protection on the choice of method for commercializing the innovation. These issues are 
addressed in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
2.5 Economic theories of organizations 
In order to address the issues raised above, the research described in this thesis draws on the 
literature on economic theories of organizations to provide a theoretical basis for examining 
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methods of commercializing new technologies arising from university research. Two areas of 
literature, in particular, are addressed. The first is the transaction cost theory of organizations. 
The second is the literature on markets for technology. 
Neoclassical economic theory views the firm as a ‘black-box.’ The firm is described as a 
production function that transforms inputs into outputs. It is assumed that firms operate to 
maximize profits but, otherwise, little attention is paid to what happens in these firms 
(Demsetz, 1997; Slater and Spencer, 2000). This view of the firm is useful for studying 
prices and their impact on firms’ outputs and use of resources. It is, however, less useful for 
understanding why firms exist and how they work (Williamson, 2003). Beginning early in 
the last century, researchers began to look into the ‘black box’ of the firm to understand why 
firms exist and how they operate. For example, Coase (1937) asked the question ‘why do 
firms exist?’ and argued that the main reason why firms exist is that there are costs of using 
the pricing system involved in markets. These include the costs of gathering information 
about prices and the costs of negotiating contracts. Collectively, Coase refered to these as 
transaction costs and argued that firms exist because the costs associated with some activities 
may be lower when they are conducted within a single firm than when they are conducted 
through markets.  
Simon (1947) and Cyert and March (1963) examined how decisions are made within firms. 
One important result of their work is the suggestion that the concept of rational decision 
making in neoclassical theory is not feasible. Rational decision-making assumes that the 
decision maker knows all of the alternatives available to them and all of the consequences of 
those alternatives. Simon argued that there are limits to decision maker rationality resulting 
from cognitive limits on the number of alternatives decision makers can consider and 
uncertainty as to the consequences of those alternatives. Simon proposed instead that 
decision makers’ rationality is bounded. Bounded rationality refers to behaviour that is 
“intendedly rational but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv) due to human limits in 
processing information and solving complex problems. Penrose (1959) was concerned with 
the growth of firms and argued that firm growth involves the interaction of management and 
resources and, consequently, that management capability is a key constraint on firm growth 
(Mahoney, 2005). This emphasis on the role of management goes beyond the ‘black box’ 
view of firms. Together, this research leads to the conclusion that it is a “mistake to confuse 
the firm of [neoclassical] economic theory with its real world namesake. The chief mission of 
neoclassical economics is to understand how the price system coordinates the use of 
resources, not the inner workings of real firms” (Demsetz, 1988, p. 189). Over the past 30 
20 
 
years, a number of theories of the firm have been proposed to explain why firms exist and 
how they operate. In the sections that follow one of these theories, transaction cost 
economics theory, is discussed in detail. It is also compared to some of the alternative 
theories of the firm. 
2.6 Transaction cost economics 
The theoretical basis of this thesis is the transaction cost theory of organizations. Transaction 
cost economics is a multidisciplinary approach drawing on economics, organization theory 
and legal concepts (Mahoney, 2005). The basic premise of transaction cost economics is that 
the decision to perform an activity inside or outside the firm should be based on the relative 
efficiency of conducting the activity in these two environments. Transactions should be 
performed inside the firm when the costs of transacting in the market are higher than the 
costs of performing the activity internally. The basic concepts involved in transaction cost 
economics are governance structures, transaction costs and transaction attributes. These are 
discussed in the following sections. 
2.6.1 Governance structures 
Transaction cost economics focuses on the issue of governance structures for firms. Initially 
transaction cost economics dealt primarily with two types of governance structures: markets 
and hierarchies. Market governance refers to situations where transactions are carried on with 
third parties outside the firm through the use of contracts. Hierarchies refer to situations 
where the transactions are internalized so that the economic activities involved in the 
transaction occur within a single firm. The distinguishing feature of hierarchies is that the 
activities are integrated under a single common control. 
Traditional economic analysis views markets as the most efficient approach. However, a 
number of reasons have been identified for market failure. Two primary ones are contractual 
hazards and the needs for adaptation (Mahoney, 2005). Contractual hazards refer to situations 
that make contracting between separate parties risky for at least one of the parties. 
Contractual hazards include situations where one or both parties is dependent on the other 
party and thus in a weak bargaining position (Williamson, 1971) and situations where weak 
property rights exist resulting in the risk that one party will appropriate use of the property 
without paying for it (Libecap, 1989). Contractual hazards are reflected in the two 
behavioural assumptions underlying transaction cost analysis: 1) that decision makers are 
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subject to bounded rationality and 2) that some individuals may act opportunistically 
(Williamson, 1981). Bounded rationality makes it impossible to anticipate all relevant issues 
involved in a complex transaction and deal with them in a contract. Thus contracts with 
outside parties are often incomplete. This incompleteness creates opportunities for the parties 
to act opportunistically. The problems and hazards of dealing with outside parties through 
contracts are greatly increased when parties may act opportunistically, particularly, when the 
parties make “false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or promises” (Goffman, 1969, p. 
105). 
The need for adaptation also creates issues in operating through markets. Some adaptation 
occurs as a result of changes in prices. For example, when gasoline costs increase, a 
manufacturing firm may adapt by changing its distribution methods from truck to rail. This 
type of adaptation, sometimes referred to as autonomous adaptation, is handled well by 
markets (Hayek, 1945). Other types of adaptation involve intended cooperation between 
parties “that kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, purposeful” 
(Barnard, 1938, p. 4). This type of adaptation, sometimes referred to as cooperation 
adaptation, is difficult to achieve through market structures (Williamson, 1991). The 
existence of contractual hazards and the need for adaptation suggest that markets are not 
always the most effective approach and that hierarchy governance structures may be more 
appropriate in some circumstances. 
Each of these governance structures has different attributes. Market governance structures 
provide strong incentives to the individual firms to minimize costs and to adapt quickly to 
changing circumstances in order to maximize their income. These structures are very good at 
adapting to situations where coordination between the parties is not necessary and each can 
act autonomously (i.e., autonomous adaptation). Hierarchies have much weaker incentives 
but have greater administrative controls over activities providing greater abilities to adapt to 
situations requiring coordination between activities (i.e., cooperation adaptation) 
(Williamson, 1991). 
Subsequent to its initial formulation, hybrid forms of governance have been introduced 
into transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1991). Williamson (1991) describes hybrids as 
follows: 
The hybrid mode is located between market and hierarchy with 
respect to incentives, adaptability, and bureaucratic costs. As 
compared with the market, the hybrid sacrifices incentives in 
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favor of superior coordination among the parts. As compared 
with the hierarchy, the hybrid sacrifices cooperativeness in 
favor of greater incentive intensity.” (p. 283) 
Examples of hybrid governance structures include joint ventures (Klein, Frazier and Roth, 
1990) and a variety of other inter-firm alliances (Oxley, 1999). 
The choice of governance structure has consequences for the firm. A firm that adopts a 
hierarchy structure when a market approach is more appropriate will invest resources in 
activities but receive no strategic benefit for doing so. A firm that adopts a market structure 
when a hierarchy structure is more appropriate may find itself in a weak bargaining position 
with another firm that controls certain critical activities or assets with the result that its 
profitability is diminished. In some cases, it may even find that its survival is threatened 
(Teece, 2000). 
2.6.2 Transaction costs 
“A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically 
separable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another begins” (Williamson, 1985, 
p. 1). Transaction costs result from the need to manage these transfers and include the costs 
of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts with outside parties and the costs of 
managing internally governed exchanges (Coase, 1937; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
While transaction costs represent real economic costs, it is difficult to estimate these costs 
reliably in advance of choosing a governance structure and, even after a governance structure 
has been chosen, it is difficult to allocate the costs incurred by the firm to specific 
transactions. Consequently, transaction cost economics focuses on a number of transaction 
attributes that affect transaction costs. 
2.6.3 Transaction attributes 
Transaction cost economics identifies three principal dimensions affecting transaction costs. 
“These key attributes are the frequency with which transactions recur, the uncertainty 
(disturbances) to which transactions are subject, and the degree to which transactions are 
supported by transaction specific assets. A good deal of the explanatory power of transaction 
cost economics turns on this last” (Williamson, 1999, p. 1089). 
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Asset specificity refers “to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative 
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1996a, p. 
59). Asset specificity can take a variety of forms including site-specific, physical, human, 
dedicated assets, brand name capital and temporal (Williamson, 1996a). According to 
transaction cost economics, market governance has high transaction costs when dealing with 
assets of high specificity due to the difficulties resulting from small numbers bargaining 
(Williamson, 1975). “Specific assets trigger a threat of opportunistic behavior that requires 
costly contractual safeguards to deter” (Poppo and Zenger, 1998, p. 853). Thus, it is argued 
that in situations of high asset specificity, more integrated governance forms are preferred as 
they have the lower transaction costs (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
Uncertainty is the second key factor affecting governance approaches in transaction cost 
economics. Uncertainty makes it difficult to contract in the market and increases market 
transaction costs in two ways. Transaction costs are increased as a result of the costs of trying 
to anticipate uncertain events and writing these into the contract. Secondly, costs arise 
because the transactions are maladapted to the environment while the parties adjust to the 
changed circumstances (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Williamson, 1991). Thus, in highly 
uncertain environments, transaction cost economics predicts that more integrated forms of 
governance will be more efficient. Empirical support for this view of uncertainty has been 
mixed. For example, Walker and Weber (1984) found in their study of make or buy decisions 
in the U.S. automotive industry that volume uncertainty was positively related to integrated 
forms of governance while technological uncertainty was negatively (though not 
significantly) related to integrated forms of governance. Klein, et al. (1990) argued that this 
is because uncertainty has a number of dimensions that may impact governance structures 
differently. The two dimensions of uncertainty identified by Klein et al. are volatility and 
diversity. Volatility reflects the speed of change in the environment and diversity reflects the 
number of sources of uncertainty in the environment. Klein et al. argued that higher levels of 
volatility create problems in writing contracts and higher transaction costs for market 
governance structures thus encouraging more integrated forms of governance. Klein et al. 
argued that diversity leads to a desire for flexibility and that market governance structures 
provide this flexibility. Research by Klein et al. (1990) and McNaughton and Bell (2000) 
found some evidence supporting the diversity effect on governance structures but was 
inconclusive on the effect of volatility. 
The frequency of interaction between parties is the third key factor identified in transaction 
cost economics. The argument is that parties that transact frequently have incentives to work 
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more cooperatively and less opportunistically than parties that do not expect to have future 
dealings with each other. Transaction cost economics argues that market contracting is thus 
most efficient when higher frequencies of transactions are expected. 
2.6.4 Discriminating alignment hypothesis 
The concepts of governance structures, transaction costs and transaction attributes are 
brought together in the discriminating alignment hypothesis. “Transactions, which differ in 
their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and 
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way” (Williamson, 
1991, p. 277). The discriminating alignment hypothesis is the basis for most of the empirical 
research on transaction cost economics. Figure 2.2 illustrates this hypothesis. 
 







- frequency  
 
 
2.6.5 Evidence supporting transaction cost economics 
Macher and Richman (2005) identified over 600 empirical studies of aspects of transaction 
cost economics. These studies covered a broad variety of fields and specific applications. In 
evaluating the results of these studies, Macher and Richman concluded the following: 
Taken together, the papers surveyed provide considerable 
support for the main propositions derived from transaction cost 
economic theory. The central hypothesis that governance 
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choice is largely determined by the cost of transacting and that 
these costs are influenced by observable characteristics of the 
underlying transactions receives overwhelming support in our 
assessment. There is also considerable support for many of the 
specific transaction-level factors identified in the theory as 
influencing contracting costs. (p. 35) 
Studies of transaction cost economics involve numerous methodological approaches. 
Common approaches that have been used include focused case studies and studies of 
contracts, statistical analysis of secondary data and statistical analysis using field data 
(Mahoney, 2005).  
The subject areas covered by these studies are quite broad. Vertical integration and long-
term contracting are the subject of many studies. Distribution networks in marketing, 
diversification and the choice of debt versus equity financing in finance have also been 
studied using transaction cost economics (Macher and Richman, 2005). However, little 
research has been done in the application of transaction cost economics to innovation in 
general and the commercialization of university research in particular. The one instance 
identified in the literature where transaction cost economics was applied to the issue of the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research is Shane (2002). In 
this study, Shane argued that licensing to noninventors represents a market form of 
governance and that licensing to inventors represents a hierarchy form of governance. This 
study is described in further detail in sections 2.4.4 and 3.4. 
2.6.6 Criticism of transaction cost economics 
Two major themes recur in the criticisms of transaction cost economics. One theme is that 
the focus on transaction costs is too limited (Grant, 2001). For example, Zajac and Olsen 
(1993) argued that maximizing the total value of the transaction to both participants is a more 
appropriate focus than minimizing the transaction costs to the individual participants. 
Transaction cost economics does emphasize transaction costs over other costs (e.g., 
differences in production costs) and other sources of value (e.g., strategic and learning gains). 
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence discussed above demonstrates that a focus on transaction 
costs can go a long way towards understanding governance structures. Similarly, Holmstron 
and Roberts argued “the theory of the firm … has become too narrowly focused on the hold-
up problem and the role of asset specificity” (1998, p. 91). Much of the empirical testing of 
hypotheses based on transaction cost economics does focus on asset specificity. However, 
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transaction cost economics does not suggest that asset specificity is the only source of 
transaction costs, only that it is an important one (Williamson, 1985). This thesis considers 
sources of transaction costs beyond asset specificity consistent with this criticism (see 
chapter 4). 
The second major criticism of transaction cost economics relates to the underlying 
behavioural assumption of opportunism. Critics argue that, as a result, transaction cost 
economics places too large an emphasis on contractual controls and management fiat and 
underemphasizes the role of trust, social controls and other features of organizations (Connor 
and Prahalad, 1996; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). Responses to this criticism are two-fold. 
First, transaction cost economics does not require that all individuals act opportunistically all 
of the time. Rather, it assumes that some individuals will act opportunistically some of the 
time (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). Secondly, as stated by Williamson (1996b): 
The main purposes served by invoking opportunism are these: 
(a) it avoids the contractual naivete that arises when contract as 
mere promise (unsupported by credible commitments) is 
invoked and (b) it invites the identification, explication, and 
mitigation of hazards that have their origins in opportunism. 
Neither of these require scholars to regard economic agents as 
mean spirited or to behave in a manner unconstrained by 
morality. (p. 50) 
In summary, while there are numerous valid criticisms of transaction cost economics, it has 
remained “a predominant theoretical explanation of boundary choice” (Poppo and Zenger, 
1998, p. 853). 
2.7 Comparison to related theories 
Transaction cost economics is closely related to property rights theory, agency theory and the 
resource-based view of the firm. Table 2.4 provides a brief comparison of some of the major 
features these theories. 
Property rights theory is based on the idea that a transaction involves the exchange of 
property rights (Demsetz, 1967). These property rights include the right to use an asset, the 
right to appropriate returns from an asset and the right to change the form or substance of an 
asset. Under property rights theory, the economic problem is to ensure property rights are 
allocated between firms appropriately in order to maximize wealth (Mahoney, 2005). The  
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Table 2.4 Comparison of transaction cost economics, property rights theory, agency 
theory and the resource based view of the firm 
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unit of analysis in property rights theory is the institution or firm. Property rights theory is 
based on the same human assumptions as transaction cost economics but emphasizes 
different key variables. In property rights theory, these key variables are control rights to the 
property, the extent of sunk cost investments and the complementarity between different 
assets (Hart 1995; Joskow, 1985). Applying property rights theory to the question of how the 
boundaries of a firm should be determined, Hart (1995) argues that firm boundaries are 
chosen to optimally allocate control rights over the property between the parties to the 
transaction. 
Agency theory focuses on the relationship between principals and agents. Agency 
relationships arise when one individual depends on the actions of another. The agent is the 
one taking action and the principal is the individual depending on the agent. Under agency 
theory, the economic problem is to structure the agency relationship to minimize agency 
costs (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). Agency costs include the costs of monitoring the agent, 
bonding expenditures incurred to reassure the principal and the costs resulting from conflicts 
of interest between the principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The unit of analysis 
in agency theory is the contract between the principal and agent. The key variables in agency 
theory are goal conflict, differences in risk preferences between principal and agent, and 
measurement difficulties related to the effort of the agent. Agency theory is focused on the 
separation of ownership and control (Williamson, 1996a). Its indirect application to the 
question of firm boundaries focuses on minimizing agency costs related to the transaction. 
The resource-based view of the firm is based on the idea that competitive advantage is 
derived from the possession of valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable (“VRIN”) 
resources (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). The unit of analysis in the resource-based view is 
routines and bounded rationality is an underlying human assumption. The key variables in 
the resource-based view are the VRIN attributes of resources. Applied to the question of firm 
boundaries, the resource-based view focuses on the acquisition of those resources that are 
needed to support a firm’s competence and strategic direction and the disposition of those 
resources that are not needed even though the resulting governance choices may not be the 
most efficiency when viewed on a transaction by transaction basis (Tsang 2000). A closely 
related theory to the resource-based view is the dynamic capabilities view. It builds on the 
resource-based view and focuses on the ability of firms to generate new capabilities or 
resources that have the VRIN attributes. Specifically, dynamic capabilities are defined as 
“the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997, p. 516). 
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2.7.1 Competing or complementary theories 
Much of the literature on theories of the firms views these theories as competing theories 
where one is correct and the others incorrect (see, for example, the debates in Connor and 
Prahalad, 1996; Foss, 1996; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Perrow, 
1986; Williamson, 1996b). In recent years, a number of researchers have begun to look at the 
theories of the firm as complementary rather than as competing (Schilling and Steensma, 
2002; Silverman, 1999; Steensma and Corley, 2001). Steensma and Corley (2001) 
characterized this view as asking ‘when does each theory apply?’ rather than ‘which theory is 
correct?’ Silverman (1999) integrated ideas from transaction cost economics with the 
resource-based view in looking at decisions of firms to diversify into other industries and 
concluded that “while conflicts between the two theories do exist, the strong 
complementarities between them should not be ignored” (p. 1123). Steensma and Corley 
(2001) and Schilling and Steensma (2002) looked at technology-sourcing decisions and 
found that transaction cost economics, the resource-based view and an options perspective 
play complementary roles in the choice of firm boundaries. This view that different theories 
of the firm are complementary is the one adopted in this thesis. While transaction cost 
economics is the primary lens used to view boundary choice decisions, other lenses are 
considered where they are helpful in understanding the specific circumstances of 
commercializing new technologies arising from university research. 
2.7.2 Basis for choice of transaction cost economics 
This thesis addresses the issue of how new technologies arising from university research are 
commercialized. More specifically, it is concerned with the question of how the activities 
involved in commercializing a new technology should be organized. Transaction cost 
economics was selected as the primary theoretical basis for this research because it most 
directly relates to the choice of firm boundaries. Boundary choice “focuses on the operating 
parts and asks which activities should be performed within the firm, and which outside it, and 
why” (Williamson, 1981, p. 549). The other theories discussed above have implications for 
the choice of firm boundaries but are primarily focused on other issues. The unit of analysis 
in transaction cost economics, the transaction, is also well suited to the study of the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. Commercializing a 
new technology involves technology development, product development (Shane, 2004) and 
supporting activities such as manufacturing, distribution and marketing. Thus, there are a 
number of distinct activities that need to be coordinated either through markets or hierarchies 
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(i.e., we have transactions). Nonetheless, as indicated earlier, insights from other theories will 
be considered in developing the hypotheses tested in this thesis. 
2.8 Special issues related to commercializing new technologies 
2.8.1 The nature of innovation 
Due to issues of potentially weak property rights and the need for responsiveness to changing 
conditions, Williamson (1991) suggests that transaction cost economics not be applied 
uncritically to the special issues of commercializing new technologies though he suggests 
that the general framework is applicable. The work of Teece has been particularly important 
in looking at governance structures involving the commercialization of new technologies. 
Teece (1986) identifies the appropriability of a technology and the requirement for 
specialized complementary assets, such as manufacturing capabilities and distribution 
networks, as two key factors in the choice of governance structures for commercializing new 
technologies. The work of Teece and others also suggests that the need to coordinate various 
tasks in the innovation process can result in significant transaction costs if a market 
governance structure is adopted (Teece, 1996, Arora et al., 2001). Teece (1986) suggests that 
the choice of governance structure is a critical factor in determining how much of the profit 
from a new technology is captured by the inventor. 
Teece (2000) also specifically considers the issues facing an individual inventor. These 
situations are similar to that facing an academic researcher/university in commercializing a 
new technology arising from university research since universities are not in the business of 
producing commercial goods or services and lack the complementary assets needed to 
commercialize the new technologies developed through university research (Shane, 2004b). 
Teece (2000) identifies the following alternatives open to the individual inventor: 
(1) licensing the technology to incumbent firms who already 
have the necessary complementary assets in place; (2) using 
intellectual property as collateral to raise debt funds to 
establish an organization to exploit the technology; (3) 
exchanging the patent for equity in a new venture-funded firm; 
(4) exchanging the intellectual property for cash or equity in an 
established firm. (p. 55) 
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The first of these options represents a market governance structure while the other three 
represent hierarchy governance structures (see section 2.6.1). 
2.8.2 Markets for technology 
The discussion on governance structures presumes the existence of effective markets. In the 
case of the commercialization of new technologies arising from university research, this 
means effective markets for technology. Markets for technology are markets for “intellectual 
property that is licensed and its close substitutes” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1995, p. 8). 
Markets for technology represent a method for firms to acquire the right to use a new 
technology and are an alternative to developing the new technology in house. In the case of 
commercializing new technologies arising from university research, markets for technology 
allow the university/researcher to sell certain rights to a new technology to firms that will put 
the technology into use by producing new products or services based on the innovation or by 
using the technology in their production or other processes. 
A number of difficulties to having effective markets for technology have been identified 
(Teece, 1986). These difficulties are the result of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
(Shane, 2003). The nature of information creates problems in transferring information 
between parties that do not exist in transferring goods or services. In the absence of 
intellectual property protection, if an owner of information discloses that information to a 
prospective buyer, the buyer now knows the information and no longer has a need to bargain 
for access to it. But if the owner of the information does not disclose it, the potential buyer 
cannot evaluate the value of it and, consequently, will not be willing to pay for information 
which may turn out to be worthless to him (Arrow, 1962). Arrow’s paradox of disclosure 
results from the combined effect of information asymmetry and the difficulties in protecting 
intellectual property and implies that information that lacks legal protection cannot be sold 
through markets. 
The high level of uncertainty related to new technologies also creates problems in the 
market. One source of this uncertainty relates to the technical development of the technology. 
The research by Thursby, Jensen and Thursby (2001) discussed earlier in this chapter (see 
section 2.4.3) shows the early stage of development of most university inventions. A second 
source of uncertainty relates to whether markets exist for products or services derived from 
the technology (Shane, 2004). These high levels of uncertainty make it difficult for 
prospective buyers to evaluate the technology. The uncertainties also create bargaining 
32 
 
problems as the seller of the technology will often have a significantly different view of the 
value of the technology than a potential buyer (Shane, 2003). 
Despite the challenges of transacting through markets for technology, there is evidence that 
markets for technology exist and are becoming increasing important. Chesbrough (2003) 
argues that we have entered a world of ‘open innovation’ where firms increasingly look 
outside the boundaries of the firm to acquire new technologies from other firms and to 
transfer to other firms technologies they have invented that do not fit their business plans. 
One of the reasons Chesbrough cites for this change is the emergence of external options for 
ideas that are not commercialized by the firm where they are invented (i.e., the emergence of 
markets for technology). 
Arora et al. (2001) argue that markets for technology improve the efficency of the 
innovation process by allowing for the division of innovative labour. Firms can specialize in 
whatever components of the innovation process they have comparative advantage in. For 
some, this may be research and development activities that lead to the invention and 
development of new technologies. For others, this may be in the production and sale of goods 
and services derived from these new technologies. Arora et al. found evidence that markets 
for technology do, in fact, exist and are growing in importance. The worldwide market for 
technologies is estimated at US$35-50 billion annually and is growing (Arora et al., 2001). 
Gans and Stern (2003) examined how the emergence of markets for technology affects the 
commercialization strategies available to technology entrepreneurs. They argue that inventors 
have two strategic options available to them. They can compete in the product market by 
developing, producing and selling goods or services based on the technology or they can 
compete in the ‘market for ideas’ by transferring rights to their technology to established 
firms who operate in the product market selling products or services based on the technology. 
Gans and Stern argue that the two key factors affecting this strategic choice are the ability of 
the firm to exclude others from copying the technology and the firm’s position relative to any 
specialized complementary assets needed to commercialize the technology. 
2.9 Summary 
The literature on the commercialization of university research and the literature on economic 
theories of the firm suggest a number of implications for the commercialization of new 
technologies. First, governance structures seem to be important for the successful 
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commercialization of new technologies. Nonetheless, a focus on governance structures has 
been absent in the literature on the commercialization of new technologies arising from 
university research with the exception of a brief mention by Shane (2002). 
Second, the choice of governance structures is affected by transaction attributes. Under 
transaction cost economics theory, these attributes are the existence of specialized assets, 
uncertainty and frequency. Looking more specifically at the commercialization of new 
technologies, key transaction attributes that have been identified are the ability to exclude 
others from using the technology and access to specialized complementary assets. 
Third, in applying transaction cost economics to the commercialization of new 
technologies, it is important to consider carefully the governance structures that may arise in 
this specific environment, the specific attributes of new technologies that may affect 
transaction costs and the ramifications of selecting specific governance structures in light of 
these specific attributes. That is, it is important to tailor the application of transaction cost 
economics to the specifics of the situation being considered (Williamson, 2002). 
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Chapter 3 
Build, Rent and Sell – Governance Structures for Commercializing 
New Technologies 
In this chapter, difficulties with the traditional approach to classifying the methods used to 
commercialize new technologies arising from university research (licensing vs. start-up) are 
identified and a proposal for a new method of categorization that links to the concept of 
governance structures discussed in the preceding chapter is presented. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, problems with the licensing vs. start-up 
dichotomy are identified. Then, a new method of categorization is proposed. The rationale 
for the proposed new method is discussed and criteria for the categories are developed. 
Finally, the benefits of the proposed categorization scheme are presented. 
3.1 Limitations of the licensing vs. start-up approach for analyzing methods of 
commercialization 
Section 2.4.1 describes the existing literature on the use of licensing and start-ups as 
categories for analyzing the methods used to commercialize new technologies arising from 
university research. In this section, some of the more significant limitations of this system for 
categorizing the methods used to commercialize university research are described and why 
these limitations are important is indicated.  
The primary limitation of the licensing vs. start-up system is that it reflects the legal form 
rather than the substance of the method used to commercialize the technology. Licenses 
represent an “agreement … between two parties, where the owner of the technology 
(licensor) permits the other party (licensee) to share the rights to use the technology” 
(AUTM, 2004, p. 42, emphasis added). The extent of the sharing of these rights to use the 
technology can vary widely. Licensing a technology on a non-exclusive basis to a number of 
firms with the researcher/university continuing to develop and market the technology 
represents a limited form of sharing. In these cases, the researcher/university retains the 
majority of the risks and benefits of ownership of the technology. These benefits include the 
ability to benefit from future development of the technology and the risks include the risk of 
technological obsolescence. Licensing the technology on an exclusive basis to an established 
firm for substantially all of the economic life of the technology with the researcher/university 
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retaining no rights to ownership of improvements in the technology represents a very 
different form of sharing of the rights to the technology. In these cases, the 
researcher/university transfers the majority of the risks and benefits of ownership of the 
technology to the licensee. It is the licensee who benefits from future development of the 
technology and incurs the risk of technological obsolescence. In these cases, the 
researcher/university has, in substance, sold the technology to the licensee. This discussion 
demonstrates that the license vs. start-up classification scheme, by focusing on the legal form 
of the transaction, fails to capture the substance of the method used to commercialize the 
technology. Shane (2002) recognizes this limitation, in part, when he identifies that licensing 
to inventors typically represents, in substance, the creation of a start-up company. 
A second limitation of the licensing and start-up categories is that they are not distinct. For 
example, a start-up firm founded by a researcher may need to license the technology from his 
or her university if the university holds the intellectual property rights to the technology. This 
situation involves both creation of a start-up firm and licensing. 
Third, the categories are not comprehensive. Most of the discussion of start-ups focuses on 
start-ups that develop new products or services based on the technology. As indicated in 
section 2.8.2, this is not the only way that start-ups can commercialize an invention. Start-ups 
can commercialize new technologies either through the product market or the market for 
technologies. The product market refers to situations where the start-up launches a product 
based on the technology. The market for technologies refers to situations where the start-up 
commercializes the technology by “identifying and executing agreements with other firms – 
usually incumbents – who serve as conduits for commercializing technology to the product 
market” (Gans and Stern, 2003, p. 336). These agreements often take the form of licensing 
arrangements. Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001) emphasize the emergence in recent 
years of markets for technologies as an important method of commercializing new 
technologies. However, little attention has been paid in the literature on university 
technology transfer to start-ups that compete through the market for technologies. These 
start-ups face a different set of risks than do start-ups in the product market. Specifically, 
they do not face the risks associated with acquiring the skills and complementary assets, such 
as manufacturing capabilities and distribution networks, needed to commercialize the 
technology but face the contracting hazards that exist in markets for technologies (Arora, 
Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003). These start-ups face risks similar to 
those faced by university technology transfer offices attempting to license new technologies 
to existing firms and very different from those faced by start-ups in the product market. 
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Rambus Inc. is a firm founded by two university professors that “designs, develops and 
markets chip-to-chip interface solutions that enhance the performance and cost-effectiveness 
of its customers' chip and system products” (Rambus, 2002, p. 1). Rambus does not 
manufacture chips rather it “sell[s] licenses to semiconductor and system companies who 
then incorporate our interface products into their chips and systems” (Rambus, 2002, p. 2). 
Rambus is an example of a start-up that operates in the market for technologies rather than in 
the product market. Certicom and Senesco, described in the chapter 6, are also examples of 
start-ups that operate in the market for technologies. The licensing vs. start-up approach does 
not recognize the differences in start-ups that operate in markets for products compared to 
those that operate in markets for technology. 
An objective of this thesis is to better understand which methods of commercialization are 
appropriate for a particular new technology. Is there a free choice as to how to commercialize 
(i.e., are all choices equal?) or do certain methods suit certain technologies? If the latter is the 
case, it is important to understand and recognize the substance of these methods. As 
illustrated above, the licensing vs. start-up system of diverse, indistinct and non-
comprehensive categories does not do this. Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive 
framework that 1) reflects the substance rather than the legal form of commercialization 
activities, 2) reflects the variety of approaches to commercializing university research (e.g., 
creation of new firms, sale of technology to existing firms), and 3) reflects multiple methods 
of commercialization (i.e., does not just subdivide either the start-up or licensing categories). 
In the next section, a classification approach that attempts to address these issues is proposed. 
3.2 Build, rent or sell: A proposed categorization scheme 
To address the issues identified above, the following typology for categorizing the methods 
used to commercialize new technologies arising from university research is proposed. The 
descriptions that follow are from the perspective of the university/researcher rather than from 
the perspective of the firm that commercializes the technology. It is proposed that there are 
three primary methods of commercializing new technologies arising from university 
research: 1) Build – creating a new business based on the technology, 2) Rent – ongoing 
development and marketing of the technology to established firms that use the technology in 
their businesses and 3) Sell – disposition of the technology to an established firm. 
The build option involves the creation of a new business based on the technology and 
reflects situations where the technology forms the basis for the development of a new firm to 
37 
 
exploit the invention. This new firm acquires or develops the complementary assets needed 
to commercialize the technology. 
The rent option involves ongoing development and marketing of the technology to firms 
that use the technology in their business and reflects situations where the right to use 
technology is ‘rented,’ typically through a licensing arrangement, to firms to use in their 
businesses for a fee. The university/researcher retains ownership of the technology and is 
often involved in enhancing the technology so that it can continue to mine the technology for 
additional revenues. Often, the technology is rented to more than one firm. 
The sell option involves disposition of the technology to an established firm and reflects 
situations where the technology is ‘sold’ to an existing firm. The established firm typically 
has the complementary assets needed to commercialize the technology. The technology may 
be sold outright or licensed on an exclusive basis so that the licensee obtains substantially all 
of the risks and benefits of ownership of the technology. The university/research typically 
retains no ongoing rights to the technology or its future enhancements.  
The build option differs from the rent option in that building involves developing and 
selling products or services based on the technology while renting involves selling rights to 
use the technology to others who develop and sell products based on the technology (i.e., the 
build option operates through the product market while the rent option operates through the 
market for technologies). The build option differs from the sell option in that, in the build 
option, the technology forms the core around which a new business is formed while, in the 
sell option, the technology supplements an existing business. The difference between the rent 
option and the sell option is analogous to selling the fruit of a tree versus selling the tree. The 
rent option is similar to selling the fruit of a tree. The technology (the tree) continues to be 
grown and harvested by the university/researcher while limited rights to use the technology 
(the fruit) are sold to one or more firms. The sell option is similar to selling the tree. The 
university/researcher retains no ongoing economic interest in the technology. 
3.3 Examples of build, rent and sell approaches to commercialization 
Each of the build, rent and sell options can be implemented using various legal structures 
such as licensing arrangements and the creation of start-up companies. For example, the 
Association of University Technology Manager’s Licensing Survey for 2003 indicates that 
12.9% of licenses were to start-up firms (AUTM, 2004). A large of number of these start-ups 
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are likely to be involved in developing new products or services based on the technologies 
(i.e., they are commercializing the technology using the build option). DALSA, described in 
chapter 6, is an example of a start-up using the build option.  
The rent option may be implemented through non-exclusive licensing such as with the 
Waterloo Emitter™ for the bio-enhanced remediation of contaminated groundwater 
(University of Waterloo, 2005) but also may involve the use of intermediaries (Arora et al., 
2001) and start-up companies. Rambus, described in section 3.1, and Certicom, described in 
chapter 6, are examples of such start-up companies. 
An example of the sell option involving licensing is Florida State University’s exclusive 
license of a patented process for the synthesis of the anticancer drug Taxol to Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (Eisenstein and Resnick, 2001). Genetech Inc., a start-up company founded in 1976, 
operated using a sell model in its early years though it has since become a fully integrated 
pharmaceutical company. Genentech’s first two discoveries, human insulin and Factor VIII, 
were licensed to pharmaceutical companies who manufactured and marketed drugs based on 
these discoveries (Genentech, 2005). Senesco, described in chapter 6, is also an example of a 
start-up using the sell option. 
These examples illustrate that the build, rent and sell options can be implemented in a 
variety of legal forms and, therefore, reaffirm the importance of having a categorization 
scheme that reflects the economic substance of these transactions rather than their legal form. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics of the build, rent and sell options; and the examples 
described in this section. 
3.4 Rationale for build, rent and sell categories 
The rationale for the build, rent and sell categories is based on the application on the concept 
of governance structures discussed in section 2.6.1 to the specific circumstances of the 
commercialization of university research.  
In applying transaction cost economics to the commercialization of university research, it 
is necessary to identify the transaction involved and the possible governance structures. “A 
transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable 
interface. One stage of activity terminates and another begins” (Williamson, 1985, p. 1). In 
the commercialization of university research, the transaction is the transfer of a new 
technology from a research setting to a commercialization setting. This transaction involves 
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two groups of related activities and their supporting assets. One activity is the development 
of the technology and the assets supporting this activity include codified information 
concerning the innovation, related intellectual property rights and the tacit know-how of the 
researcher. The other activity is the production and delivery of products based on the 
technology. The operating assets for this activity consist of the complementary assets needed 
to commercialize the technology. Manufacturing capabilities and distribution networks are 
examples of the other complementary assets needed to put technological innovations into 
commercial use (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptions, characteristics and examples of the build, rent and sell 
options 
 Build Rent Sell 
Description Create a new 
business based on 
the invention 
Market the 
technology to other 
firms who will use it 
in their business 
Dispose of the 
technology to a firm 
who will use it in its 
business 
 
Characteristics Technology is the 
key source of 
competitive 
advantage for the 
new business. 
Complementary 
assets need to be 
acquired or 
developed 
Technology is made 
available through 
the markets for 
technology to 
established firms 
that develop new 
products or services 
based on the 
technology  
The acquiring firm 
incorporates the 
technology into its 
existing business 
Examples: Many of the 12.9% 
of all licenses that 








Process for the 
synthesis of Taxol 






The build, rent and sell categories reflect differences in organizational form. Market 
governance refers to situations where transactions are carried on with third parties outside the 
firm through the use of contracts and, in this case, reflects situations where the 
university/researcher, who retains ownership of the technology, and third parties, who own 
the complementary assets needed to produce products and services based on the technology, 
transact through the use of contracts, often non-exclusive licensing arrangements. The rent 
option represents a market form of governance. Hierarchies refer to situations where the 
transactions are internalized so that the economic activities involved in the transaction occur 
within a single firm. In both the build and sell options, the technology and the 
complementary assets required to commercialize the technology are brought together in a 
single firm. In the build option, they are brought together in a newly created firm while in the 
sell option they are brought together in an established firm. Figure 3.1 depicts the differing 
organizational structures involved in the build, rent and sell options. 
This examination of governance structures reinforces the concerns with the licensing vs. 
start-up view of the methods of commercialization. It is difficult to link the licensing vs. 
start-up dichotomy to the literature on markets and hierarchies. These difficulties relate 
primarily to the fact that the licensing and start-up categories do not align well with the 
market and hierarchy governance structures. Shane (2002) recognizes this difficulty by 
arguing that licensing to firms founded by inventors represents, in substance, a hierarchy 
governance structure rather than a market one (i.e., that licensing cannot always be equated 
with a market governance structure). Similarly, Rambus and Certicom are start-up firms but 
ones that operate through a market governance structure with the established firms that put 
their technologies into use. In these cases, commercialization by a start-up firm cannot be 
equated with a hierarchy governance structure. In summary, these examples show that a 
simple ‘licensing = market, start-up = hierarchy’ model does not adequately reflect the 
complexities that exist in the business models used to commercialize new technologies 
arising from university research. 
3.5 Criteria distinguishing the build, rent and sell categories 
For the build, rent and sell categories to be useful, it must be possible to uniquely place the 
commercialization of a particular technology into one of these categories. Two criteria are 
proposed for doing so. The first criterion is whether a new firm or an established firm 
commercializes the technology. Commercialization by a new firm involves a different set of 
risks than those faced by an established firm commercializing a technology (Teece, 1996). 
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These risks include the problems of acquiring the skills (Shane, 2002) and complementary 
assets (Teece, 1986) necessary to commercialize the technology. 
 
Figure 3.1 Governance structures of the build, rent and sell options 
 Build  – hierarchy governance structure 
Innovation Complementary assets 
New firm 
Rent  – market governance structure 
Innovation Complementary assets 
Innovation Complementary assets 
University/researcher Established firm 





The second criterion relates to the ownership of the property rights to the technology. The 
ownership of the property rights can be evaluated based on “three elements: (a) the right to 
use the asset …, (b) the right to appropriate returns from the asset …, and (c) the right to 
change the asset’s form and/or substance” (Williamson, 1991, p. 287). Some rights to use the 
technology will always be held by the commercializing firm. Otherwise, it would be unable 
to commercialize the technology. The right to use a technology also implies the right to 
exclude others from using the technology. A firm that controls ownership of a technology has 
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the right to exclude others from using the technology. Thus the right to exclude others from 
using the technology is an important consideration in assessing the ownership of the property 
rights to the technology. The right to appropriate returns from the technology will be shared 
in some form between the university/researcher and the commercializing firm. This sharing 
may take the form of fixed payments, payments dependent on use of the technology (e.g., 
running royalties), equity in the commercializing firm or some combination of these. This 
sharing varies in nature from fixed contractually determined amounts though to residual 
returns (i.e., the profit resulting from the sale of the products after all expenses). Retention of 
residual returns by the university/researcher suggests that they have retained the majority of 
the rights to appropriate returns while fixed returns suggest that they have transferred the 
majority of the rights to appropriate returns to the commercializing firm. The right to change 
the technology’s form and/or substance reflects the university’s/researcher’s rights to benefit 
from further enhancements of the technology. (e.g., to develop and patent improvements or 
enhancements to the technology). If the university/researcher retains the rights to benefit 
from future enhancements of the technology, this is evidence that they have retained 
ownership of the property rights to the technology. An overall evaluation of these three 
elements leads to an assessment of whether the university/research, or a firm created by them 
to market the technology to established firms, have retained the majority of the property 
rights to the technology or whether they have transferred the majority of the property rights 
to the commercializing firm. 
Table 3.2 summarizes how these criteria relate to the three proposed categories of 
commercialization. The table also makes clear that each proposed category represents a 
unique combination of the three criteria. 
Together these criteria specify three distinct governance structures for commercializing 
technologies. The build model reflects a hierarchy governance structure where the 
technology forms the core of the business and the complementary assets needed to 
commercialize the technology are acquired by the new business. The rent model reflects a 
market governance structure where the technology and the complementary assets needed to 
commercialize it are held in two (or more) separate firms transacting through markets for 
technology. The sell model reflects a hierarchy structure where the technology is sold to and 
incorporated into an existing firm that has the complementary assets needed to 




Table 3.2 Criteria for the build, rent and sell options 
 Build Rent Sell 
Criteria:    
1) Firm that 
commercializes the 
technology 
New firm Established firm(s) Established firm 
2) Ownership of 




Majority retained by 
inventor/university or 
a firm created by 




Governance structure Hierarchy Market Hierarchy 
 
3.6 Implications and benefits of the build, rent or sell approach 
The build, rent or sell approach has a number of implications and benefits for understanding 
the commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. First, the 
approach is easily reconcilable to the broader literature on commercializing innovations. For 
example, Teece (2000) identifies the following four options available to independent 
inventors and stand-alone laboratories:  
(1) licensing the technology to incumbent firms who already 
have the necessary complementary assets in place; (2) using 
intellectual property as collateral to raise debt funds to 
establish an organization to exploit the technology; (3) 
exchanging the patent for equity in a new venture-funded firm; 
(4) exchanging the intellectual property for cash or equity in an 
established firm. (p. 55) 
The first of these options is comparable to the rent option; the second and third options are 
comparable to the build option and the fourth option is comparable to the sell option. Teece 
argues that appropriability conditions and control of complementary assets are the key factors 
in determining which of these options is preferable in a particular circumstance. 
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The build, rent or sell approach also better reflects the ideas of markets and hierarchies 
than does the licensing vs. start-up approach. The focus on governance structures enables 
researchers to draw on the extensive literature on markets and hierarchies and on the 
literature on markets for technology (see sections 2.6.5 and 2.8.2) to study the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. This is done in 
chapter 4 where transaction cost economics theory is used to develop hypotheses related to 
the methods of commercializing university research. It is significant to note that the 
hypotheses developed from the proposed approach differ in important ways from those 
developed using the licensing vs. start-up dichotomy. For example, there are a significant 
number of licensing arrangements that will be identified as hierarchy governance structures 
using the proposed approach. The Association of University Technology Manager’s 
Licensing Survey for 2003 indicates that 87% of licenses were to existing companies (52.5% 
of licenses were to small companies and 34.5% of licenses were to large companies). A 
significant number of these licenses (35% of licenses to large companies and 43% of licenses 
to small companies) are exclusive (AUTM, 2004). Many of these licenses will be classified 
as sell transactions resulting in a hierarchy governance structure using the proposed 
approach. These licenses are grouped with other licensing arrangements and considered 
market governance structures under the licensing vs. start-up approach. 
An important third benefit of the proposed approach is that it captures the governance 
structure in place at the time when the invention is commercialized. The licensing vs. start-up 
approach focuses on the point in time when a technology leaves the university. However, 
there is evidence that significant time can pass between the point when a technology leaves 
the university and when it is commercialized (see section 2.4.3). The licensing vs. start-up 
approach fails to take into account the significant changes that can occur between the time a 
technology leaves the university setting and when it is put into commercial use. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, difficulties with the licensing vs. start-up dichotomy were identified and a 
proposal for a new method of categorization that takes into account the variety of methods of 
commercialization was developed. In the next chapter, this approach is used to generate a 
number of hypotheses relating the characteristics of new technologies arising from university 




In this chapter, the hypotheses that will be tested are developed. Two sets of hypotheses are 
proposed in this chapter. The first set is related to firm characteristics associated with the 
strategic governance choices of build, rent or sell. The second set of hypotheses relate to the 
link between certain characteristics of new technologies (i.e., transaction attributes) and the 
strategic governance choices made in their commercialization. 
4.1 Hypotheses related to governance choices and firm characteristics 
The build, rent and sell typology of governance choices proposed in chapter 3 is derived from 
theory related to the concepts of markets and hierarchies. While this typology has a strong 
theoretical basis, it must also be anchored in empirical experience to be useful (Meyer, Tsui 
and Hinings, 1993). Accordingly, hypotheses are derived that link the theoretical 
classifications to specific firm characteristics. These characteristics relate to the markets the 
firms derive their revenue from and how they allocate their resources. 
4.1.1 Revenue sources 
As discussed in section 2.8.2, firms may operate in markets for products or markets for 
technology (Arora et al., 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003; Giuri and Luzzi, 2005). It is expected 
that the strategic governance choice made in commercializing a new technology will affect 
the extent to which a firm operates in each of these markets. When the build option is used to 
commercialize a technology, a new firm is created to produce goods or services based on the 
new technology. Therefore, it is expected that the new firm will derive its revenue primarily 
from product market activities. Revenue from product market activity includes revenue from 
sales of products; long-term contracts for the provision of products or services; services and 
support; and software products. When the rent option is used to commercialize a technology, 
the technology is marketed to established firms who use it in their business. Similarly, when 
the sell option is used to commercialize a technology, the technology is disposed of to an 
established firm that uses it in its business. In both the rent and sell situations, the established 
firm(s) that commercialize the technology are expected to derive their revenue primarily 
from the product market while the university/inventor, or a firm created by them for the 
purpose of marketing the technology to other firms, is expected to derive its revenue 
primarily from technology market activity. Revenue from technology market activity is 
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revenue that is derived from intellectual property (U.S. Department of Justice, 1995). This 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: The build option is positively associated with new firms 
created to commercialize technologies deriving revenue 
primarily from product market activity. 
H1b: The rent and sell options are positively associated with 
new firms created to commercialize technologies deriving 
revenue primarily from technology market activity. 
4.1.2 Allocation of resources 
The allocation of internal resources between different business activities is a critical element 
in implementing a firm’s strategy (Porter, 1980). Therefore, it is expected that a firm’s 
strategic governance choice will affect the allocation of resources to certain business 
activities. As discussed in section 2.4.3, most new technologies arising from university 
research are at an early stage. Consequently, technology development and follow-on product 
development are important activities in commercializing a new technology (Shane, 2004). 
Technology development activity is reflected in a firm’s spending on research and 
development activities. Once products have been developed, they need to be produced and 
sold in product markets. Consequently, the production of goods and services based on the 
new technology is another significant business activity involved in the commercialization of 
a new technology. 
The build option involves a hierarchy governance structure where both the technology 
development activities and production activities are expected to be performed by the new 
firm created to commercialize the technology. The rent option involves a market governance 
structure where the technology development activities are expected to be performed by the 
university/inventor, or a firm created by them for the purpose of marketing the technology to 
other firms, and the production activities are expected to be performed by the established 
firms that produce goods or services based on the technology. When the sell option is used to 
commercialize a new technology, the university/inventor, or a firm created by them for the 
purpose of marketing the technology to other firms, is expected to perform the technology 
development activities up to the point when the technology is disposed of to an established 
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firm. The established firm is expected to perform any subsequent technology development 
activity and the production activity. This analysis leads to the following hypotheses: 
H2a: The build option is positively associated with new firms 
created to commercialize technologies expending resources on 
both technology development activities and production 
activities. 
H2b: The rent and sell options are positively associated with 
new firms created to commercialize technologies expending 
resources on technology development activities but not on 
production activities. 
4.2 Hypotheses related to transaction attributes 
The basic premise of transaction cost economics is that the decision to perform an activity 
inside or outside the firm should be based on the relative efficiency of conducting the activity 
in these two environments. Transactions should be performed inside the firm when the costs 
of transacting in the market are higher than the costs of performing the activity internally. 
These transaction costs include the costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts 
with outside parties and the costs of managing internally governed exchanges (Coase, 1937; 
Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Transaction cost economics identifies three principal dimensions 
affecting transaction costs. These are the extent to which the transaction involves transaction 
specific assets, uncertainty related to the transaction and the frequency with which 
transactions recur (Williamson, 1999). 
Asset specificity refers “to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative 
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1996a, p. 
59). According to transaction cost economics, market governance has high transaction costs 
when dealing with assets of high specificity (Williamson, 1975). “Specific assets trigger a 
threat of opportunistic behavior that requires costly contractual safeguards to deter” (Poppo 
and Zenger, 1998, p. 853). Thus, in situations of high asset specificity, more integrated 
governance forms are preferred as they have the lower transaction costs (Poppo and Zenger, 
1998). In the commercialization of new technologies arising from university research, the 
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two primary issues of asset specificity relate to the appropriability of the technology and the 
requirement for specialized complementary assets. 
4.2.1 Appropriability of the technology 
Appropriability relates to how easily and quickly potential competitors can imitate a 
technology. Winter (2000) identifies four mechanisms of appropriability: 1) patents and 
related legal protection, 2) secrecy, 3) lead time and 4) control of complementary assets. 
Strong intellectual property protection makes it more difficult to imitate an innovation 
(Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1991). “When … poorly protected intellectual capital … [is] at 
issue, pure market arrangements expose the parties to recontracting hazards or appropriability 
hazards. In such circumstances, hierarchical control structures may work better than pure 
arms-length contracts” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997, p. 522). Where patents and related 
legal protection are strong, the legal safeguards provided mitigate the threat of opportunistic 
behavior. This suggests that strong patents or other legal protection support the 
commercialization of technologies using a market governance structure (i.e., the rent option). 
Empirical support for this relationship was found by Oxley (1999) who examined technology 
transfer alliances between U.S. and non-U.S. firms and found that, when intellectual property 
protection was weak, firms adopted more hierarchical governance structures. This leads to 
the following hypothesis. 
H3: The greater the patent or other legal protection for the 
technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will 
be commercialized using the rent option. 
Secrecy is another method of keeping others from appropriating the benefits of the 
technology. Secrecy requires that information about the technology be kept secret and, 
therefore, opportunities for trading in markets for technologies are limited if secrecy is to be 
maintained. Two elements that make it easier to maintain secrecy and more difficult for other 
firms to transfer and imitate a technology are high levels of tacitness and complexity in the 
knowledge inherent in the technology (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Tacit knowledge 
refers to knowledge that cannot be easily communicated and shared (Simonin, 1999). 
“Complexity is usually defined according to dimensions that increase the difficulty of 
comprehending how a system (i.e., an organization, organism, device) functions or produces 
some outcome. Simon (1962) defines a complex system as one that consists of many unique 
and interacting elements, which have equally important effects on the outcomes produced by 
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the system.” (McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002, p. 289). Complexity requires coordination to 
enable rapid adjustment as components change over time. This is facilitated by hierarchical 
governance structures better than by market governance structures (Chesbrough and 
Kusonoki, 2001). Therefore, high levels of tacitness and complexity suggest that the 
technology be commercialized through a hierarchical governance structure (i.e., either the 
build or sell options). 
H4a: The greater the tacitness of the knowledge inherent in a 
technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will 
be commercialized using the build or sell options. 
H4b: The greater the complexity of the knowledge inherent in a 
technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will 
be commercialized using the build or sell options. 
Lead time reflects the fact that the threat of appropriability can be reduced even without 
patent or other legal protection or secrecy if there exists a lead time before substitute 
technologies can be developed. However, because lead times before substitutes appear are 
limited in duration, it is important to maximize the returns from the technology in the time 
before substitutes appear. A market governance structure facilitates this by making the 
technology available to multiple established firms who have the manufacturing and 
distribution capabilities to bring products based on the technology to market quickly. 
H5: The greater the risk of substitutes, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the 
rent option. 
4.2.2 Complementary assets 
The complementary assets needed to commercialize the technology may be generic or 
specialized to the invention (Teece, 1986). Assets that are specialized to the technology 
increase the transaction costs of market governance. Therefore, the rent option is likely to be 
less effective when specialized complementary assets are needed to commercialize the 
technology as it involves a market governance structure. Furthermore, Teece (1986) and 
Gans and Stern (2003) suggest that situations where specialized complementary assets are 
required to commercialize the technology pose significant hazards to new firms attempting to 
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compete with the existing firms that control these specialized complementary assets. This is 
the situation faced when the build option is used to commercialize a new technology. This 
suggests that the sell option is likely to be most effective when specialized complementary 
assets are required to commercialize the technology. 
H6: The greater the importance of specialized complementary 
assets, the greater the likelihood that the technology will be 
commercialized using the sell option. 
4.2.3 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is the second key dimension affecting transaction costs. Uncertainty makes it 
difficult to contract in markets for technology and increases market transaction costs in two 
ways. Transaction costs are increased as a result of the costs of trying to anticipate uncertain 
events and writing these into the contract. Secondly, costs arise because the transactions are 
maladapted to the environment while the parties adjust to the changed circumstances (Poppo 
and Zenger, 1998; Williamson, 1991). Empirical studies of the effect of uncertainty on the 
choice of governance structures have produced contradictory evidence (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 
1998). Klein et al. (1990) argue that uncertainty has a number of dimensions that may impact 
governance structures differently. The two dimensions of uncertainty identified by Klein et 
al. are volatility and diversity. Volatility reflects the speed of change in the environment and 
diversity reflects the number of sources of uncertainty in the environment. Klein et al. argue 
that higher levels of volatility create problems in writing contracts and higher transaction 
costs for market governance structures thus encouraging more integrated forms of 
governance. Klein et al. argue that diversity leads to a desire for flexibility and that market 
governance structures provide this flexibility. 
Two important sources of uncertainty that have been identified are technical and market 
uncertainty (Schilling and Steensma, 2002; Walker and Weber, 1984). Thus, it is 
hypothesized that greater volatility related to technical and market uncertainty increases the 
likelihood that technologies will be commercialized using the build or sell options and that 
greater dynamism related to technical and market uncertainty increases the likelihood that 
technologies will be commercialized using the rent option. 
H7a: The greater the volatility relating to technical uncertainty 
associated with the technology, the greater the likelihood that 
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the technology will be commercialized using the build or sell 
options. 
H7b: The greater the volatility relating to market uncertainty 
associated with the technology, the greater the likelihood that 
the technology will be commercialized using the build or sell 
options. 
H8a: The greater the dynamism relating to technical 
uncertainty associated with the technology, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the 
rent option. 
H8b: The greater the dynamism relating to market uncertainty 
associated with the technology, the greater the likelihood that 
the technology will be commercialized using the rent option. 
4.2.4 Frequency 
The third dimension affecting transaction costs is the frequency with which transactions 
recur. The commercialization of new technologies arising from university research is an 
environment where transactions between a specific researcher and a specific commercializing 
firm are expected to be infrequent. Thus, it is expected that frequency of interaction will not 
be a distinguishing feature in this environment and, therefore, no hypotheses related to 
frequency are proposed. 
4.3 Summary of hypotheses tested 
Table 4.1 summarizes the hypotheses tested in this thesis. For the reasons set out in section 
8.2, Hypotheses 3a and 3b related to tacitness and complexity are combined into a single 
hypothesis. Likewise, Hypotheses 7a and 7b related to volatility and Hypotheses 8a and 9b 





Table 4.1 Summary of hypotheses tested 
Hypotheses 
Firm characteristics associated with the strategic governance choices of build, rent or sell: 
H1a The build option is positively associated with new firms created to commercialize 
technologies deriving revenue primarily from product market activity. 
H1b The rent and sell options are positively associated with new firms created to 
commercialize technologies deriving revenue primarily from technology market 
activity. 
H2a The build option is positively associated with new firms created to commercialize 
technologies expending resources on both technology development activities and 
production activities. 
H2b The rent and sell options are positively associated with new firms created to 
commercialize technologies expending resources on technology development 
activities but not on production activities. 
Transaction attributes and the strategic governance choices made in their commercialization: 
H3 The greater the patent or other legal protection for the technology, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the rent option. 
H4 The greater the tacitness and complexity of the knowledge inherent in a technology, 
the greater the likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the 
build or sell options. 
H5 The greater the risk of substitutes, the greater the likelihood that the technology will 
be commercialized using the rent option. 
H6 The greater the importance of specialized complementary assets, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the sell option. 
H7 The greater the volatility associated with the technology, the greater the likelihood 
that the technology will be commercialized using the build or sell options. 
H8 The greater the dynamism associated with the technology, the greater the likelihood 





Three studies were conducted in the course of this research. Study #1 analyzes three start-ups 
based on new technologies arising from research conducted at the University of Waterloo. 
Study #2 examines the business activities of a number of Canadian and U.S. public start-up 
firms. Study #3 is a survey of university faculty members who have had new technologies 
arising from their academic research put into commercial use. Each of these studies uses 
different methods. The use of multiple methods, known as triangulation, has the benefit of 
providing differing perspectives on the research question. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First the concept of triangulation is discussed and its 
advantages and disadvantages for this particular research are discussed. This is followed by 
detailed descriptions of the methods used in each of the three studies. 
5.1 Triangulation 
Triangulation is “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” 
(Denzin, 1978, p. 291). Each of the three studies in this research uses different methods. 
Study #1, the tale of the three start-ups, involves the detailed qualitative analysis of data 
gathered from a variety of archival data sources. Study #2, the examination of public start-up 
firms, involves the quantitative analysis of data gathered from archival data sources. Study 
#3, the study of academic researchers involved in commercialization, involves the 
quantitative analysis of data gathered using a survey document. Focused case studies and 
studies of contracts, statistical analysis of secondary data and statistical analysis using field 
data have all been used in the study of transaction cost economics (Mahoney, 2005). 
However, they have rarely been used together as complementary sources of evidence. 
The primary advantage attributed to triangulation is that the strengths of one method can 
compensate for weaknesses in the other methods (Baumard and Ibert, 2001; Jick, 1979). 
When two or more methods support the same result, this “enhances our belief that the results 
are valid and not a methodological artifact” (Bouchard, 1976, p. 268). The primary weakness 
attributed to triangulation is that, in general, there are no reliable methods for combining the 
results of the various tests (Jick, 1979). 
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Study #1, the tale of three start-ups, has the advantage of providing an in-depth analysis of 
the three firms examined. This allows for an understanding of some of the subtleties of the 
commercialization process that are difficult to capture through quantitative means. However, 
Study #1 involves the study of a very limited number of firms selected for their differences 
rather than for their representativeness. Thus, Study #1 has weak external validity. Study #2, 
the examination of public company start-up firms, is quantitative in nature and provides 
greater objectivity in its findings that Study #1. Study #2 involves both Canadian and U.S. 
firms and uses secondary data from reliable sources. Study #2 provides strengths related to 
the reliability and external validity of the overall research. Study #3, the survey of academic 
researchers, has strengths related to the internal validity of the overall research. The survey is 
designed to specifically measure the variables of interest whereas Studies #1 and #2 use 
secondary data that was originally prepared for other purposes. Enhanced internal validity is 
an attribute commonly attributed to primary data such as that collected in Study #3 (Baumard 
and Ibert, 2001). Studies #1 and #2 also focus on instances of commercialization that 
involved a start-up firm that eventually went public. Study #3 approaches commercialization 
from the inventor side irrespective of how the new technology was commercialized. This 
adds to the generalizability of the overall research findings. This discussion illustrates how 
the three studies complement each other in terms of enhancing the reliability and validity of 
the overall research. 
5.2 Study #1, a tale of three start-ups 
The analyses in Study #1 use archival data related to the three start-ups examined. The 
primary sources of data used are documents issued by the start-ups and filed with the 
applicable securities regulators. Limited use is also made of information on the start-ups 
websites. The information filed by these start-ups with the applicable securities regulators 
includes prospectuses, annual reports, material change reports, significant contracts and news 
releases. This information is available from the date the firm became a public company. 
A prospectus is a document issued by a firm when it offers securities, such as shares in the 
firm, to the public. Prospectuses are intended to ensure that potential investors receive “full, 
true and plain disclosure of all material facts” (Ontario Securities Act, 1990, s 56(1)). 
Prospectuses typically contain the following information (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2003): 
 A description of the company's properties and business; 
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 A description of the security to be offered for sale; 
 Information about the management of the company; and 
 Financial statements audited by independent accountants.  
Annual reports are reports issued by a firm to its shareholders. Annual reports typically 
include the following information: 
 Management’s discussion and analysis – this is an analysis by management of a firm’s 
past performance and its future prospects (Canadian Performance Reporting Board, 
2004); and 
 Audited financial statements. 
Material change reports are required to be filed by public companies whenever a material 
change in the business of the company occurs. A material change is “a change in the 
business, operations or capital of the reporting issuer that would reasonably be expected to 
have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the securities of the 
[company]” (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2003, p. 67). 
The reliability of the data in these documents is enhanced by a number of factors. These 
include the fact that substantial criminal and civil penalties can arise from filing false or 
misleading information with the securities commissions. In addition, these documents are 
subject to review, in full or in part, by the applicable securities commission, a firm’s auditors, 
a firm’s lawyers and, in the case of a prospectus, a firm’s underwriters. 
5.3 Study #2, an examination of public company start-ups 
5.3.1 Sample 
Study #2 uses two separate samples of public start-up firms that have commercialized new 
technologies arising from university research. The first sample is of Canadian companies 
built on National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (“NSERC”) funded 
research. The second sample is of U.S. companies built on research conducted at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”). 
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The Canadian start-up sample is derived from companies listed in NSERC’s Research 
Means Business publication. This publication profiles start-up companies that have their 
origins in university research funded by NSERC (NSERC, 2002). NSERC is a primary 
source of funding for research in the natural sciences and engineering in Canada (NSERC, 
2005). These natural sciences and engineering disciplines are an important source of 
commercialized new technologies (Read, 2003). Research Means Business is a periodic 
publication of NSERC and has been used in other research on the economic impacts of 
academic start-ups (Vincett, 2005). The Canadian start-up sample was constructed primarily 
using the 2002 edition of the publication. This edition profiles 134 start-up companies. From 
this list of companies, those that became public companies were identified. Only public 
companies are included in the sample as being a public company brings obligations to 
publicly report significant information about the company and it is this public information 
that is analyzed in this study. Public companies were identified through information 
contained in Research Means Business, visits to the companies’ websites and through 
searches of public company databases maintained by Canadian and U.S. securities regulators. 
Of the 134 start-up companies listed in Research Means Business, 30 (22%) were found to be 
public companies. The 1998 edition of Research Means Business was also reviewed. Most of 
the companies included in the 1998 edition also appear in the 2002 edition. Nonetheless, one 
additional public start-up was identified bringing the total Canadian start-up sample to 31 
firms. 
The US start-up sample is based on MIT start-ups founded between 1980 and 1996 that 
went public as identified by Shane (2004). MIT is a preeminent source of start-up firms in 
the United States and its commercialization activities have been the most widely studied (see, 
for example, Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Neckar and Shane, 2003; and Shane, 2004). 
Rough estimates by Shane (2001) suggest that MIT accounts for approximately7.5% of start-
ups founded to exploit new technologies arising from university research in the United 
States. Shane (2004) identified 23 public start-ups and the fact that these start-ups became 
public companies was confirmed through searches of public company databases maintained 
by U.S. and Canadian securities regulators. 
In summary, the Canadian start-up sample consists of 31 firms and the U.S. start-up 
sample consists of 23 firms for a total of 54 firms. These two samples may not be 
representative of all start-ups created to commercialize new technologies arising from 
university research. While NSERC funded research is an important source of new 
technologies, new technologies also result from university research not funded by NSERC. 
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MIT start-ups also may not be representative of start-ups from other universities due to 
geographic advantages and strong ties to the venture capital community (Shane, 2001). 
Nonetheless, the samples represent important sources of new technologies and afford the 
benefits arising from having two separate samples from different countries and derived from 
two different sources. 
5.3.2 Measurement 
This study involves comparisons between the method used to commercialize a new 
technology and the business activities of the start-up involved in commercializing the 
technology. 
5.3.2.1 Method of commercialization 
The method of commercialization was classified as build, rent, sell, hybrid or development 
stage. The criteria used for classifying the method as build, rent or sell were those developed 
in chapter 3. The method used was classified as hybrid if commercialization of the 
technology involved the combined efforts of the start-up and an established firm rather than 
being commercialized primarily by the start-up or an established firm. For example, the 
technology may have been commercialized through a joint venture or partnership with an 
established firm with the start-up contributing manufacturing capabilities and the established 
firm contributing marketing and distribution capabilities to the joint venture. Start-ups were 
classified as development stage if products based on the technology had not yet been put into 
commercial use. In some cases, multiple methods of commercialization were used by the 
start-up. In these cases, the method of commercialization used was categorized based on the 
primary method used. 
5.3.2.2 Business activities of the start-up 
The nature and extent of business activities of the start-up was captured using four measures. 
Two of these measures relate to the markets in which the start-up operates. The other two 
measures relate to the allocation of internal resources to technology development activities 
and to production activities. 
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5.3.2.2.1 Markets the start-up operates in 
As discussed in section 2.8.2, firms may operate in markets for products and markets for 
technology (Arora et al., 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003; Giuri and Luzzi, 2005). Two measures 
are used to determine the extent to which the start-ups operate in each of these markets. 
Product market activity is measured by the percentage of the start-up’s total revenue that is 
derived from products or services. 
 
Product market activity   = Product market revenue Total revenue 
 
Total revenue and product market revenue are measured in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and are taken from the start-up’s most recent audited financial 
statements. Product market revenue includes revenue from sales of products; long-term 
contracts for the provision of products or services; services and support; and software 
products. 
Technology market activity is measured by the percentage of the start-up’s total revenue 
that is derived from intellectual property (U.S. Department of Justice, 1995).  
 
Technology market activity   = Technology market revenue Total revenue 
 
Technology market revenue includes revenue from milestone payments, licensing fees and 
royalties related to contracts allowing other firms to use the start-ups intellectual property. 
Excluded from both product market activity and technology market activity is revenue 
derived from other sources. These other sources include contract research and development 
where the start-up undertakes R&D activities related to another firm’s technology, 
investment income and other miscellaneous sources of revenue. 
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5.3.2.2.2 Allocation of internal resources to technology development activities and to 
production activities 
The allocation of internal resources between different business activities is a critical element 
in implementing a firm’s strategy (Porter, 1980). Performing activities generates costs (Hope 
and Hope, 1997) and, consequently, an examination of a firm’s costs can indicate the 
emphasis the firm places on various business activities. 
Technology development activity is measured by the percentage of the start-up’s total 
operating costs that is spent on research and development activities. 
 
Technology development activity   = Research and development costs Total operating costs 
 
Total operating costs and research and development costs are measured in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles and are taken from the start-ups most recent audited 
financial statements. Research and development costs are measured net of any related 
government assistance (e.g., R&D tax credits). 
Production activity is measured by the percentage of the start-up’s total operating costs that 
is spent on production activities. 
 
Production activity   = Cost of goods sold Total operating costs
 
Cost of goods sold reflects the costs incurred to purchase or produce the products sold by 
the firm. Cost of goods sold includes the cost of material and labor used in the production of 




The analyses use archival data related to the start-ups contained in the annual filings of the 
start-ups with the applicable securities regulator. In the case of start-ups required to file 
information with the Canadian securities regulators, this information is available through the 
System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (‘SEDAR’) available at 
http://www.sedar.com. In the case of start-ups required to file information with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, this information is available through the Electronic 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (‘EDGAR’) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. The annual filings of start-ups typically include the 
following information: 
 Annual information form – this document includes various information about the firm 
including a description of the business of the firm (Canadian Securities Administrators, 
2003); 
 Management’s discussion and analysis – this is an analysis by management of a firm’s 
past performance and its future prospects (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2003); 
 Audited financial statements. 
Annual filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 10K contain 
similar contents to those listed above. 
5.3.3.1 Method of commercialization 
The methods of commercialization were determined using the criteria developed in section 
3.5. Appendix A includes the descriptions of the categories that were used for this purpose. 
Two individuals identified the method of commercialization for each start-up: the author and 
another researcher who conducts research in the area of scientific research 
commercialization. Appendix A also includes the instructions given to the second coder. The 
second coder was trained by providing the coder with the materials contained in Appendix A 
and by working through two examples with the coder to ensure that the instructions were 
understood. The identification of the methods of commercialization used by the start-ups 
were done independently by the two coders and then compared. Of the 54 start-ups in the 
sample, the two coders identified the same method of commercialization in 50 cases (93%). 
Cohen’s Kappa measure of inter-rater reliability is .89. A Kappa greater than .70 is generally 
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considered satisfactory. The four cases where the coders identified different methods of 
commercialization were discussed by the coders and a final resolution was reached that was 
acceptable to both coders. 
5.3.3.2 Business activities of the start-up 
The data needed to calculate the four measures of the business activities of the start-up were 
identified from the audited financial statements contained in the annual reports of the firms. 
5.4 Study #3, survey of academic researchers 
Study #3 consisted of two phases. The measure development and preliminary fieldwork 
phase focused on the development and testing of the measures to be used in the study. The 
survey phase focused on gathering data related to individual innovations from researchers. 
5.4.1 Measure development and preliminary fieldwork 
The development of measures followed the general approach set out in Churchill (1979). The 
steps of this approach and the specific activities undertaken are described in the following 
sections. 
5.4.1.1 Specifying the domain of the constructs 
Specifying the domain of the construct involves delineating what is included and excluded 
from the concept (Churchill, 1979). Each of the independent variables has previously been 
specified and used in research on technology transfer or transaction cost economics (see 
chapter 2, Literature review, and Table 5.1). The dependent variable, the governance 
structure used in the commercialization of the innovation, is developed and specified in 
chapter 3. 
5.4.1.2 Generate item pool 
Generating the item pool involves 1) identifying how the variables have been defined 
previously and how many dimensions they have and 2) identifying or generating items which 
tap each of the dimensions of the constructs (Churchill, 1979). 
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Items related to the independent variables were identified from a review of the literature. 
The wording of these items was reviewed and amended as necessary to ensure the wording of 
items was as precise as possible and suited to the university commercialization environment. 
The items identified were further refined using the results of the pilot survey (see section 
5.4.1.3). Table 5.1 sets out the items identified for the independent variables and identifies 
their sources. 
 
Table 5.1 Items for independent variables and their sources 
Variables and items Source 
Patent or other legal protection  
 The intellectual property protection obtained was effective in 
deterring imitation of the innovation 
Gans et al. (2000) 
 Fundamentally similar innovations exist. (R) Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
 Few credible substitutes competed with this innovation. Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
Tacitness  
 Manuals and documents accurately explained the implementation 
and operation of this innovation. (R) 
Gopalakrishnan and Bierly 
(2001) 
 Educating and training personnel for this innovation was a quick 
and easy job. (R) 
Gopalakrishnan and Bierly 
(2001) 
 The critical elements of this innovation could be easily explained 




 Interactions between this innovation and related components or 
systems were poorly understood. 
Derived from Chesbrough 
and Kusunoki (2001) 
 Technical information about how this innovation functions 
together with other components or systems was well defined. (R) 
Derived from Chesbrough 
and Kusunoki (2001) 
 This innovation was a component of a larger product, process or 
system. (Note 1) 
 
 A change in the design of this innovation would require 






Table 5.1 (continued) 
Variables and items Source 
Risk of substitutes  
 It would be easy for others to imitate this innovation. Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
 The ‘reverse engineering’ of this innovation by a competitor would be 
technically difficult. (R) 
Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
Technology volatility  
 I was confident that this innovation would perform as it was 
originally designed. 
Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
 It was clear that this innovation would work as it was intended 
technologically. 
Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
Market volatility  
 I was certain this innovation would meet user demands. Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
Technology dynamism  
 Future technological breakthroughs were likely to render this 
innovation of little value in a short time period. 
Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
Market dynamism  
 I expected this innovation to have a relatively long life cycle. (R) Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) 
Complementary assets  
 The following were important for the commercialization of the 
innovation: a) Manufacturing capabilities, b) distribution channels, c) 
Salesforce, d) After-sales support capabilities, e) Complementary 
technologies, f) Other (specify) 
Gans et al. (2000) 
 The following needed to be tailored to the innovation: a) 
Manufacturing capabilities, b) distribution channels, c) Salesforce, d) 
After-sales support capabilities, e) Complementary technologies, f) 
Other (specify) 
Gans et al. (2000) 
Notes: 
1. Item was included in final survey but was dropped from final measures for the reasons described in 
section 8.2. 




For the dependent variable, two dimensions related to the governance structures used to 
commercialize the technology were identified in chapter 3. These are 1) whether a new firm 
or an established firm commercialized the new technology and 2) ownership of the property 
rights to the innovation. Items for these dimensions were generated through discussions with 
a small number of experienced persons (Churchill, 1979). Specifically, individuals in the 
University of Waterloo’s Technology Transfer and Licensing Office and faculty members 
who are experienced in commercialization were interviewed. For the ownership of property 
rights dimension of governance structures, numerous factors could be considered as 
indicators of ownership of the property rights (see section, for example, section 6.4.1.2). 
Based on the discussions with experts, it was decided that holding equity rights in the 
commercializing firm was a strong indicator that the university/inventor retained property 
rights to the invention. This decision is consistent with Oxley (1999) who identifies the 
possession of equity as an important break point in market-hierarchy governance structures. 
Table 5.2 sets out the items identified for the two dimensions. 
5.4.1.3 Purify the measures (pilot study) 
Based on the above, an initial survey instrument was developed containing multiple items for 
each variable (Churchill, 1979). This initial instrument was sent to approximately 25 faculty 
members in the Department of Management Sciences at the University of Waterloo. They 
were asked to complete the survey and also to provide opinions and comments relating to the 
face validity of the measures. The feedback received and analysis of the responses provided 
supported most of the items in the survey. Nonetheless, a small number of changes to the 
measures were made. 
5.4.2 Survey phase 
5.4.2.1 Sample 
The population for the survey is faculty members who have had new technologies resulting 
from their academic research put into commercial use and who are located at one of two of 
the universities participating in the “C4” consortium. The C4 consortium is the result of an 
agreement between four south-western Ontario universities to cooperate in areas related to 
the support of technology transfer. The choice of intense examination of faculty from a small 
geographic area rather than a broader sample from numerous universities was made to 
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minimize the impact of environmental factors such as differing economic environments and 
the availability of venture capital (see section 2.2). This choice is also convenient and limits 
the costs of performing the research. Research into commercialization of university research 
has often taken this approach. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) and Shane (2002) both focused 
on innovations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Colyvas et al. (2002) examined 
innovations from two universities. This approach limits somewhat the generalizability of the 
findings. Future research can extend the population to other universities. 
 





The innovation was commercialized by:  
1) A newly created firm founded by you/other key researchers on the 
project,  
2) A newly created firm founded by someone other than you/other key 
researchers on the project,  
3) One or more established firms,  
4) Other (please describe) 
[If 1) above] The purpose of the newly created firm was to:  
1) Produce and sell new products or services based on the innovation,  
2) Market the innovation to other firms that would produce and sell new 
products or services based on the innovation. Marketing the innovation 
may occur through selling licenses, development kits, or consulting 
services related to the innovation,  
3) Other (please describe) 
Ownership of property 
rights to the technology 
My/my university’s rights to receive income from the innovation took the 
form of:  
1) A fixed license fee or consulting fees,  
2) Royalties based on product sales,  
3) Equity in the commercializing firm (e.g., shares in the 
commercializing firm, stock options, dividends),  
4) I have no rights to receive income from the innovation,  




One of the universities has a strong reputation for entrepreneurial activity and for its 
engineering and computer science schools. The other university has strong medical and 
engineering schools. Research has shown that medical schools and engineering faculties are 
significant producers of commercialized research. Thursby et al. (2001) found that 33% of 
the inventions disclosed in their survey came from medical schools and 29% came from 
engineering schools. These were the two largest sources of inventions in their survey. 
Faculty members who have been involved in commercialization were identified as follows. 
Members of the Technology Transfer and Licensing Office at the first university indicated 
that reported disclosures to the university’s Office were not a reliable source for identifying 
faculty members who have been involved in commercialization as there is evidence that 
many commercialized innovations are not disclosed to the Office. Consequently, the 
following sources were used to develop a list of faculty members who may have been 
involved in commercialization: 
 Waterloo Region “TechMap.” This document, produced by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
CTT and Communitech, identifies high technology firms in the Waterloo Region and 
identifies technology and people links to local universities; 
 OCE/CITO Innovation Tree. This document, produced by the Ontario Centres of 
Excellence, identifies spin-off companies and receivers of technology transfer resulting 
from technology transferred from research sponsored by Communication and 
Information Technology Ontario (“CITO”); 
 Spin-off Company Profiles. This internal publication of the Technology Transfer and  
Licensing Office of University #1 is a compilation of corporate profiles of numerous 
companies that have a connection to technologies or people from the university; and 
 The University’s Technology Transfer and Licensing Office website. This site lists 
technologies available for licensing. 
Some faculty members involved in commercialization were also identified from references 
by other faculty members and articles in the local newspaper. Multiple sources were used to 
ensure as complete an identification of faculty members who may have been involved in 
commercialization as possible. A high proportion of the faculty members were identified by 




At the second university, a senior member of the university’s Technology Transfer and 
Licensing Office indicated that he believed that their records did comprise a complete listing 
of faculty members who had been involved in commercialization activities. In this case, a 
listing of these faculty members provided by the Office was used as the sampling frame. 
For both universities, the lists included faculty members who may have been involved in 
commercialization. However, the commercialization activities were at various stages. In 
many cases, the commercialization process had begun but the technology was not yet in 
commercial use. This study is concerned with the governance structures in place when the 
technology is commercialized and, consequently, it was necessary to identify those instances 
where the technology had been put into commercial use. 
Attempts were made to contact by telephone each of the faculty members identified to 
determine whether the technology they had invented had been put into commercial use. Table 
5.3 indicates the results of these contacts. In some cases, contact was not made after multiple 
attempts. This may be because the faculty member was away from the university for an 
extended period of time (e.g., on sabbatical) or because the faculty member chose not to 
return messages left for them. In total, there were only 13 cases where contact was not made. 
In a high proportion of the cases, contact was made and the faculty member indicated that the 
technology they had invented was not yet in commercial use. The difference in the 
proportion of such cases between the two universities is due to the differences in the way the 
faculty members were identified. As indicated above, the list for University #1 was compiled 
from multiple sources and, in order to be as complete as possible, included all faculty 
members who appeared in these sources regardless of the likelihood that their inventions had 
been put into commercial use. At University #2, the list was compiled by members of the 
University’s Technology Transfer and Licensing Office who were more familiar with the 
cases and, therefore, could more accurately eliminate cases that had not been put into 
commercial use. Overall, the large proportion of cases where technologies were not yet in 
commercial use indicates the difficulties and time involved in commercializing a new 
technology. The number of cases where technologies were in commercial use is much greater 
at University #1 than University #2. This is not an usual finding. Clayman (2004) analyzed 
reported information on commercialization activity at Canadian universities and found great 
variability between universities in most measures of commercialization activity. In total, 64 
faculty members who have invented new technologies that have been put into commercial 
use were identified. 
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Table 5.3 Number of faculty members who have been involved with 
commercialized technologies 
Description University #1 University #2 
Number of faculty members identified as possibly having 
commercialized new technologies 
207 (100%) 13 (100%)
Number where contact was not made 9 (4%) 4 (30%)
Number where technologies were not yet in commercial use 138 (67%) 5 (38%)
Number where technologies were in commercial use 60 (29%) 4 (31%)
 
5.4.2.2 Design and procedures 
A survey approach was used to collect the data. The survey consisted of a self-administered 
questionnaire that was mailed to participants. A copy of the questionnaire is contained in 
Appendix B. Since the survey involved human participants, ethics approval was solicited 
from the University of Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics. Full ethics clearance was 
received in September 2003. 
Faculty members identified as possibly having been involved in commercialization (see 
section 5.4.2.1) were contacted by telephone. The purposes of the telephone call were to 1) 
determine whether technologies resulting from their academic research had been put into 
commercial use (i.e., they are part of the target population) and 2) to ask for their 
participation in the research. The survey was mailed to those who agreed to participate in the 
research. Multiple attempts were made to contact faculty members. The choice to make 
multiple attempts to contact faculty members rather than to leave voice messages asking for a 
response was made based on early experience in contacting faculty members. This early 
experience indicated that the response rate to voice messages was very low. Up to 10 
attempts were made to contact an individual over multiple academic terms. As indicated in 
Table 5.3, these procedures resulted in contact being made with 203 (94.1%) of the 220 




A number of steps were taken to increase response rates to the survey. First, the survey was 
designed to make it easy to complete. This included laying out the survey clearly, making the 
questions easy to read and well spaced, and making responses easy to complete by simply 
circling the appropriate response (Fowler, 2002). Second, a number of follow-up procedures 
were used to encourage participants to respond (Babbie, 1999; Dillman, 2000). The first 
follow-up procedure conducted was a telephone follow-up. This follow-up reminded the 
participants of the survey, confirmed that they had received the survey and encouraged them 
to respond to it. The second follow-up procedure was a written memo. This memo again 
reminded the participants of the survey and their agreement to participate and encouraged 
them to respond. A copy of the survey was included with this memo. Follow-up procedures 
were timed to reach participants at less busy times of the year. Specifically, experience in 
contacting potential participants suggested that the beginning of academic terms was a better 
time to obtain cooperation from participants than later in the term when examinations and 
other deadlines were imminent. Consequently, follow-up procedures were performed early in 
the term. As a result of these procedures, an overall response rate of 70% was achieved. 
These procedures were conducted over the period from January 2004 to September 2005. 
In total, over 1,000 contact attempts were made through telephone calls, e-mails and 
memoranda to achieve the participation and response rates indicated above. Chapter 8 reports 
the results of the analysis of the survey responses including the results of tests designed to 
assess the reliability and validity of the data obtained (Churchill, 1979). 
5.5 Summary 
Three studies were conducted in the course of this research. Study #1 analyzes three start-ups 
based on new technologies arising from research conducted at the University of Waterloo. 
Study #2 examines the business activities of a number of Canadian and U.S. public start-up 
firms. Study #3 is a survey of university faculty members who have had new technologies 
arising from their academic research put into commercial use. Each of these studies uses 
different methods providing multiple perspectives on the research question. The results of 
these studies are presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8, respectively. 
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Chapter 6 
Results Study #1 – A Tale of Three Start-ups 
This chapter contains the results of the analysis of three start-ups based on new technologies 
arising from research conducted at the University of Waterloo. The primary purpose of these 
examples is to illustrate the significant differences that exist in the governance structures 
used to commercialize new technologies. 
6.1 Background to the three start-ups 
Table 6.1 contains a summary of key information about the three start-ups. It also indicates 
the specific sources of the information obtained. 
DALSA Corporation (“DALSA”) is a start-up that commercialized image capture charge-
coupled device (“CCD”) technology. Dr. Savvas Chamberlain founded DALSA. Dr. 
Chamberlain was a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of 
Waterloo from 1974 to December 1994. DALSA was founded in 1980 and was originally 
involved in performing contract R&D work for other firms. In the late 1980’s, DALSA 
adopted a “business strategy to focus on developing and expanding standard product lines of 
high performance CCD image sensor silicon chips and electronic cameras” (DALSA, 1996, 
p. 8). 
Certicom Corp. (“Certicom”) is a start-up that commercialized elliptical curve 
cryptography technology. Dr. Scott Vanstone was involved in the founding of Certicom. Dr. 
Vanstone is a Professor of Combinatorics and Optimization in the Faculty of Mathematics at 
the University of Waterloo. Certicom was founded in 1985 as a research and development 
company to develop a high speed cryptographic integrated circuit for Newbridge Networks. 
In 1993, Certicom “decided to emphasize the provision of OEM cryptographic technologies 
based on ECC to major vendors of computing and communications products” (Certicom, 
1998, p. 10). 
Senesco Technologies, Inc. (“Senesco”) is a start-up involved in commercializing a lipase 
gene that controls the aging of plants. Senesco was founded in 1998 to commercialize this 
technology discovered by Dr. John Thompson. Dr. Thompson is a Professor of Biology in 
the Faculty of Science at the University of Waterloo. 
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Table 6.1 Summary of key information about the three start-ups 






technology (Note 1) 
Elliptical curve 
cryptography 
(“ECC”) (Note 2) 
Lipase gene which 
controls the aging 
(senescence) of 
plants (Note 3) 
Primary inventor and 




Waterloo (Note 1) 
Dr. Scott Vanstone / 
University of 
Waterloo (Note 2) 
Dr. John Thompson / 
University of 
Waterloo (Note 3) 





R&D work. In the 
late 1980’s, DALSA 






founded as a R&D 
company. 
In 1993, Certicom 










markets image sensor 
and electronic 
camera products 
based on the 
technology (Note 1) 
Licensing of the 
technologies covered 
by Certicom’s patent 
portfolio to firms 
who build their own 




to firms dealing in 
specific application 
areas who conduct 
further technological 
development and 





Notes: Sources of information: 
1. DALSA Corporation, Initial Public Offering and Secondary Offering prospectus 
dated May 10, 1996. 
2. Certicom Corp., Additional Offering prospectus dated January 14, 1998. 
3. Senesco Technologies, Inc., Proxy Statement in connection with reverse take over 
of Nava Leisure USA, Inc. dated January 8, 1999. 
4. Certicom Corp., Renewal Annual Information Form dated September 3, 2004. 
5. Senesco Technologies, Inc., 2004 Annual Report. 
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6.1.1 Transfer of technologies to the start-ups 
The University of Waterloo has an ‘inventor owns’ intellectual property policy. Specifically, 
the University’s Policy 73 states that “ownership of rights in IP created in the course of 
teaching and research activities belong to the creator(s)” (University of Waterloo, 2000). 
Consequently, transfer of intellectual property rights from the university to the start-ups is 
not required as it is at universities with a ‘university owns’ intellectual property policy. 
Nonetheless, the start-ups still have a need to obtain the rights to the technologies from their 
inventors. In the cases of DALSA and Certicom, a search of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office patent databases conducted on July 20, 2005 identified seven patents with 
Dr. Chamberlain as an inventor that had been assigned to DALSA and 32 patents with Dr. 
Vanstone as an inventor that had been assigned to Certicom. In the case of Senesco, the start-
up’s 1999 proxy statement indicates that “by assignment dated June 25, 1998 …, Dr. 
Thompson and Meesrs. Hong and Hudak assigned all of their rights in and to the Patent 
Application … with respect to the invention and/or improvements thereto to Senesco” 
(Senesco, 1999, p.6). Thus each start-up has acquired rights to the technologies from their 
inventors. 
6.1.2 Approaches taken to the commercialization of the technologies by the 
start-ups 
In its 1996 Initial Public Offering prospectus, DALSA described its business as the “design, 
development, manufacture and marketing of image sensor and electronic camera products” 
(DALSA, 1996, p. 4). In commercializing its technology, DALSA designed a number of 
standard sensor and camera products, created a manufacturing facility in Waterloo, 
developed distribution channels to service customers in North America, Europe and the Asia-
Pacific region, and formed a team to market its products (DALSA, 1996). 
In 1998, Certicom’s description of its business was that Certicom “develops and markets 
cryptographic algorithms and licenses cryptographic software and integrated circuits to 
manufacturers of equipment and software” (Certicom, 1998, p. 4). Certicom developed 
cryptographic and information security protocol toolkits to help other firms integrate 
Certicom’s security features into their products (Certicom, 2004a). Certicom also developed 
systems integration consulting and development support capabilities as well as selling and 
marketing capabilities to support the commercialization of its technology (Certicom, 1998). 
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In 2004, Certicom adopted a new strategy for commercializing its technology. “Certicom’s 
Intellectual Property Licensing Program provides licenses to organizations that have 
implemented or are wishing to implement the technologies covered in Certicom’s extensive 
patent portfolio” (Certicom, 2004b, p. 7). Under this strategy, Certicom grants other firms 
licenses to its portfolio of patents. These firms then have the flexibility to build their own 
security products using Certicom’s technologies. 
Senesco’s strategy is “to follow a … commercialization strategy that involves the licensing 
of our technology to business partners for the purpose of further technological development, 
marketing and distribution … who will pay us royalties when they market and distribute 
products incorporating our technology upon commercialization” (Senesco, 2004, p. 33). This 
approach means that Senesco does not need to develop manufacturing, marketing or selling 
capabilities and was adopted “so that we can direct our resources to what we do best: further 
understanding the role of Factor 5A [its patented technology]” (Senesco, 2004, p. 4). 
6.2 Analysis 
This section contains two analyses of information related to the three start-ups. The first 
compares the start-ups on the basis of criteria developed for the build, rent and sell 
governance structures. The second analysis looks at differences in the nature of the business 
operations of the three start-ups. 
6.2.1 Comparison of the three start-ups in relation to specified criteria 
This section compares the three start-ups using the criteria for distinguishing between the 
build, rent and sell governance structures developed in chapter 3. These criteria include who 
commercializes the technology and who retains the risks and benefits of ownership related to 
the technology. Detailed motivation for the choice of these criteria is given in section 3.5. 




Table 6.2 Comparison of start-ups in relation to specified criteria 





Start-up operates in 
product market 
Other established firms: 
National Security 
Agency, General 
Dynamics, Pitney Bowes 
and Research In Motion 
Start-up operates in 
market for technologies 
Other established firms: 
ArborGen, Cal/West, 
Rahan Meristem, Harris 
Moran, The Scotts 
Company and the Broin 
Companies 
Start-up operates in 
market for technologies 
Rights of ownership of technology   
Right to use the 
technology 
DALSA retains all rights 
to use the technology and 
to prevent others from 
using the technology 
Certicom retains the right 
to use the technology and 
to license to other firms 
Licensees have limited 
rights to use the 
technology. Licensees do 
not have the right to 
prevent others from using 
the technology 
Senesco has given up the 
right to use its technology 
in certain fields 
Licensees have acquired 
the right to use the 
technology in certain 
fields and to prevent 
others from using the 
technology in these fields 
Right to 
appropriate 
returns from the 
technology 
DALSA retains all of the 
rights to appropriate 
returns from the 
technology 
Certicom’s returns from 
licensees are limited to 
the contractually 
determined amounts 
though it can appropriate 
additional returns from 
licensing to other firms 
Licencees obtain the 
residual returns from 
selling products based on 
the technology 
Senesco’s returns in the 
fields covered by the 
licenses are limited to the 
contractually determined 
amounts 
Licencees obtain the 
residual returns from 
selling products based on 
the technology in the 
specified fields of use 




DALSA retains all rights 
to change the 
technology’s form or 
substance 
Certicom retains all 
rights to change the 
technology’s form or 
substance 
Senesco retains rights to 
improvements in the 
technology but not to 
inventions developed by 




6.2.1.1 Who commercializes the technology 
“Commercialization is the production, manufacturing, packaging, marketing, and distribution 
of a product that embodies an innovation” (Rogers, 1995, p. 143). Using this definition of 
commercialization, it is clear that DALSA itself commercializes the CCD technology that it 
controls. The previous sections contain evidence demonstrating that DALSA has developed 
sensor and camera products and that it manufactures, markets and distributes these products 
to its customers. 
Under Certicom’s current primary strategy of intellectual property licensing, it is other 
established firms that commercialize the ECC technologies on which the company is based. 
As described previously, these other established firms acquire the right to use Certicom’s 
patented technology in order to develop their own products. Established firms that use 
Certicom’s technology to develop their own products include the United States National 
Security Agency, General Dynamics, Pitney Bowes and Research In Motion (Certicom, 
2005). 
Likewise, in Senesco’s case, it is other established firms that commercialize the gene 
technology on which the company is based. Established firms license Senesco’s technology 
in order to develop specific crops incorporating Senesco’s technology. These established 
firms include “ArborGen for forestry products, Cal/West for alfalfa, Rahan Meristem for 
bananas, Harris Moran for lettuces and melons, The Scotts Company for turf and 
ornamentals and the Broin Companies for ethanol” (Senesco, 2004, p. 4). 
These differences in whether the technology is commercialized by the start-up or by other 
established firms reflect fundamental differences in the commercialization strategies of the 
start-ups. Start-ups that commercialize products themselves operate in the ‘product market.’ 
Conversely, start-ups that execute “agreements with other firms—usually incumbents—who 
serve as conduits for commercializing technology to the product market” (Gans and Stern, 
2003, p. 336) operate in markets for technology. Using these classifications, DALSA 
operates in the product market while Certicom and Senesco operate through markets for 
technology. 
6.2.1.2 Rights of ownership of the technology 
This section examines three specific rights related to the ownership of the technology. These 
rights are 1) the right to use the technology, 2) the right to appropriate returns from the 
76 
 
technology and 3) the right to change the technology’s form or substance. These criteria are 
based on the concept of property rights discussed in section 3.5. 
6.2.1.3 Right to use the technology 
DALSA retains all of the rights to use its technology and exercises these rights through the 
production of products based on the technology. Through its patents, DALSA has ability to 
prevent others from using its technology. 
Certicom has licensed some of the rights to use its technology to other parties. For 
example, Certicom has granted the United States National Security Agency a non-exclusive 
worldwide license to use Certicom’s ECC intellectual property (Certicom, 2003). The 
licensees obtain the right to use the technology under these arrangements though these rights 
are limited by the terms of the agreement. For example, the licensees do not have the right to 
prevent others from using the technology. In addition, Certicom retains the right to use the 
technology itself. It exercises this right through sale of internally developed products and 
through the licensing of the technology to other firms. For example, Certicom has licensed 
some of the same technology it licensed to the National Security Agency to Research In 
Motion Limited (Certicom, 2004). 
Senesco has also licensed some of the rights to use its technology to other parties. For 
example, Senesco has granted The Scotts Company (“Scotts”) the exclusive right to use its 
technology in the fields of garden plants, potted plants and turf grass (Senesco, 2004b). This 
license covers the period until the expiration of the last of Senesco’s patents involved in the 
agreement. Scotts has acquired the rights to use the technology in the specified fields and to 
exclude others from using the technology in these fields. Senesco has given up the right to 
use the technology in these fields though it retains the right to use the technology in other 
fields. 
6.2.1.4 Right to appropriate returns from the technology 
DALSA retains all of the rights to appropriate returns from the technology. It exercises this 
right through the sale of products based on the technology and retains all of the profits 
resulting from the sale of the products. 
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Certicom appropriates returns from its technology through its intellectual property 
licensing agreements. Certicom’s returns from licensees are limited to the contractually 
determined amounts though it can appropriate additional returns from licensing to other 
firms. The licensees obtain the residual returns from selling products based on the technology 
(i.e., the profit resulting from the sale of the products after paying the contractually agreed 
amounts to Certicom). 
Senesco’s returns in the fields covered by the licenses are limited to the contractually 
determined amounts. These contractually determined amounts include benchmark payments 
payable on the meeting of conditions set out in the contract and a royalty of a fixed 
percentage of net sales of products developed and sold by the licensee (Senesco, 2004b). 
Senesco can appropriate no returns other than those specified in the licensee agreement in the 
specified areas of use. The licensees have obtained the right to appropriate all returns from 
the technology in the specified fields of use after paying the contractually agreed amounts. 
Senesco can appropriate additional returns from the technology only by licensing rights to 
use the technology in other fields of use. 
6.2.1.5 Right to change the technology’s substance or form 
DALSA retains all rights to change the technology’s substance or form (e.g., to develop and 
patent improvements or enhancements to the technology). Certicom’s non-exclusive licenses 
of its intellectual property suggest that Certicom has given the licensees the rights to use its 
technology but not the right to own improvements or enhancements of the technology. 
Senesco’s license to Scotts provides that Senesco will own modification or improvements 
to Senesco’s technology made by Scotts (Senesco, 2004b). However, any inventions by 
Scotts developed during the commercialization process will belong to Scotts. Consequently, 
Senesco’s rights to changes in the technology are limited to the basic technology and do not 
extent to new inventions in the field of use set out in the agreement. 
6.2.1.6 Summary of rights of ownership of the technology 
The three start-ups have very different levels of interest in the risks and benefits of ownership 
of technology. DALSA has retained substantially all of the rights of ownership discussed in 
this section. Certicom has transferred limited rights to the use of and returns from the 
technology to its licensees. Nonetheless, Certicom has retained the primary rights of 
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ownership to its technology. Conversely, Senesco has transferred the primary rights of 
ownership to its technology to its licensees in the specific fields covered by the liceneses. 
Senesco’s rights of ownership to its technology apply primarily to fields of use not covered 
by its license agreements.  
The difference between Certicom’s and Senesco’s situations is analogous to the difference 
between an owner of a residential building who rents apartments and one who sells 
condominium units. The property owner who rents apartments gives tenants limited rights to 
use his/her property but retains the primary rights to the property. The property owner who 
sells condominium units transfers the primary rights to the unit to the buyer. Certicom’s 
situation is analogous to the property own who rents out his property while Senesco’s 
situation is analogous to the property owner who sells units in his/her building to others. 
6.2.1.7 Methods used to commercialize the technology 
Based on the analysis in this section and using the criteria developed in section 3.5, DALSA 
has used a build governance structure to commercialize its technology since it is a new firm, 
DALSA, that commercializes the technology and this new firm has ownership of the property 
rights to the technology. Certicom has used a rent governance structure to commercialize its 
technology since it is established firms that commercialize the technology but the majority of 
the property rights are retained by a firm, Certicom, created by the inventor to market the 
technology to established firms. Senesco has used a sell governance structure to 
commercialize its technology since it is established firms, rather than Senesco, that 
commercialize the technology and these established firms have acquired the majority of the 
property rights to the technology in the fields of use where the technology is commercialized. 
6.2.2 Nature of business operations 
This section analyses the nature of the business operations of each of the start-ups. Two 
elements of the nature of business operations are considered. The first is the method used by 
the start-up to appropriate returns from the technology. Inventing a successful new 
technology that provides significant value to customers is necessary for the successful 
commercialization of a new technology. But it is not enough. The gains from a new 
technology often go to competitors who imitate the technology, customers or suppliers of the 
complementary assets needed to commercialize the technology (Teece, 1986). Therefore, 
successful commercialization also involves finding a way to appropriate enough of the gains 
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from the new technology to make the commercialization effort worthwhile (Winter, 2000). 
The second element is the nature of core activities undertaken by the start-up. The 
commercialization of a technology requires a number of capabilities in addition to the 
technology itself. These capabilities include manufacturing, marketing, distribution and 
service activities (Teece, 1986). This section identifies which of these core activities are 
conducted by the start-ups versus which are conducted by other firms. Table 6.3 summarizes 
the results of these analyses. 
 
Table 6.3 Nature of business operations of the start-ups 
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Notes: Sources of information: 
1. DALSA Corporation, 2004 Annual Report. 
2. Certicom Corp., 2004 Annual Report. 
3. Senesco Technologies, Inc., 2004 Annual Report. 
 
6.2.2.1 Method of appropriating returns from technology 
DALSA earns returns on its technology primarily through sales of standard products based 
on the technology. In 2004, standard product sales produced revenues of $159m representing 
94% of the company’s total revenue (DALSA, 2004). 
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Under its Intellectual Property Licensing Program, Certicom earns returns on its 
technology through royalties from licensing its technology to other firms. These licensing 
agreements generally give the licensees non-exclusive rights to use Certicom’s patented 
technologies (Certicom, 2004a). In 2004, royalties from technology licenses produced 
revenues of $25m representing 72% of the company’s total revenue (Certicom, 2004a). 
Senesco licenses its technology on a crop by crop basis and earns returns on its technology 
from: 
 nonrefundable upfront license fees received in exchange for the transfer of the 
technology to the licensee; 
 milestone payments contingent on the achievement of certain research goals; and 
 royalty payments on the commercial introduction of products using Senesco’s 
technology. 
These licensing agreements are generally worldwide exclusive rights to use Senesco’s 
patented technologies for a specific crop. In 2004, earned US$16,667 in nonrefundable 
upfront license fees representing 100% of the company’s total revenue (Senesco, 2004). 
In summary, DALSA derives its revenues from product market activity while Certicom 
and Senesco derive their revenues from technology market activity. These findings are 
consistent with Hypotheses 1a: The build option is positively associated with new firms 
created to commercialize technologies deriving revenue primarily from product market 
activity and 1b: The rent and sell options are positively associated with new firms created to 
commercialize technologies deriving revenue primarily from technology market activity. 
6.2.2.2 Operating activities 
DALSA designs, develops, manufactures, markets and sells products based on its 
technology. In 2004, the costs of manufacturing it standard products were $88m representing 
63% of its total operating costs. Research and development expenditures totaled $23m 
representing 16% of its total operating costs. The cost of marketing and selling activities are 
not separately broken out in DALSA’s financial statements but are part of a $26m expense 
category (DALSA, 2004). Thus DALSA is directly involved in all of the activities involved 
in commercializing its technologies. 
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In the case of Certicom’s Intellectual Property Licensing Program, Certicom has 
undertaken the research and development activities necessary develop its patent portfolio. 
Once the patents are licensed, Certicom has “no continuing obligations” (Certicom, 2004a, p. 
27) related to the licenses. The licensee is responsible for developing products based on the 
technology and manufacturing, marketing and selling those products. 
Senesco is similar to Certicom in that it undertakes research and development activities but 
not the other activities involved in the commercialization of its technology. Senseco develops 
partnerships with other firms who take on further technological development, marketing and 
distribution of products based on Senesco’s technology (Senesco, 2004, p. 4). 
In summary, DALSA is involved in both technology development activities and production 
activities while Certicom and Senesco are involved in technology development activities but 
not production activities. This finding is consistent with Hypotheses 2a: The build option is 
positively associated with new firms created to commercialize technologies expending 
significant resources on both technology development activities and production activities and 
2b: The rent and sell options are positively associated with new firms created to 
commercialize technologies expending significant resources on technology development 
activities but not on production activities. 
6.3 Discussion 
6.3.1 Limitations 
The analyses above are based examination of only three firms. These three firms were 
selected because of the differences in their approach to the commercialization of new 
technologies rather than to be a representative sample of start-up firms involved in the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. For these reasons, 
while the findings are consistent with Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, they cannot be 
considered strong evidence in support of the hypotheses. The findings may also not be 
generalizable to other firms. These issues are addressed in part by the broader sample in 
Study #2. In addition, these analyses are based on archival data sources and it is not possible 
to gather information about the technology attributes that are involved in Hypotheses 3 
through 8 from these sources. Consequently, no evidence concerning these hypotheses is 
provided by this study. This issue is addressed in part by Study #3 which involves gathering 




The above analyses highlight a number of important considerations related to start-ups that 
commercialize new technologies arising from university research. The first is that start-ups 
can have very distinctive approaches to commercialization. DALSA’s approach of building a 
business that manufactures and sells products based on the new technology is the 
conventional one most often thought of when commercialization through start-ups is 
discussed. However, Certicom and Senesco have taken different approaches to 
commercialization. Neither manufactures and sells products based on their technology. 
Rather they operate in markets for technology where they sell rights to use their technology 
to other firms who manufacture and sell products based on the technology. These differences 
suggest that there may be important differences between start-ups that are not accounted for 
when all start-ups are grouped together and considered a single method of 
commercialization. 
Secondly, even though all three firms reflect situations where a start-up was involved in 
the commercialization of a technology, in two of the three cases (Certicom and Senesco) the 
situations also involved the subsequent licensing of the technology to established firms. This 
finding suggests that the traditional method of analyzing the commercialization of 
technologies arising from university research as either start-up or licensing do not reflect the 
variety of approaches to commercialization actually found in practice. Related to this is the 
finding that the method used to transfer an innovation out of a university may not reflect the 
method used to commercialize the technology. In the cases of both Certicom and Senesco, 
start-up firms were used to transfer the technology out of the university environment and into 
the commercial one. However, the actual commercialization of the technology was done by 
established firms who licensed the technologies from Certicom and Senesco respectively. 
This finding suggests that classifying the method used to commercialize a technology based 
on the method used to transfer the innovation out of the university may not reflect the actual 
method of commercialization. 
Thirdly, there are significant differences in the nature of the operations of the three firms. 
DALSA is organized to provide a full range of operating activities from research and 
development, through product development, manufacturing, marketing and distribution of 
products based on the technology. Certicom and Senesco have much more limited operating 
activities focused primarily on research and development activities related to developing the 
technology involved. An important finding is that differences in the nature of operations of 
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these start-ups are reflected in the nature of the revenues the start-up receives and in the types 
of operating expenses it incurs. This finding is used in Study #2 to analyze a larger sample of 
start-ups. 
6.4 Summary 
In summary, this tale of three start-ups supports the concerns raised in section 3.1 about the 
licensing vs. start-up dichotomy for analyzing the commercialization of new technologies 
arising from university research. It also provides some support for the build, rent and sell 
classification of governance structures proposed in chapter 3. Further, the findings of this 
study are consistent with Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b. 
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Chapter 7 
Results Study #2 – An Examination into the Nature of Business 
Activities of Public Start-up Firms 
This chapter presents the results of the examination of the nature of the business activities of 
public start-up firms involved in the commercialization of new technologies arising from 
university research. The purposes of this examination are 1) to demonstrate that the criteria 
identified in chapter 3 can be applied effectively in practice to classify the method used to 
commercialize a new technology arising from university research, 2) to demonstrate that the 
build, rent and sell methods are all common approaches to commercialization, and 3) to 
demonstrate that there are substantive differences in the business activities of firms 
depending on the method of commercialization used. 
7.1 Results 
This study uses two separate samples of public start-up firms that have commercialized new 
technologies arising from university research. The first sample is of Canadian companies 
built on National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (“NSERC”) funded 
research. The second sample is of U.S. companies built on research conducted at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”). Tables 7.1 and 7.2 list the firms and the 
years they were founded. 
Table 7.3 contains demographic information on the firms. Average revenues and total 
operating costs are broadly comparable between the Canadian and U.S. samples although the 
U.S. firms are somewhat larger. In both samples, there is significant variability in revenues 
and operating costs between the individual firms. The industries in which these firms operate 
were classified as either life sciences or physical sciences. Life sciences firms are primarily 
involved in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Physical sciences firms are primarily 
involved in electronics and software. Approximately one half of the firms are involved in life 




Table 7.1 Canadian start-up firms and years of founding 
Firm name Year of founding 
AD OPT Technologies Inc. 1987 
Advitech Inc. 1996 
BioChem Pharma Inc. 1986 
Biomira Inc. 1985 
Biorem Technologies Inc. 1990 
Cell-Loc Location Technologies Inc. 1995 
Certicom Corp. 1985 
DALSA Corporation 1980 
Forbes Medi-Tech Inc. 1993 
GeneMax Corp. 1999 
Innova LifeSciences Corporation 1992 
Innovotech Inc. 1996 
Kipp &Zonen Inc. 1981 
Lumenon Innovative Lightwave Technology, Inc. 1998 
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. 1969 
Micrologix Biotech Inc. 1993 
Millenium Biologix Corporation 1992 
Nexia Biotechnologies Inc. 1993 
NTI Newmerical Inc. 1998 
Open Text Corporation 1991 
Polyphalt Inc. 1992 
Prescient NeuroPharma Inc. 1992 
QLT Inc. 1981 
SatCon Technology Corporation 1980 
SemBioSys Genetics Inc. 1994 
TIR Systems Ltd. 1982 
TurboSonic Technologies, Inc. 1976 
Virtek Vision International Inc. 1986 
Westport Innovations Inc. 1995 
Wi-LAN Inc. 1992 
ZENON Environmental Inc. 1980 
Notes: Some firms have changed names over time. The most current names are listed in this table. Years of 
founding for the Canadian start-up sample come from Research Means Business (NSERC, 2002). 
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Table 7.2 U.S. start-up firms and years of founding 
Firm name Year of founding 
Algos Pharmaceutical Corporation 1992 
Alpha-Beta Technology, Inc. 1988 
American Superconductor Corporation 1987 
ARIAD Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1991 
Aspen Technology, Inc. 1981 
Aware, Inc. 1986 
Axys Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1989 
Cambridge Heart, Inc. 1990 
Cirrus Logic, Inc. 1984 
Cubist Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1992 
Electronics for Imaging Inc. 1989 
GelTex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1991 
ImmuLogic Pharmaceutical Corporation 1987 
Indevus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1988 
Integra LifeSciences Holdings Corporation 1989 
Kopin Corporation 1984 
Matritech, Inc. 1987 
Open Market, Inc. 1993 
Organogenesis Inc. 1985 
Soligen Technologies, Inc. 1991 
Somatix Therapy Corporation 1991 
SpectraScience, Inc. 1983 
Stressgen Biotechnologies Corporation 1990 
Notes: Some firms have changed names over time. The most current names are listed in this 
table. Years of founding for US start-up sample come from company Annual Reports filed on 
Form 10K, company websites or Standard & Poor’s Stock Report for the company. 
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Table 7.3 Total revenues, total operating costs and industry classification of the 
start-up firms 
Characteristic Mean s.d. n % 
Total revenues:  Canadian sample 77,628,629 158,953,727 
 U.S. sample (in Cdn$) 87,279,582 144,661,405 
Total operating costs:  Canadian sample 66,701,127 132,920,839 
 U.S. sample (in Cdn$) 117,558,186 145,286,377 
Industrial classification  
Life sciences:  Canadian sample  13 42
 U.S. sample  12 52
Physical sciences:  Canadian sample  18 58
 U.S. sample  11 48
 
7.1.1 Method of commercialization 
Table 7.4 summarizes the results of the analysis of the methods of commercialization for the 
start-up firms. The start-ups were classified using the methods described in section 5.3.3.1. 
The build method of commercialization was the most frequently observed method of 
commercialization among the start-ups (50%). The rent and sell methods of 
commercialization were observed less frequently. Nonetheless, they are important methods 
representing in total 13% of the start-ups examined and 18% of those that have emerged from 
development stage. As indicated in section 3.1, little attention has been paid in the literature 
on university technology transfer to these start-ups that compete through the market for 
technologies rather than through the product market. Hybrids represent 7.4% of the start-ups 
examined. Hybrids reflect situations where commercialization of the technology involves the 
combined efforts of both the startup and an established firm(s). For example, the technology 
may have been commercialized through a joint venture or partnership with an established 
firm with the startup contributing manufacturing capabilities and the established firm 
contributing marketing and distribution capabilities to the joint venture. As described in 
section 2.6.1, hybrids represent governance structures that fall between markets and 
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hierarchies. The development stage start-ups (29.6%) represent firms whose technologies had 
not yet been put into commercial use. 
 
Table 7.4 Methods used to commercialize technologies 
Method used Canadian 
start-ups 
U.S. start-ups Total 
 n % n % n % 
Build 16  51.6 11  47.8 27  50.0 
Rent  3   9.7  1   4.3  4   7.4 
Sell  1   3.2  2   8.7  3   5.6 
Hybrid  2   6.5  2   8.7  4   7.4 
Development 
stage 
 9  29.0  7  30.4 16  29.6 
Total 31 100.0 23 100.0 54 100.0 
 
7.1.2 Business activities of the start-up 
Table 7.5 summarizes the means, standard deviations and correlations between the four 
measures of business activities used in this study. These measures are defined in section 
5.3.2. 
One of the objectives of this study is to demonstrate that there are substantive differences 
in the business activities of firms depending on the method of commercialization used. 
Cluster analysis is a technique for grouping items in a population based on the characteristics 
they possess (Hair et al., 1998). Cluster analysis has the benefit that it does not depend on the 
normality, linearity and homoscedasticity of the data that many other techniques rely on. This 
is important because the data on business activities have nonnormal distributions. Criticisms 
of cluster analysis are that it is descriptive, uses no theoretical basis for clustering the data 
and does not provide a statistical basis for drawing inferences (Hair et al, 1998). 
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Acknowledging these limits of cluster analysis, it is, nonetheless, well suited for identifying 
differences in the business activities of the start-ups. 
 
Table 7.5 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for business activity 
measures (N = 54) 
 Business activity measures Mean s.d. 1 2 3 
1 Product market activity .59 .46    
2 Technology market activity .17 .32 -.53   
3 Technology development activity .32 .25 -.74  .43  
4 Production activity .26 .24  .84 -.45 -.74 
 
Cluster analysis was run separately on the Canadian and U.S. data as a test of the validity 
of the cluster solutions (Hair et al., 1998). As a first step, both samples were analyzed using 
the Ward’s linkage hierarchical method in SPSS. Based on a review of the agglomeration 
coefficients and dendrograms, a three-cluster solution proved to be the simplest and most 
appropriate structure in both cases. To fine-tune the cluster analysis, both samples were 
analyzed using the quick cluster nonhierarchical method in SPSS. The two analyses produced 
clusters with very similar cluster centers. These results support the validity of the cluster 
solutions. Since the results are very similar, the samples were combined and the analyses 
repeated on the combined sample. The results that follow are from the combined samples. 
Two items in the Canadian sample had missing data and were excluded from the analyses 
resulting in a sample size of 52. 
Table 7.6 reports the number of items in each cluster and the cluster centers for each 
variable. Also reported is an F value reflecting the ratio of between-cluster variation to 
within-cluster variation. Due to the nature of cluster analysis, these F values are considered 
descriptive rather than as measures of statistical significance (Hair et al., 1998). Nonetheless, 
these F values suggest a very good overall fit to the cluster model. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 are 
plots of the start-ups on the two market measures and the two resources measures 
respectively. Figure 7.1 demonstrates very clear differences between the clusters in relation 
to the product market activity and technology market activity measures. The differences 
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between clusters in Figure 7.2 are less pronounced but still show difference between the 
clusters in relation to the technology development activity and production activity measures. 
 
Table 7.6 Cluster analysis for combined sample (N = 52) 
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 F value 
Number of start-ups in cluster 30 10 12  
Product market activity .97 .14 .01 588.11*
Technology market activity .01 .75 .02 348.78*
Technology development activity .18 .52 .52 22.03* 
Production activity .43 .05 .02 56.13* 
Note: * p < .001 
 





















































Cluster 1 (n=30) Cluster 2 (n=10) Cluster 3 (n=12)
 
 
7.1.2.1 Characterization of the three clusters 
Start-ups in Cluster 1 are firms that operate almost exclusively in product markets with little 
activity in markets for technology. They also expend a significant amount of their resources 
on production activities and a more limited amount of their resources on technology 
development activities. 
Start-ups in Cluster 2 are firms that operate primarily in markets for technology with 
limited activity in product markets. They expend the majority of their resources on 
technology development activities and a very limited amount of resources on production 
activities. 
Start-ups in Cluster 3 are firms that are not yet active in either product markets or markets 
for technology. Like start-ups in Cluster 2, they expend the majority of their resources on 
technology development activities and virtually none on production activities. These 
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characterizations serve to illustrate the substantive differences in the business activities of 
firms in the three clusters. 
7.2 Comparison of methods of commercialization with cluster analysis 
Table 7.7 contains a comparison of the results of the analysis of the methods of 
commercialization with the results of the cluster analysis. 
 
Table 7.7 Comparison of methods of commercialization with cluster analysis 
Method of 
commercialization 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Missing 
data 
Total 
Build 26  0  0 1 27 
Rent  0  3  0 1  4 
Sell  0  3  0 0  3 
Hybrid  3  1  0 0  4 
Development 
stage 
 1  3 12 0 16 
Total 30 10 12 2 54 
 
The hypotheses related to governance choices and firm characteristics are: 
H1a: The build option is positively associated with new firms 
created to commercialize technologies deriving revenue 
primarily from product market activity. 
H1b: The rent and sell options are positively associated with 
new firms created to commercialize technologies deriving 
revenue primarily from technology market activity. 
H2a: The build option is positively associated with new firms 
created to commercialize technologies expending resources on 
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both technology development activities and production 
activities. 
H2b: The rent and sell options are positively associated with 
new firms created to commercialize technologies expending 
resources on technology development activities but not on 
production activities. 
As indicated in section 7.1.2.1, Cluster 1 characterizes firms that derive revenue primarily 
from product market activity and expend resources on both technology development 
activities and production activities. Cluster 2 characterizes firms that derive revenue 
primarily from technology market activity and expend resources on technology development 
activities but not on production activities. Consequently, these hypotheses can be reframed as 
considering whether there is an association between firms using the build method of 
commercialization and the characteristics of firms in Cluster 1 and between firms using the 
rent or sell methods of commercialization and the characteristics of firms in Cluster 2. The 
Fisher exact test for the 2x2 table (build vs. rent or sell, Cluster 1 vs. Cluster 2) is highly 
statistically significant (p < .001). Thus, hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b are supported. 
7.3 Conclusions 
7.3.1 Limitations of the study 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, as described earlier, the sample 
population may not be representative of all start-ups created to commercialize new 
technologies arising from university research. While NSERC funded research is an important 
source of new technologies, new technologies also result from university research not funded 
by NSERC. MIT start-ups also may not be representative of start-ups from other universities. 
Consequently, the results of this study may not be generalizable to all commercialized 
technologies arising from university research. Nonetheless, the samples represent important 
sources of new technologies and afford the benefits arising from having two separate samples 
from different countries and derived from different sources. A second limitation is that the 
variables used in the cluster analysis are not sensitive to differences between the rent and sell 
methods of commercialization. The cluster analysis is based on accounting data and this data 
does not address the issues of ownership of property rights to the technology that distinguish 
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between the rent and sell methods. Future research can attempt to identify an additional 
variable(s) that capture these differences and can be used to distinguish between the two 
methods. A third limitation of the study is that the analysis does not capture all ways that the 
sell method can be implemented. The analysis in this chapter uses financial statement 
information. Financial statements capture situations where rights to a technology are 
transferred to an established firm by way of a transaction between the start-up and the 
established firm. They do not, however, capture situations where the established firm 
acquires the technology by acquiring the start-up. In the course of performing this study, 
three situations were identified where established firms acquired a technology indirectly by 
acquiring the start-up while it was still in the development stage. 
7.3.2 Implications 
This study has a number of implications for examining the commercialization of new 
technologies arising from university research. First, it demonstrates that the criteria 
developed in chapter 3 to distinguish between the build, rent and sell categories can be 
applied to actual commercialization situations. This is important as it demonstrates that the 
build, rent and sell categorization scheme is not only theoretically based but also is a 
practical tool for looking at the actual commercialization of specific technologies. 
Second, it demonstrates that the build, rent and sell methods of commercialization are all 
frequently occurring methods of commercialization. This is important since theoretically 
derived categories might describe situations that are theoretically possible but do not occur in 
actual practice. This analysis has shown that the build, rent and sell methods of 
commercialization do, in fact, occur in actual practice. 
A third implication is that the build, rent and sell categorization scheme identifies 
substantive differences in the operating activities associated with commercialization of a new 
technology. Significant differences were identified in the markets in which the firms operate 
and in how they allocate their resources. This is important since it demonstrates that the 
differences between the build, rent and sell methods of commercialization are not subtle 




The study in this chapter demonstrates that build, rent and sell are common and viable 
approaches to commercialization and that there are substantive differences between the 
approaches. In doing so, it provides evidence as to the validity of the build, rent and sell 
categorization approach. The next chapter builds on the findings in this and the preceding 
chapter using the build, rent and sell categorization approach to examine whether 
characteristics of technologies affect the methods used to commercialize the technologies. 
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Chapter 8 
Results Study #3 – Survey of academic inventors 
This chapter contains the results of the survey of academic inventors. The primary purpose of 
this study was to examine the connection between the characteristics of a new technology 
and the method used to commercialize the technology. 
8.1 Demographic information 
The sample consisted of 42 participants. Table 8.1 includes information about the faculty 
affiliation, academic rank, number of years actively involved in academic research and 
number of innovations put into commercial use of the participants.  
The distribution of faculty affiliations is reasonably consistent with the findings of Thursby 
et al. (2001) whose survey of 62 U.S. universities found that the most common affiliations of 
inventors were medical schools (33% of inventions), engineering (29%) and science (22%). 
Faculty from medical schools are underrepresented in this study since University #1, which is 
the primary source of data, does not have a medical school. This finding might suggest that 
life sciences technologies are not represented in the sample. However, as indicated in Table 
8.2, a number of life sciences technologies are represented in the sample. These life sciences 
technologies were developed by faculty members in science (e.g., biology, optometry) and 
engineering (e.g., chemical engineering). 
The academic rank and number of years actively involved in academic research of the 
respondents indicates a broad range of experience among those who have commercialized 
new technologies. While most of those who have commercialized new technologies are 
senior faculty members with significant experience, more junior faculty members with much 
less research experience are also represented. 
Participants were asked how many new technologies resulting from their academic 
research have been put into commercial use. Faculty members reported an average of 2.5 
commercialized technologies. Of those who responded to this question (n = 37), 14 
respondents (38%) reported one commercialized technology, eight respondents (22%) 
reported two commercialized technologies and 15 respondents (41%) reported more than two 
commercialized technologies. The maximum number of commercialized technologies 
reported was ten by two respondents. The large number of respondents reporting multiple 
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commercialized technologies suggests the existence of a class of serial commercializers 
among faculty members. 
 
Table 8.1 Faculty affiliation, academic rank, experience and number of 
commercialized technologies of survey participants 
Characteristic n % Mean s.d. 
Faculty affiliation:  Engineering 21 50   
 Science 13 31   
 Mathematics  6 14   
 Other  2  5   
Academic rank:  Professor emeritus  3  7   
 Professor 24 57   
 Associate professor  9 21   
 Assistant professor  3  7   
 Other  3  7   
Number of years actively involved in academic research   24.0 10.2
Number of technologies put into commercial use     2.5  2.2 
 
Participants were asked to identify the most significant new technology they had invented 
that had been put into commercial use and the remainder of the survey addressed this 
technology. The use of the most significant innovation of an inventor as the unit of analysis 
is consistent with the approach taken by both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (1996) and Statistics Canada. Table 8.2 shows information about the field 
of use, type and stage of development of the technologies. 
Respondents were asked to provide a brief description of the new technology. These were 
classified by field of use. The sample covers a broad variety of fields with the most common 
being computer related (26%), environmental (17%) and life sciences (14%). The majority of 
the technologies are product innovations (64%) while the balance are primarily process 
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innovations (31%). The information gathered on the stage of development of the 
technologies supports the findings of Thursby et al. (2001) that most technologies coming out 
of universities are at an early stage. Only 17% of the technologies were unchanged through 
the commercialization process. Approximately equal proportions (38%) required minor or 
major change and a small proportion 7% were substantially changed during the 
commercialization process. 
 
Table 8.2 Field of use, type and stage of development of technologies 
Characteristic n % 
Field of use:  Computer related 11 26 
 Environmental 7 17 
 Life sciences 6 14 
 Electronics 4 10 
 Manufacturing 4 10 
 Transportation 2 5 
 Other 8 19 
Type of technology:  Product 27 64 
 Process 13 31 
 Knowledge not embodied in a specific 
product, process or service 
4 10 
Stage of development:   
 Technology unchanged through transfer from research 
environment to commercial one 
7 17 
 Technology underwent minor change during transfer 
from research environment to commercial one 
16 38 
 Technology changed significantly during transfer 
from research environment to commercial one 
16 38 
 Technology put into commercial use bore little resemblance 
to the one that emerged from the research environment 
3 7 
Note: Percentages for type of technology add to more than 100% due to multiple responses. 
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In summary, the survey covers a broad range of faculty affiliations, researcher experience, 
types of technologies and stages of development. Further, the distribution of survey 
respondents across these categories is consistent with other research on the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. 
8.2 Independent variables 
Consistent with the process set out by Churchill (1979), the reliability of the independent 
variable measures was assessed using the survey data. This was done by calculating 
Cronbach’s alpha for each of the independent variables using the items listed in Table 5.1. 
Two issues arose in this analysis. The first issue involves the tacitness and complexity 
variables. Cronbach’s alpha for the tacitness and complexity variables, .40 and .37 
respectively, were below the levels generally required to conclude that the measures are 
reliable (Hair et al., 1998). One of the items for the tacitness variable, ‘The critical elements 
of this innovation could be easily explained to my colleagues (e.g., in a paper or at a 
conference),’ is highly skewed (52% of participants gave responses of 5 to this item on a 5-
point scale where 1 represented “Strongly disagree” and 5 represented “Strongly agree”). It 
also had very low correlations with the other two items for tacitness. Based on these analyses 
and the fact that this is an additional item developed by the author of this thesis and is not 
from the same source as the other two items, this item was removed from the tacitness 
measure. Two of the items for the complexity measure, ‘This innovation was a component of 
a larger product, process or system’ and ‘A change in the design of this innovation would 
require compensating design changes in related components or system,’ had low correlations 
with each other and with the other two items for complexity. Because of this and the fact that 
these were additional items not derived from the source used for the other two items, these 
items were removed from the complexity measure. The remaining items in the tacitness and 
complexity measures had strong correlations to each other. Based on a review of the items, it 
was concluded that the items reflected a single underlying construct. The complexity items 
were derived from Chesbrough and Kusunoki (2001) who suggest that new technologies 
typically begin in an ‘integral’ phase where the interactions between components of the 
system are not well understood. They suggest that only later in the development process do 
“standards develop that articulate and codify the interactions between elements of a system” 
(p. 205). The items in the measure for tacitness can reasonably be interpreted as reflecting 
this codification. Consequently, it is reasonable to interpret the correlations as indications 
that a single construct is being measured. 
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The second issue that arose involves the volatility and dynamism constructs. The survey 
included items related to technology volatility, technology dynamism, market volatility and 
market dynamism. The results show strong correlations between the technology volatility and 
market volatility items. Accordingly, these items were combined into a single volatility 
construct. Similarly, the results show strong correlations between the technology dynamism 
and market dynamism items. These items were combined into a single dynamism construct. 
Table 8.3 shows the adjusted constructs and items together with the values for Cronbach’s 
alpha. Values exceeding .70 for Cronbach’s alpha are generally considered good indicators of 
measure reliability though lower values exceeding .60 are considered acceptable in 
exploratory research (Hair et al., 1998). All of the values for Cronbach’s alpha exceed this 
lower threshold. 
The measures and items used in this study come from previous research (see Table 5.1). 
The evidence gathered in these previous studies provides significant support for the validity 
of the measures. However, since the measures come from more than one previous study, 
there is a risk that the scales and items derived by two different authors may be measuring 
the same underlying construct. To test for this, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted 
using the 14 items listed in Table 8.3. The analysis was performed using principal component 
analysis with varimax rotation. Using a cut-off of eigenvalues greater than 1.0, the analysis 
produced a five factor solution. The five factors align with the independent variables. For 
each of the 14 items, the largest factor loading in the rotated solution aligned with the 
variable to which it was predicted to be associated. The five factors account for 73% of the 
variance of the 14 items. These findings provide further support for the validity of the 
measures. 
8.2.1 Specialized complementary assets 
The importance and specificity of complementary assets are addressed through two questions 
in the survey. The first, question 24, asked about the importance of various complementary 
assets for the commercialization of the technology. The second, question 25, asked whether 
these complementary assets need to be tailored to the technology. Each question was 
measured using a 5-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Hypothesis H6 
is concerned with complementary assets that are specialized to the technology (i.e., those that 
are tailored to the technology). However, if complementary assets are specialized but are not 
important for commercialization, they will not create contracting problems and, therefore, are  
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Table 8.3 Technology attribute variables and items 
Variables and items Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Patent or other legal protection (IP) .61 
 The intellectual property protection obtained was effective in deterring 
imitation of the innovation 
 
 Fundamentally similar innovations exist. (R)  
 Few credible substitutes competed with this innovation.  
Tacitness/Complexity (TACCOM) .72 
 Manuals and documents accurately explained the implementation and 
operation of this innovation. (R) 
 
 Educating and training personnel for this innovation was a quick and 
easy job. (R) 
 
 Interactions between this innovation and related components or systems 
were poorly understood. 
 
 Technical information about how this innovation functions together 
with other components or systems was well defined. (R) 
 
Risk of substitutes (SUBSTITUTE) .66 
 It would be easy for others to imitate this innovation.  
 The ‘reverse engineering’ of this innovation by a competitor would be 
technically difficult. (R) 
 
Volatility (VOLATILITY) .87 
 I was confident that this innovation would perform as it was originally 
designed. 
 
 It was clear that this innovation would work as it was intended 
technologically. 
 
 I was certain this innovation would meet user demands.  
Dynamism (DYNAMISM) .65 
 Future technological breakthroughs were likely to render this innovation 
of little value in a short time period. 
 




unlikely to affect the choice of governance structure. Consequently, only specialized 
complementary assets that are important for the commercialization of the technology are 
addressed in this section. To capture important specialized complementary assets, the 
measure SPECCA was created. This measure has the value 1 if there was a complementary 
asset that was identified as both important (i.e., assessed as 5 on the 5-point scale used for 
question 24) and specialized (i.e., assessed as 5 on the 5-point scale used for question 25). 
SPECCA has a value of 0 if no complementary asset was identified as both important and 
specialized. In the sample, 21 (50%) items have a value of 1 for SPECCA and 21 (50%) 
items have a value of 0 for SPECCA. This approach to the measurement of complementary 
assets is similar to that used by Gans et al. (2002) who use a measure for complementary 
assets that is the maximum over 5-point scales measuring the importance and effectiveness of 
ownership of various complementary assets. 
8.2.2 Control variables 
Two control variables were considered in the analysis. The first is the affiliation of the 
faculty inventor. Previous research suggests that university differences may have an 
influence on commercialization (see section 2.3). The sample comes from universities in the 
same geographic area minimizing the impact of geographic differences. The two universities 
do have differing intellectual property ownership policies. University #1 has an ‘inventor 
owns’ policy while University #2 has a ‘university owns policy.’ Differences in intellectual 
property policy might influence the methods used to commercialize an innovation since 
individual inventors may take a wide variety of approaches to commercialization while 
universities may develop routines over times that tend to restrict the approaches to 
commercialization that they consider (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1961). However, the 
number of sample items from University #2 (n = 3) is very limited and, consequently, the 
university affiliation of the faculty inventor is not an effective control variable. This 
limitation will be addressed as part of future research (see section 9.3). Within a university, 
differences that might affect methods of commercialization could occur at the faculty and 
department levels. For example, Todorovic (2004) suggests that the entrepreneurial 
orientation of university departments influences commercialization activity. Considering the 
trade off between the benefits of being more specific and the limitations of the overall sample 




The second factor considered as a control variable is the stage of development of the 
innovation. As described in section 2.4, some researchers have suggested that the stage of 
development may affect the method used to commercialize an innovation. 
8.2.2.1 Faculty affiliation 
Table 8.4 shows the faculty affiliations of the faculty inventors in the sample categorized by 
whether the technologies were commercialized using the build, rent or sell option and by 
whether a Start-up or Licensing was involved. Fisher’s exact test for the 4 x 3 table (Faculty 
affiliation vs. governance structure) was not significant (p = .07) though it approached 
significance. Examination of the table suggests that this is due to a low proportion of 
technologies developed by Science faculty members that were commercialized using the 
build option. Fisher’s exact test on the 2 x 2 table (science/other faculty vs. build/other 
options) was significant (p = .01). This suggests that it is appropriate to control for Science 
affiliations when testing hypotheses related to governance structure. 
 
Table 8.4 Faculty affiliations and methods used to commercialize innovation 
Faculty affiliations Build Rent Sell Total Start-up Licensing Total
Engineering 14 4  3 21 17 4 21 
Science  3 4  6 13  5 8 13 
Mathematics  5 0  1  6  6 0  6 
Other  1 1  0  2  2 0  2 
Total 23 9 10 42 30 12 42 
 
Fisher’s exact test on the 4 x 2 table (Faculty affiliation vs. Start-up) was also significant (p 
= .01). This is due to the proportion of technologies from the science faculty that involved 
start-ups (38%) being substantially lower than the proportion of technologies from other 
faculties that involved start-ups (86%). These findings suggest that it is appropriate to include 




While there is no direct evidence concerning why affiliation with science faculties affects 
the method of commercialization, it may be that researchers in science faculties pursue more 
basic research than researchers in other faculties and are less likely to appreciate the potential 
markets for products and services based on the technology. As a result, they may be more 
likely to commercialize a technology by transferring it to an established firm than by creating 
a new firm to commercialize the technology. 
8.2.2.2 Stage of development 
Table 8.5 shows the stage of development of the technologies in the sample categorized by 
whether the technologies were commercialized using the build, rent or sell option and by 
whether a Start-up or Licensing was involved. Fisher’s exact test for the 4 x 3 table (Stage of 
development vs. governance structure) was not significant (p = .57). Fisher’s exact test for 
the 4 x 2 table (Stage of development vs. start-up) also was not significant (p = .45). Based 
on these findings and examination of the table, there no evidence suggesting that the stage of 
development has any relationship to the choice of governance structure or whether the 
technology was commercialized using a start-up. Thus, stage of development will not be 
controlled for in the tests of the hypotheses related to governance structures. 
8.2.3 Dependent variable – Governance structure 
The dependent variable for this study is the governance structure used to commercialize the 
innovation. More specifically, the dependent variable measures whether a build, rent or sell 
option to commercialization was adopted. The classification of governance structure is based 
on whether the technology was commercialized by a new firm or existing firm and on 
ownership of the property rights to the technology (see section 3.5). Participants were asked 
whether the innovation was commercialized by a newly created firm or by one or more 
established firms (question 29). When participants indicated that a newly created firm was 
involved, they were further asked whether the newly created firm produced products or 
services based on the innovation or whether the newly created firm marketed the innovation 
to other firms that produced products or services based on the innovation (question 30). 
When it was indicated that a new firm was created and that the newly created firm produced 
products or services based on the technology, the technology was assessed as having been 
commercialized by a new firm. In these cases, the technology was coded as having been 
commercialized using the build option consistent with the criteria in section 3.5. When it was 
indicated that a new firm was created and that the newly created firm marketed the  
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Table 8.5 Stage of development and methods used to commercialize innovation 
Stage of development Build Rent Sell Total Start-
up 
Licensing Total
Technology unchanged through 
transfer from research environment 
to commercial one 
 3 1  3  7  4  3  7 
Technology underwent minor change 
during transfer from research 
environment to commercial one 
 9 5  2 16 13  3 16 
Technology changed significantly 
during transfer from research 
environment to commercial one 
 8 3  5 16 10  6 16 
Technology put into commercial use 
bore little resemblance to the one that 
emerged from the research 
environment 
 3 0  0  3  3  0  3 
Total 23 9 10 42 30 12 42 
 
technology to other established firms who produced products or services based on the 
technology or when it was indicated that the technology was commercialized directly by 
established firms, the technology was assessed as having been commercialized by established 
firms. Ownership of the residual property rights to the technology was assessed based on 
whether the faculty inventor or their university held an equity ownership interest in the 
technology. Oxley (1999) identifies the sharing of equity as “a discrete, observable, ‘step 
function’ in governance attributes, effectively separating it from contractual forms. As such 
this is a useful ‘break point’ in the underlying market-hierarchy continuum” (p. 288). When 
the faculty inventor or their university held an equity interest in the technology, the 
technology was assessed as having been commercialized using the rent method consistent 
with the criteria in section 3.5. When the faculty inventor and their university did not hold an 
equity interest, the technology was assessed as having been commercialized using the sell 
method consistent with the criteria in section 3.5. Based on this method of classification, 23 
sample items (55%) were classified as using the build option, nine sample items (21%) were 




In this research, it is suggested that the build, rent and sell classification scheme better 
reflects the substance of the methods used to commercialize new technologies than the 
licensing vs. start-up dichotomy. In order to allow comparisons between the two 
classification approaches, a second dependent variable (STARTUP) was created. This 
variable was coded as 1 if the respondent indicated that a newly created firm was founded in 
response to question 29 and 0 otherwise. Based on this method of classification, 30 sample 
items (71%) were classified as involving the creation of a start-up. 
8.2.4 Summary of independent, control and dependent variables 
Table 8.6 contains the means, standard deviations and correlations for the independent, 
control and dependent variables described above. 
8.3 Tests of hypotheses 
Because the dependent variables are categorical, logistic regression was used as the primary 
method of testing the hypotheses. While there are three categories for the governance 
structure dependent variable, each of the hypotheses groups two of the categories together. 
For example, Hypothesis 3 is that “the greater the patent or other legal protection for the 
technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the 
rent option.” When using logistic regression to test this hypothesis, the build and sell 
categories are combined for comparison against the rent category. 
8.3.1 Patent and other intellectual property protection for the technology 
Hypothesis 3 is that “the greater the patent or other legal protection for the technology, the 
greater the likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the rent option.” 
Table 8.7 show the results of logistic regressions of the patent and other intellectual property 
protection variable IP on the rent option vs. the build and sell options. Model 1 “explains” 
approximately 22% (Nagelkerke R2) of the total variation in governance structures. Also, the 
model is a significantly better fit to the data (change in –2 log likelihood from base model = 
6.40, df = 1, p =.01) than a model which excludes IP (i.e., one that considers only the mean). 
The estimated coefficient for IP is .43. This indicates that the odds of being in the rent 
category increase by approximately 1.5 times (e.43) for each increase of 1 in the IP scale. This 
coefficient for the IP variable is statistically significant and in the predicted direction. Thus 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. These data were also analyzed controlling for faculty affiliation in 
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science (see section 8.2.2). The results are shown in Table 8.7 as Model 2. Controlling for 
faculty affiliation in science has no significant impact on the model fit or coefficient 
estimates. 
Table 8.6 Means, standard deviations and correlations for the independent, control 
and dependent variables 
Variable M s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 IP 10.30 2.98           
2 TACCOM 10.70 4.03 -.16          
3 SUBSTITUTE 5.50 2.37 -.14 -.12         
4 VOLATILITY 11.79 2.74 .32* -.39* -.06        
5 DYNAMISM 3.76 1.96 -.33* -.08 .09 -.23       
6 SPECCA .50 .51 .23 -.13 .21 .17 .03      
7 SCIENCE .31 .47 .13 -.10 .36* .13 -.24 -.05     
8 BUILD .55 .50 -.14 -.03 -.24 -.04 .33* .24 -.43**    
9 RENT .21 .42 .35* .18 .06 -.20 -.27 -.17 .15 n.m.   
10 SELL .24 .43 -.17 -.14 .22 .23 -.13 -.11 .35* n.m. n.m.  
11 STARTUP .71 .46 .16 .25 -.32* -.05 .14 .11 -.49** .70** -.06 -.76** 
Note: “n.m.” indicates that these values are not meaningful as the variables represent 
alternative values for the primary dependent variable. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
Table 8.7 also shows the results of a logistic regression on the alternative dependent 
variable STARTUP. This regression has substantially poorer fit than the primary model 
(change in –2 log likelihood from base model = 1.09, df = 1, p =.30) and the estimated 
coefficient for the IP variable (.12) is not statistically significant in this model. 
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Table 8.7 Results of logistic regression related to patent and other protection 
Independent variable Rent – Model 
1 
Rent – Model 
2 
Start-up 
IP .43* (.20) .40* (.20) .12 (.12) 
Science  -.47 (.86)  
Constant -6.07* (2.44) -5.51* (2.58) -.29 (1.19) 
Fit statistics:    
-2 log likelihood 37.24 36.95 49.17 
Change in –2 log likelihood from base 
model (χ2) 
6.40* 6.69* 1.09 
Nagelkerke R2 .22 .23 .04 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
 
8.3.2 Tacitness and complexity 
Hypothesis 4 is that “the greater the combined levels of tacitness and complexity of the 
knowledge inherent in a technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will be 
commercialized using the build or sell options.” Table 8.8 shows the results of the logistic 
regression of the tacitness and complexity variable TACCOM on the build and sell options 
vs. the rent option. The model “explains” approximately 5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the total 
variation in governance structures. The model does not produce a significantly better fit to 
the data (change in –2 log likelihood from base model = 1.37, df = 1, p =.24) than a model 
which excludes TACCOM (i.e., one that includes only the constant term). Thus this model 
does not provide a good fit to the data. The estimated coefficient for TACCOM is -.11. This 
coefficient for the TACCOM variable is not statistically significant and is not in the direction 




Table 8.8 Results of logistic regression related to tacitness and complexity 
Independent variable Build or sell Start-up 
TACCOM -.11 (.10) .15 (.10) 
Constant 2.54 (1.19) -.62 (1.00) 
Fit statistics:   
-2 log likelihood 42.28 47.55 
Change in –2 log likelihood from base model (χ2) 1.37 2.71 
Nagelkerke R2 .05 .09 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
 
Table 8.8 also shows the results of a logistic regression on the alternative dependent 
variable STARTUP. This regression also has a poor fit to the data (change in –2 log 
likelihood from base model = 2.71, df = 1, p =.10) and the estimated coefficient for the 
TACCOM variable (.15) is not statistically significant in this model. 
8.3.3 Risk of substitutes 
Hypothesis 5 is that “the greater the risk of substitutes, the greater the likelihood that the 
technology will be commercialized using the rent option.” Table 8.9 includes the results of a 
logistic regression of the risk of substitutes variable SUBSTITUTE on the rent option vs. the 
build and sell options. The model “explains” approximately 1% (Nagelkerke R2) of the total 
variation in governance structures. The model does not produce a significantly better fit to 
the data (change in –2 log likelihood from base model = .16, df = 1, p =.69) than a model 
which excludes SUBSTITUTE (i.e., one that includes only the constant term). Thus the 
model does not provide a good fit to the data. The estimated coefficient for SUBSTITUTE is 
.06. This coefficient for the SUBSTITUTE variable is in the predicted direction but is not 
statistically significant. Thus Hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
Table 8.9 also includes the results of a logistic regression on the alternative dependent 
variable STARTUP. The model “explains” approximately 14% (Nagelkerke R2) of the total 
variation in start-up vs. licensing activity. Also, the model is a significantly better fit to the 
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data (change in –2 log likelihood from base model = 6.40, df = 1, p =.04) than a model which 
excludes SUBSTITUTE (i.e., one that includes only the constant term). The estimated 
coefficient for SUBSTITUTE is -.31. This indicates that the odds of being in the rent 
category decrease by approximately .7 times (e-.31) for each increase of 1 in the 
SUBSTITUTE scale. This coefficient for the SUBSTITUTE variable is statistically 
significant (p = .05). These data were also analyzed controlling for faculty affiliation in 
science (see section 8.2.2). The results are shown in Table 8.9 as Model 2. Controlling for 
faculty affiliation in science results in a better fitting model than the model that does not 
control for faculty affiliation in science. In addition, the SUBSTITUTE variable is no longer 
statistically significant. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that the greater the risk of 
substitutes, the greater the likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using start-
up option is not supported by the data. 
 
Table 8.9 Results of logistic regression related to risk of substitutes 




SUBST .06 (.16) -.31* (.16) -.20 (.18) 
SCIENCE   2.03* (.81) 
Constant -1.66 (.98) 2.70* (1.02) .84 (1.32) 
Fit statistics:    
-2 log likelihood 43.49 46.07 39.38 
Change in –2 log likelihood from base 
model (χ2) 
.16 4.19* 10.87* 
Nagelkerke R2 .01 .14 .33 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 




8.3.4 Complementary assets 
Hypothesis 6 is that “the greater the importance of specialized complementary assets, the 
greater the likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the sell option.” 
Table 8.10 includes the results of a logistic regression of the complementary asset variable 
SPECCA on the sell option vs. the build and rent options. The model “explains” 
approximately 2% (Nagelkerke R2) of the total variation in governance structures. The model 
does not produce a significantly better fit to the data (change in –2 log likelihood from base 
model = .53, df = 1, p =.47) than a model which excludes SPECCA (i.e., one that includes 
only the constant term). Thus the model does not provide a good fit to the data. The 
estimated coefficient for SPECCA is -.53. This coefficient for the SPECCA variable is not 
statistically significant and is not in the predicted direction. Thus Hypothesis 6 is not 
supported. 
 
Table 8.10 Results of logistic regression related to complementary assets 
Independent variable Sell Start-up 
SPECCA -.53 (.74) .47 (.69) 
Constant 1.45* (.56) -1.16* (.51) 
Fit statistics:   
-2 log likelihood 45.58 49.79 
Change in –2 log likelihood from base model (χ2) .53 .47 
Nagelkerke R2 .02 .02 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
 
Table 8.10 also includes the results of a logistic regression on the alternative dependent 
variable STARTUP. This regression also has poor fit to the data (change in –2 log likelihood 
from base model = .47, df = 1, p =.49) and the estimated coefficient for the SPECCA variable 





Hypothesis 7 is that “the greater the volatility relating to the technology, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the build or sell options.” Table 
8.11 includes the results of a logistic regression of the volatility variable, VOLATILITY, on 
the build and sell options vs. the rent option. The model “explains” approximately 6% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the total variation in governance structures. The model does not produce a 
significantly better fit to the data (change in –2 log likelihood from base model = 1.51, df = 1, 
p = .22) than a model which excludes VOLATILITY (i.e., one that includes only the constant 
term). Thus this model does not provide a good fit to the data. The estimated coefficient for 
VOLATILITY is .17. This coefficient for the VOLATILITY variable is in the predicted 
direction but is not statistically significant. Thus Hypothesis 7 is not supported. 
 
Table 8.11 Results of logistic regression related to volatility 
Independent variable Build or sell Start-up 
VOLATILITY .17 (.13) -.04 (.13) 
Constant -.59 (1.54) 1.41 (1.58) 
Fit statistics:   
-2 log likelihood 42.13 50.15 
Change in –2 log likelihood from base model (χ2) 1.51 .11 
Nagelkerke R2 .06 .00 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
 
Table 8.11 also includes the results of a logistic regression on the alternative dependent 
variable STARTUP. This regression also has poor fit to the data (change in –2 log likelihood 
from base model = .11, df = 1, p =.74) and the estimated coefficient for the VOLATILITY 




Hypothesis 8 is that “the greater the dynamism relating to the technology, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the rent option.” Table 8.12 
includes the results of a logistic regression of the dynamism variable, DYNAMISM, on the 
rent option vs. the build and sell options. The model “explains” approximately 14% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the total variation in governance structures. Also, the model is a 
significantly better fit to the data (change in –2 log likelihood from base model = 3.92, df = 1, 
p =.05) than a model which excludes DYNAMISM (i.e., one that includes only the constant 
term). The estimated coefficient for DYNAMISM is -.55. This indicates that the odds of 
being in the rent category decrease by approximately .58 times (e-.55) for each increase of 1 in 
the IP scale. This coefficient for the DYNAMISM variable is not statistically significant (p = 
.11) and is not in the predicted direction. Thus Hypothesis 8 is not supported. 
 
Table 8.12 Results of logistic regression related to dynamism 
Independent variable Rent Start-up 
DYNAMISM -.55 (.34) .18 (.20) 
Constant .49 (1.07) .26 (.79) 
Fit statistics:   
-2 log likelihood 39.73 49.37 
Change in –2 log likelihood from base model (χ2) 3.92* .89 
Nagelkerke R2 .14 .03 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05 
 
Table 8.12 also includes the results of a logistic regression on the alternative dependent 
variable STARTUP. This regression has substantially poorer fit than the primary model 
(change in –2 log likelihood from base model = .89, df = 1, p =.35) and the estimated 
coefficient for the DYNAMISM variable (.18) is not statistically significant in this model. 
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8.3.6 Multiple attributes 
The preceding analyses considered the transaction attributes individually. In this section, the 
impact of multiple attributes is considered. Table 8.13 shows the results of multinomial 
logistic regressions run on the data. Model 1 is a base model including only the control 
variable for faculty affiliation in science. Model 2 adds IP as this was the attribute found to 
be significant in the previous analyses. Model 3 continues the stepwise addition of variables 
adding VOLATILITY. This variable was added as it resulted in the next largest reduction in 
the -2 Log Likelihood value. Model 4 includes all of the transaction attribute variables. The 
reference category for the dependent variable is the build governance structure. 
The chi-square test for the change in the –2 log likelihood value from the base model tests 
the null hypothesis that all of the logistic regression coefficients except the constant are zero. 
For all models, this test is statistically significant providing support for acceptance of the 
models as significant logistic regressions. Table 8.14 shows the classification table for model 
4. The model correctly classifies 67% of the cases. However, the model does misclassify a 
large percentage of the cases that used the sell option as having used the build option. This 
may be a result of the build and sell options both reflecting hierarchy governance structures 
with the model not being able to distinguish differences between the two hierarchy 
governance structures. Overall, consideration of the various fit measures suggests the models 
provide a good fit to the data given the limited sample size. 
The coefficient for the IP variable related to the rent governance structure is statistically 
significant and in the direction hypothesized by H3. The coefficient for the VOLATILITY 
variable is also statistically significant and in the direction hypothesized by H7. The 
coefficients for the SPECCA and DYNAMISM variables approach statistical significance. In 
the case of the SPECCA variable, no difference was hypothesized between the build and rent 
governance structures by H6. In the case of the DYNAMISM variable, the coefficient is not 
in the direction hypothesized by H8. Thus, the results provide some support for H3 and H7 




Table 8.13 Multiple logistical regression analysis of governance structures 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Rent         
  SCIENCE 1.68 .91 1.31 .98 1.21 1.07 -.17 1.83
  IP   .37 .21 .77* .35 1.10* .51
  TACCOM       -.03 .22
  SUBSTITUTE       .30 .37
  SPECCA       -2.48 1.43
  VOLATILITY     -.45* .23 -.90* .45
  DYNAMISM       -1.5 .81
  Intercept .29 .76 -4.12 2.70 -3.73 3.22 -1.03 7.02
         
Sell         
  SCIENCE 2.30* .89 2.36* .91 2.26* .94 1.83 1.00
  IP   -.09 .14 -.17 .16 -.06 .20
  TACCOM       -.02 .12
  SUBSTITUTE       .34 .25
  SPECCA       -1.35 1.19
  VOLATILITY     .25 .21 .17 .23
  DYNAMISM       -.17 .26
  Intercept .69 .71 1.60 1.63   -2.84 5.29
         
Fit statistics:         
  -2 log likelihood  
    (-2LL) 
11.88  48.29  56.71  48.43  
  Change in –2LL from 
    base model (χ2) 
8.34*  14.49**  23.26**  35.71**  
  Nagelkerke R2 .21  .34  .49  .66  
Notes. Reference category is build governance structure. 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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Table 8.14 Classification table for model 4 
  Predicted 
Observed Build Rent Sell Percent correct 
Build 18 2 3 78% 
Rent 2 6 1 67% 
Sell 5 1 4 40% 
Overall percentage 60% 21% 19% 67% 
 
None of the coefficients for the transaction attribute variables related to the sell governance 
structure are statistically significant. Thus, these results do not provide direct support for any 
of the hypotheses. They do, however, provide some support for the rationale behind the 
build, rent and sell governance structures. Both the build and sell governance structures are 
hierarchies while the rent option is a market governance structure (see section 3.4). The 
absence of differences between the build and rent governance structures is consistent with 
their both being hierarchy governance structures. The coefficient for the SCIENCE control 
variable is statistically significant. While no definitive conclusion can be drawn from the data 
as to why the SCIENCE control variable is significant, it may be that faculty affiliation in 
science is an indication that the technologies are at a more basic stage than those from faculty 
members affiliated with more applied faculties such as engineering and mathematics 
(primarily, computer science). If this is the case, it may indicate technologies that are further 
from market. New firms may lack the resources to commercialize these further from market 
technologies and, consequently, they may be commercialized by established firms rather than 
new firms resulting in the observed difference between the build and sell governance 
structures. This explanation is consistent with the findings of Colyvas et al. (2002) who 
found that, of the four technologies they examined that were usable without further 
development, three were commercialized by new firms rather than established firms.  
8.4 Discussion 
The results of this study provide statistically significant support for Hypothesis 3 related to 
patent and other legal protection in both the logistic regression and multiple logistic 
regression tests. The results of this study provide statistically significant support for 
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Hypothesis 7 related to volatility in the multiple logistic regression test. The results of the 
logistic regression test of this hypothesis are in the direction hypothesized but are not 
statistically significant. Evidence related to the risk of substitutes was in the predicted 
direction but failed to achieve statistical significance. The results of this study do not provide 
support for the other hypotheses related to transaction attributes. These findings are discussed 
further in the following sections. 
8.4.1 Intellectual property protection 
The results provide support for the hypothesis that intellectual property protection is an 
important consideration in selecting methods of commercialization. Specifically, the 
evidence supports the hypothesis that the greater the patent or other legal protection for the 
technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the 
rent option. This is a particularly important finding since, as described in section 2.4.4, 
previous research found conflicting evidence concerning the impact of the strength of 
intellectual property protection on the choice of method for commercializing the innovation. 
For example Shane (2002) found that, when patents are effective, the new technology is 
likely to be commercialized by licensing while del Campo, et al. (1999) suggest that, when 
the proprietary position of a technology is narrow or unpatentable, licensing is an appropriate 
method of commercializing the technology. The build, rent and sell governance structures 
proposed in this thesis and the results of Study #3 provide a possible explanation for, and 
reconciliation of, these conflicting findings.  
Shane (2002) examined 717 licensed patents from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and found that when patents are not effective, technologies are likely to be 
licensed back to the inventors. Shane’s discussion suggests that the situations involving 
licensing back to the inventors represent situations where the inventor commercializes the 
technology by creating a start-up firm to develop new products or services based on the 
technology. Thus, this study can be reframed as suggesting that, when patents are ineffective, 
technologies are likely to be commercialized using the build option. 
Del Campo, Sparks, Hill and Keller (1999) discuss the attempt to commercialize 
superconducting quantum interference devices. They conclude that “licensing may be the 
best strategy when the proprietary position of the intellectual property is narrow or 
unpatentable and when the capabilities of the developer are limited” (p. 294). Further, they 
conclude that start-ups need inventions that represent a core technology with a large market 
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potential and, if possible, multiple product applications to compensate for the high risks 
involved in creating a start-up firm. The discussion of start-ups in their study suggests that 
the types of start-up firms they are describing are those that represent the build option. In 
their discussion of the licensing option, they refer to the licensee as a single firm and indicate 
that commonly the licensee will have the rights to improvements in the technology. This 
description is consistent with the sell option in the proposed taxonomy. Thus, this study can 
be reframed as suggesting that, when intellectual property protection is weak, a sell approach 
to commercialization is appropriate. 
The hypothesis that the greater the patent or other legal protection for the technology, the 
greater the likelihood that the technology will be commercialized using the rent option which 
was supported by Study #3 is consistent with the reframed analyses of both Shane and del 
Campo, et al. and provides a method for reconciling these previously inconsistent findings. 
8.4.2 Absence of support for other hypotheses related to transaction attributes 
Except for intellectual property protection and to a more limited extent volatility, there was a 
lack of support for the other hypotheses related to transaction attributes. Three possible 
explanations for this lack of support exist. First, the measures used in the study might not be 
valid and reliable measures of the underlying constructs. Second, the hypothesized 
relationships do exist but the effect sizes are too small to be detected by the sample size of 
the test. Third, the hypothesized relationships do not exist. Each of these possibilities is 
discussed in turn. 
The first possible explanation for the lack of support for the transaction attribute 
hypotheses is that the measures used in the study are not valid and reliable measures of the 
underlying constructs. Based on the findings described above and detailed review of the 
survey responses, two particular issues may exist. The first relates to the measure for 
specialized complementary assets. The idea of specialized complementary assets is a difficult 
one (see section 2.6.3 for further discussion of this concept). While others have attempted to 
measure the importance of specialized complementary assets using surveys (Gans, et al., 
2002), it may be that the concept is too complex to reliably measure using survey methods 
(Babbie, 1999). Gans, et al. (2002) who used a similar measure also did not find a 
statistically significant result with their measure. The second construct that may pose 
measurement difficulties is the build, rent and sell governance structures; particularly, the 
distinction between the rent and sell options. As described in section 3.5, two criteria are 
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used to distinguish the governance structures. The first criterion is whether a new firm or an 
established firm commercializes the technology. The second criterion relates to the 
ownership of the property rights to the technology. The first criterion is straightforward and 
distinguishes the build option from the rent and sell options. The second criterion, which 
distinguishes between the rent and sell options, is more complex. Following on Oxley (1999), 
Study #3 uses equity rights as a proxy for ownership of property rights (see section 8.2.3). It 
may be that equity rights are not a good proxy for ownership of property rights to the 
technology. Again, however, a more detailed examination of property rights is likely beyond 
what could reasonably be accomplished using survey methodology (Babbie, 1999). 
The second possible explanation for the lack of support for the transaction attribute 
hypotheses is that, while the hypothesized relationships exist, the power of the tests was not 
large to detect them. Small sample sizes are only able to detect relatively large effect sizes 
(Bohrnstedt and Knoke, 1994). For example, the analysis in section 8.3.1 estimated the 
coefficient for IP at .43. This indicates that the odds of being in the rent category increase by 
approximately 1.5 times (e.43) for each increase of 1 in the IP scale. Given that the overall 
odds of being in the rent category are .27:1, this is a large effect size. The small sample size 
is a limitation of this study (see section 8.4.4). 
The third possible explanation for the lack of support for the transaction attribute 
hypotheses is that the hypothesized relationships do not exist. Since the hypotheses are based 
on transaction cost economics, this would imply that transaction cost economics is not a 
useful approach for explaining the methods used to commercialize new technologies arising 
from university research. However, as demonstrated in the next section, the results provide 
some limited evidence that governance structures and transaction cost economics are useful 
for explaining commercialization approaches. 
While the above represent possible explanations for the lack of support for the transaction 
attribute hypotheses, there is no evidence to suggest which one or combination of these 
factors explains the results observed. 
8.4.3 Comparison of the build, rent and sell classification scheme to the 
licensing vs. start-up dichotomy 
In this research, it is suggested that the build, rent and sell classification scheme better 
reflects the substance of the methods used to commercialize new technologies than the 
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licensing vs. start-up dichotomy. In order to allow comparisons between the two 
classification approaches, a second dependent variable was created to reflect the licensing vs. 
start-up approach commonly used to analyze the methods used to commercialize new 
technologies. No statistically significant relationships to the transaction attribute variables 
were found using this alternative dependent variable. A comparison of the fit of the models 
can also provide a sense of which dependent variable better fits the data. A comparison of the 
results of the analyses in sections 8.3.1 to 8.3.5 indicates that the build, rent or sell dependent 
variable models had the better fit to the data in four of the six cases and the licensing vs. 
start-up dependent variable models had the better fit to the data in two of the six cases. Based 
on the fit of the models and the fact that the build, rent and sell models identified one 
statistically significant relationship related to the transaction attribute variables, there is some 
evidence that the build, rent and sell classification scheme did better at ‘explaining’ 
commercialization structures based on technology characteristics than did the licensing vs. 
start-up dichotomy traditionally used to look at methods of commercialization. 
8.4.4 Limitations 
Section 8.4.2 identified two limitations in this study. One is the small sample size which 
limits the ability of the analyses to detect small effect sizes. The second limitation identified 
is the limitation of survey methodologies for measuring complex variables. This limitation 
impacts on the ability to measure specialized complementary assets and the property rights to 
a technology. 
A third limitation of this study results from the sample being drawn from two universities 
located in the same geographic area. As indicated in section 5.4.2.1, the choice of intense 
examination of faculty from a small geographic area rather than a broader sample from 
numerous universities was made to minimize the impact of environmental factors such as 
differing economic environments and the availability of venture capital. This choice is also 
convenient and limits the costs of performing the research. However, this approach limits 
somewhat the generalizability of the findings. 
8.4.5 Implications 
The findings of this study have a number of implications. First, they suggest that technology 
attributes may have an impact on the methods used to commercialize a new technology 
arising from university research. Specifically, they suggest that, when intellectual property 
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protection for a technology is weak, the build and sell approaches are likely to be more 
effective. The rent approach requires stronger intellectual property protection to enable the 
inventor to appropriate gains from the technology since secrecy and other methods of 
appropriate gains are unlikely to be effective when the rent option is used. 
Second, as described in section 8.4.1, these findings help to resolve conflicts in previous 
research on the role of intellectual property protection. Specifically, the findings suggest that 
there are differences in the importance of intellectual property protection when a technology 
is licensed to numerous established firms as in the rent approach compared to when a 
technology is licensed to a single establish firm as in the sell approach. 
Third, these findings suggest that the build, rent and sell classification scheme proposed in 
this thesis provides insights into the commercialization process that the licensing vs. start-up 
approach does not. This is suggested both by the analyses of the effect of intellectual 
property protection using both approaches and by the overall comparison of the two 
approaches. 
8.5 Summary 
The study in this chapter demonstrates that there are connections between the characteristics 
of a particular new technology and the method used to commercialize the technology. It also 




In this chapter, the key results of the three studies conducted are summarized. In addition, the 
theoretical and managerial implications of the research are described. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the limitations of the research and opportunities for future research. 
9.1 Summary of key results 
The build, rent and sell classification approach is proposed in this thesis as an alternative to 
the licensing vs. start-up approach traditionally used to analyze the methods used to 
commercialize new technologies arising from university research. The build, rent and sell 
classification scheme has the advantages of being theoretically based and reflects the 
substance rather than the legal form of the governance structures adopted to commercialize a 
new technology. Specific criteria for distinguishing between the build, rent and sell options 
were developed and hypotheses linking the options to transaction attributes were developed 
using transaction cost economics theory. 
Study #1 involves the analysis of three start-ups based on new technologies arising from 
research conducted at the University of Waterloo. These examples illustrate the significant 
differences that exist in the governance structures used to commercialize new technologies. 
The results support the concerns raised in chapter 3 about the licensing vs. start-up 
dichotomy. The results also provide some support for the build, rent and sell classification of 
governance structures. Further, the findings of this study are consistent with the hypotheses 
related to firm characteristics associated with the strategic governance choices of build, rent 
or sell. 
Study #2 involves the examination of the nature of business activities of a sample of public 
start-up firms that have been involved in commercializing new technologies arising from 
university research. The results of this study 1) demonstrate that the criteria distinguishing 
the build, rent and sell methods can be applied effectively in practice to classify the method 
used to commercialize a new technology, 2) demonstrate that the build, rent and sell methods 
are all common approaches to commercialization, and 3) demonstrate that there are 
substantive differences in the business activities of firms depending on the method of 
commercialization used. The results of this study also support the hypotheses related to firm 
characteristics associated with the strategic governance choices of build, rent or sell. 
123 
 
Study #3 involves a survey of academic inventors. The study examines the connection 
between the characteristics of a new technologies and the method used to commercialize the 
technology. This study results in a number of major findings. First, the findings from this 
study suggest that technology attributes may have an impact on the methods used to 
commercialize a new technology arising from university research. Specifically, the results 
suggest that, when intellectual property protection for a technology is weak, the build and sell 
approaches are likely to be more effective than the rent approach. The rent approach requires 
stronger intellectual property protection to enable the inventor to appropriate gains from the 
technology since secrecy and other methods of appropriate gains are unlikely to be effective 
when the rent option is used. Second, the findings help to resolve conflicts in previous 
research on the role of intellectual property protection. Specifically, the findings suggest that 
there are differences in the importance of intellectual property protection when a technology 
is licensed to numerous established firms as in the rent approach compared to when a 
technology is licensed to a single establish firm as in the sell approach. Third, the findings 
suggest that the build, rent and sell classification scheme proposed in this thesis provides 
insights into the commercialization process that the licensing vs. start-up approach does not. 
Table 9.1 summarizes the results of the tests of the hypotheses contained in this thesis. 
Three of the eight hypotheses (H1a/b, H2a/b and H3) are strongly supported and one of the 
hypotheses (H7) received limited support. In addition, evidence for another of the hypotheses 
(H5) is in the predicted direction but failed to achieve statistical significance. The other three 
hypotheses (H4, H6 and H8) are not supported. A number of possible reasons for the lack of 
support these hypotheses are discussed in section 8.4.2. These results demonstrate the value 
of the build, rent or sell approach in helping to understand how new technologies arising 
from university research are commercialized. They also demonstrate that more work is 
needed to better understand the factors that affect the governance choices made in 




Table 9.1 Summary of results of tests of hypotheses 
Hypotheses Evidence 
Firm characteristics associated with the strategic 
governance choices of build, rent or sell: 
 
H1a The build option is positively associated with new 
firms created to commercialize technologies 
deriving revenue primarily from product market 
activity. 
H1b The rent and sell options are positively associated 
with new firms created to commercialize 
technologies deriving revenue primarily from 
technology market activity. 
Results of Study #1 are consistent with this 
hypothesis. 
Results of Study #2 strongly support this 
hypothesis. 
H2a The build option is positively associated with new 
firms created to commercialize technologies 
expending resources on both technology 
development activities and production activities. 
H2b The rent and sell options are positively associated 
with new firms created to commercialize 
technologies expending resources on technology 
development activities but not on production 
activities. 
Results of Study #1 are consistent with this 
hypothesis. 
Results of Study #2 strongly support this 
hypothesis. 
Transaction attributes and the strategic governance 
choices made in their commercialization: 
 
H3 The greater the patent or other legal protection for 
the technology, the greater the likelihood that the 
technology will be commercialized using the rent 
option. 
Results of Study #3 provide statistically significant 
support for this hypothesis. 
H4 The greater the tacitness and complexity of the 
knowledge inherent in a technology, the greater 
the likelihood that the technology will be 
commercialized using the build or sell options. 
Results of Study #3 do not support this hypothesis 
(coefficient for TACCOM variable not statistically 
significant and not in hypothesized direction). 
H5 The greater the risk of substitutes, the greater the 
likelihood that the technology will be 
commercialized using the rent option. 
Results of Study #3 are in the predicted direction 
but failed to achieve statistical significance. 
H6 The greater the importance of specialized 
complementary assets, the greater the likelihood 
that the technology will be commercialized using 
the sell option. 
Results of Study #3 do not support this hypothesis 
(coefficient for SPECCA variable not statistically 
significant and not in hypothesized direction). 
H7 The greater the volatility associated with the 
technology, the greater the likelihood that the 
technology will be commercialized using the build 
or sell options. 
Results of Study #3 provide some support for this 
hypothesis. Coefficient for VOLATILITY variable 
is in hypothesized direction and is statistically 
significant in one of the two tests performed. 
H8 The greater the dynamism associated with the 
technology, the greater the likelihood that the 
technology will be commercialized using the rent 
option. 
Results of Study #3 do not support this hypothesis 
(coefficient for DYNAMISM variable not 





9.2.1 Theoretical implications 
The build, rent or sell model is proposed in this thesis as an alternative to the traditional 
approach of classifying the methods used to commercialize new technologies arising from 
university research as licensing or start-ups. This model contributes to understanding how 
technologies arising from university research are commercialized in a number of ways.  
The build, rent or sell model provides a theoretical basis for the classification of methods 
that is lacking in the licensing vs. start-up approach. Licensing vs. start-up is commonly used 
in the analysis of commercialization activities but no theoretical argument is provided as to 
what the important differences are between these methods and why these differences matter. 
The build, rent or sell model uses the well established concepts of markets and hierarchies to 
distinguish between different approaches to commercialization. Market governance 
structures provide strong incentives to the individual firms to minimize costs and to adapt 
quickly to changing circumstances in order to maximize their income. These structures are 
very good at adapting to situations where coordination between the parties is not necessary 
and each can act autonomously (i.e., autonomous adaptation). Hierarchies have much weaker 
incentives but have greater administrative controls over activities providing greater abilities 
to adapt to situations requiring coordination between activities (i.e., cooperation adaptation) 
(Williamson, 1991). The choice of governance structure has consequences for the firm. A 
firm that adopts a hierarchy structure when a market approach is more appropriate will invest 
resources in activities but received no strategic benefit for doing so. A firm that adopts a 
market structure when a hierarchy structure is more appropriate may find itself in a weak 
bargaining position with another firm that controls the other complementary assets needed to 
commercialize the technology with the result that its profitability is diminished. In some 
cases, it may even find that its survival is threatened (Teece, 2000). By linking the methods 
used to commercialize a new technology to the concepts of markets and hierarchies, the 
build, rent or sell model provides a new theoretically based approach to the analysis of 
commercialization methods. 
The build, rent or sell approach better reflects the ideas of markets and hierarchies than 
does the licensing vs. start-up approach. There are difficulties in linking the licensing vs. 
start-up dichotomy to the literature on markets and hierarchies. These difficulties relate 
primarily to the fact that the licensing and start-up categories do not align well with the 
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market and hierarchy governance structures respectively. Shane (2002) recognizes this 
difficulty in arguing that licensing to firms founded by inventors represents, in substance, a 
hierarchy governance structure rather than a market one (i.e., that licensing cannot always be 
equated with a market governance structure). Likewise, Certicom (described in Study #1) is a 
start-up firm but one that operates through a market governance structure with the established 
firms that put its technologies into use. In this case, commercialization by a start-up firm 
cannot be equated with a hierarchy governance structure. These examples show that a simple 
‘licensing = market, start-up = hierarchy’ model does not adequately reflect the complexities 
that exist in the business models used to commercialize new technologies arising from 
university research. Conversely, the build, rent or sell approach is explicitly designed to align 
with the market and hierarchy governance structures. 
The focus on governance structures enables researchers to draw on an extensive body of 
literature to study the commercialization of new technologies arising from university 
research. This includes the literature on firm boundaries (e.g., Coase, 1937; various theories 
of the firm described in chapter 2) and the literature on markets for technology (e.g., Arora et 
al., 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003; Giuri and Luzzi, 2005). In this thesis, the literature on 
transaction cost economics theory is used to develop hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between certain characteristics of technologies and the methods used to commercialize them. 
It is significant to note that the hypotheses developed using the build, rent or sell model differ 
in important ways from those developed using the licensing vs. start-up dichotomy. For 
example, the Association of University Technology Manager’s Licensing Survey for 2003 
indicates that 87% of licenses were to existing companies (52.5% of licenses were to small 
companies and 34.5% of licenses were to large companies). A significant number of these 
licenses (35% of licenses to large companies and 43% of licenses to small companies) are 
exclusive (AUTM, 2004). Many of these licenses will be classified as sell transactions as 
they reflect a hierarchy governance structure. These licenses are grouped with other licensing 
arrangements and considered market governance structures under the licensing vs. start-up 
approach. This ability to draw more broadly on existing literature in related fields can help to 
advance significantly the study of the commercialization of new technologies arising from 
university research and to link it to research in these related fields. 
The build, rent or sell approach also is easily reconcilable to the broader literature on 
commercializing innovations. For example, Teece (2000) identifies the following four 
options available to independent inventors and stand-alone laboratories:  
127 
 
(1) licensing the technology to incumbent firms who already 
have the necessary complementary assets in place; (2) using 
intellectual property as collateral to raise debt funds to 
establish an organization to exploit the technology; (3) 
exchanging the patent for equity in a new venture-funded firm; 
(4) exchanging the intellectual property for cash or equity in an 
established firm. (p. 55) 
The first of these options is comparable to the rent option; the second and third options are 
comparable to the build option and the forth option is comparable to the sell option. Teece 
argues that appropriability conditions and control of complementary assets are the key factors 
in determining which of these options is preferable in a particular circumstance. Again, this 
link to the broader literature on commercializing innovations can help to advance the study of 
the commercialization of university research. 
Another important benefit of the build, rent or sell model is that it captures the governance 
structure in place at the time when the new technology is commercialized. The licensing vs. 
start-up approach focuses on the point in time when a technology leaves the university. 
However, there is evidence that significant time can pass between the point when a 
technology leaves the university and when it is commercialized and that different approaches 
may be tried before commercialization actually occurs (see section 2.4.3). The licensing vs. 
start-up approach fails to take into account the significant changes that can occur between the 
time a technology leaves the university setting and when it is put into commercial use. 
The build, rent and sell categories capture non-traditional forms of commercialization that 
are becoming more important due to the emergence of markets for technology. Existing 
research on start-ups commercializing new technologies arising from university research 
presumes that these firms operate in the product market (see, for example, Shane 2004). 
However, firms like Certicom and Senesco do not produce products or services but rather 
operate in markets for technology granting rights to their technology to established firms who 
use it in their businesses. The build, rent and sell categories recognize that start-ups can 
operate either in product markets or markets for technology. 
The build, rent and sell model also can help to resolve and explain inconsistent findings in 
previous research. For example, previous research found conflicting evidence concerning the 
impact of the strength of intellectual property protection on the choice of method for 
commercializing the innovation. Shane (2002) found that, when patents are effective, the 
new technology is likely to be commercialized by licensing while del Campo, et al. (1999) 
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suggest that, when the proprietary position of a technology is narrow or unpatentable, that 
licensing is an appropriate method of commercializing the technology. The build, rent and 
sell governance structures proposed in this thesis and the results of Study #3 provide an 
explanation for and reconciliation of these conflicting findings. The explanation for these 
apparently inconsistent findings suggested by this thesis is that effective patents may be 
important for the rent option but not as important for the sell option. Under this reframed way 
of looking at commercialization, Shane’s study (2002) suggests that, when intellectual 
property protection is weak, a build approach to commercialization is appropriate while del 
Campo, et al.’s study (1999) suggests that, when intellectual property protection is weak, a 
sell approach to commercialization is appropriate. The hypothesis that the greater the patent 
or other legal protection for the technology, the greater the likelihood that the technology will 
be commercialized using the rent option which was supported by Study #3 is consistent with 
the reframed analyses of Shane and del Campo, et al. and provides a method for reconciling 
these previously inconsistent findings. 
9.2.2 Managerial implications 
The build, rent and sell model and the findings from this research can be used to help 
managers decide on a commercialization strategy for a new technology arising from 
university research. The results of this research suggest that the characteristics of a 
technology imply that certain approaches to commercialization are better suited to a 
particular technology than other alternatives. Specifically, the results suggest that strong IP 
protection is more important if a rent strategy is to be adopted than it is if a build or sell 
strategy is adopted. In addition, while not directly supported by Study #3, other research 
(Teece, 1986; Winter, 2000) suggests that consideration of the need for specialized 
complementary assets is also important in selecting a commercialization strategy. In 
particular, when specialized complementary assets are involved, established firms may be 
able to appropriate most of the returns to a technology (Teece, 1986) and, consequently, rent 
or sell strategies than involve cooperation with established firms rather than competition with 
them may be appropriate. 
The build, rent or sell approach has implications for the development strategies of start-up 
firms. Technology based start-up firms engage in a number of activities including technology 
development, product development and business development. New technologies arising 
from university research are rarely ready for immediate conversion into commercial products 
or services (Rogers, 2003; Thursby, Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Thus, further development 
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of the technology is an important activity toward commercialization of the technology. 
Commercial products or services need to be developed using the technology. Consequently, 
product development is also an important commercialization activity. In addition, if a start-up 
intends to operate in product markets, it needs to develop various managerial, marketing, 
distribution, manufacturing and other capabilities (hereinafter referred to as business 
development activities). Study #2 demonstrated that the relative emphasis on various 
business activities varies for firms adopting build, rent or sell strategies. Firms adopting a 
build strategy plan to operate in product markets selling products or services based on their 
technology. Consequently, their development strategies must include technology 
development, product development and business development. University researchers 
forming start-ups to commercialize technologies they invent may have technology 
development skills but typically lack product development and business development skills 
(Shane, 2002). Consequently, these firms generally need to develop or acquire the relevant 
product development and business development capabilities. This requires significant 
resources on the part of the start-up and may expose the start-up to significant risks since 
these capabilities may be difficult to acquire or may be possessed by potential competitors. 
Firms adopting a rent strategy plan to develop their technology and market it to established 
firms to use in their businesses. Consequently, their development strategies will be focused 
on technology development. In the rent model, product development and business 
development activities will generally be done by the established firms that acquire the rights 
to use the start-ups technology. Thus the rent strategy is a more focused approach than the 
build one and may pose less risk and require fewer resources than a build strategy. Firms 
adopting a sell strategy plan to dispose of the technology to an established firm. These firms 
will typically undertake technology development activities in order to further develop their 
technology to make it more attractive to potential buyers. They may also engage in some 
product development activities to demonstrate to the potential buyers the commercial 
potential of the technology. However, they normally will not engage in significant business 
development activities since their strategy is to sell the technology rather than to develop an 
ongoing market presence. The sell strategy like the rent strategy is a more focused approach 
than the build one and may pose less risk and require fewer resources than a build strategy. 
Thus, start-ups adopting rent or sell strategies generally do not need to expend significant 
resources on business development activities. Start-ups adopting these strategies that do 
expend significant resources on business development activities may be wasting time and 
money that are often in short supply for start-ups. Thus, the build, rent and sell model can 
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help start-up firms to prioritize the activities that they undertake in order to commercialize 
their technology and to avoid wasting valuable resources on activities that are not important 
to their success. 
The build, rent or sell model and the findings in this thesis, also have implications for 
university support for commercialization. As described above, the model and findings 
provide resources for individuals in university technology transfer and licensing offices to aid 
them in determining or advising on commercialization strategies and on development 
strategies. The research in this thesis also suggests the existence of innovation strategies that 
may aid in the commercialization of new technologies. As indicated earlier, many new 
technologies arising from university research are at an early stage of development. In 
addition, those involved in commercialization activities often comment on the lack of 
receptor capacity for new technologies by established firms (AUCC, 2003; NSERC, 2005). A 
strategy for overcoming these issues is suggested by the examples of firms such as Senesco 
described in Study #1. These examples suggest that, for some early stage technologies, a 
viable strategy may be to use start-ups as a method of financing technology development 
prior to licensing to established firms. Universities typically do not have the resources to 
finance technology development but financing from venture capitalists and even public 
markets may be available to start-ups. In these circumstances, use of a start-up may provide a 
method of accessing capital for technology development. As the technologies are further 
developed and the technological viability of the innovations are established, established firms 
may be more willing to take on these technologies (i.e., receptor capacity is increased). This 
is an example of how the concepts underlying the build, rent and sell approach can be used to 
develop innovative strategies to aid in the commercialization of new technologies. 
9.3 Limitations and future research 
The studies in this thesis are subject to a number of limitations. Study #1 is based on the 
examination of only three firms. These three firms were selected because of the differences 
in their approach to the commercialization of new technologies rather than to be a 
representative sample of start-up firms. For these reasons, while the findings are consistent 
with hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, they cannot be considered strong evidence in support of 
the hypotheses. The findings may also not be generalizable to other firms. These issues are 
addressed in part by the broader sample in Study #2. In addition, these analyses are based on 
archival data sources and it was not possible to gather information about the technology 
attributes that are involved in hypotheses 3-8. Consequently, no evidence concerning these 
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hypotheses is provided by this study. This issue is addressed in part by Study #3 which 
involves gather information about technology attributes through a survey of inventors. 
For Study #2, the sample population may not be representative of all start-ups created to 
commercialize new technologies arising from university research. While NSERC funded 
research is an important source of new technologies, new technologies also result from 
university research not funded by NSERC. MIT start-ups also may not be representative of 
start-ups from other universities. The samples represent important sources of new 
technologies and afford the benefits arising from having two separate samples from different 
countries and derived from two different sources. Nonetheless, the results of this study may 
not be generalizable to all commercialized technologies arising from university research. A 
second limitation is that the variables used in the cluster analysis are not sensitive to 
differences between the rent and sell methods of commercialization. The cluster analysis is 
based on accounting data and these data do not address the issues of ownership of property 
rights to the technology. Ownership of property rights to the technology is the criterion that 
distinguishes between the rent and sell methods. Future research can attempt to identify 
additional variables that capture these differences and can be used to distinguish between the 
two methods. A third limitation of the study is that the analysis does not capture all ways that 
the sell method can be implemented. The analysis uses financial statement information. 
Financial statements capture situations where rights to a technology are transferred to an 
established firm by way of a transaction between the start-up and the established firm. They 
do not, however, capture situations where the established firm acquires the technology by 
acquiring the start-up. Three situations were identified where established firms acquired a 
technology by acquiring the start-up while it was still in the development stage. Future 
research can address this issue in a number of ways. First, the classification of firms as using 
the sell strategy can be broadened to include situations where start-ups are acquired by 
established firms while still in the development stage. Another way of addressing this 
limitation is to look specifically at situations where an established firm acquires a technology 
by acquiring a start-up firm. This approach to commercialization has not received much 
attention in past research even though it appears to be a common approach to 
commercializing technologies particularly in the biotechnology field (Kurtzman, 2005). 
Study #3 is subject to a number of limitations. One is the small sample size which limits 
the ability of the analyses to detect small effect sizes. While the sample size for Study #3 is 
limited, the information in Table 2.3 demonstrates that there are very few large sample 
studies in this field (Shane, 2004) and, therefore, this study provides a valuable contribution 
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to the field despite this limitation. Future research can address this limitation by extending 
the sample to researchers at other institutions. Currently, plans are in process to extend the 
survey to the other universities in the C4 consortium of south-western Ontario universities. 
The second limitation identified is the limitation of survey methodologies for measuring 
complex variables. This limitation impacts on the ability to measure specialized 
complementary assets and the property rights to a technology. Future research can address 
these issues by considering alternative measures and sources of data. For example, previous 
studies have looked at the effectiveness of patents on an industry wide basis (Levin, 
Klevorick, Nelson and Winter, 1987) and used these measures of effectiveness when 
considering individual new technologies (Shane, 2002). A similar approach might be 
practicable for complementary assets since it is reasonable to expect that the existence of 
specialized complementary assets varies by industry. A third limitation of this study results 
from the sample being drawn from two universities located in the same geographic area. The 
choice of intense examination of faculty from a small geographic area rather than a broader 
sample from numerous universities was made to minimize the impact of environmental 
factors such as differing economic environments and the availability of venture capital. 
However, this approach limits the generalizability of the findings. Future research can 
address this issue by extending the sample to researcher at a broader sample of universities. 
A number of other areas of future research are suggested by findings in this thesis. In the 
course of this research, a number of firms were identified that used multiple methods to 
commercialize their technologies. For example, while not part of the studies described in this 
thesis, Research in Motion (“RIM”) uses both a build and a rent approach to commercializing 
its technology. RIM both sells Blackberry wireless handheld products and licenses its 
technology to other mobile device manufacturers through its Blackberry licensing program 
(Research in Motion, 2005). Future research could examine these firms to determine why 
they adopt multiple methods. 
Similarly, Certicom is an example of a firm that has changed its approach to 
commercialization. As described in chapter 6, prior to 2004 Certicom’s primary approach to 
commercializing its technologies was to develop and sell software and integrated circuits 
(i.e., it had adopted a build strategy for commercialization). In 2004, Certicom adopted a new 
strategy for commercializing its technology. This new approach involved licensing its patent 
portfolio to other firms who build their own security products using Certicom’s technology 
(i.e., it changed to a rent strategy for commercialization). Future research could examine 
firms that have changed their commercialization approach to determine why firms change 
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approaches. For example, Mahoney (2005) suggests that reduced uncertainty may lead to 
changes in governance structures. It may be that, in some cases, early stage technology-based 
firms need to enter product markets in order to prove that a market for products based on the 
technology exist before they can access markets for technology. Once this market uncertainty 
is reduced they may be able to switch to a more effective governance structure. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This thesis introduces a new method of looking at the strategic governance choices that are 
made in commercializing new technologies arising from university research and provides 
evidence from three studies that support the relevance and usefulness of this method. 
Universities are an important source of new knowledge. Getting the most out of this new 
knowledge requires that it be put into use. One important method of putting this knowledge 
into use is through commercialization activities. Improving commercialization performance 
is important to universities, government, the economy and to Canadians generally who 
benefit from the new products and services that result from commercialization activities. It is 
hoped that this research contributes to and helps encourage continued research into the 
commercialization of new technologies arising from university research. 
 
Appendix A 
Study #2 – Instructions to Coder 
This appendix includes the instructions that were provided to the coder for use in classifying 
the method of commercialization used by the start-up companies in the study. 
 
Classification of Startups 
Instructions 
 
1. Read the criteria in the document “Criteria for analysis of firms.doc” (reproduced 
below). If you have any questions about the criteria just ask. 
2. Work through the example files to confirm that the process is understood. 
3. Determine the commercializiation method for each of the startups in the sample 
using the criteria above. 
4. Record your answers in the template “Classification Table.doc”. 
 
Suggested order of proceeding through documents to find 
relevant information 
 
1. AIF or 10K – There is a description of the business at the beginning of these 
documents. Note that not all startups are required to produce these documents. 
2. MD&A – The beginning of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of 
a firm’s annual report usually contains a description of the business. 
3. Financial statements. There is sometimes a description of the business in the first 
note to the financial statements. 
4. If a description of the business cannot be found in any of the above locations, look 





Criteria for analysis of firms 
 
 Build Rent Sell 
Criteria:    




(Start up sells 
products) 
Established firm(s) 
(Start up sells IP) 
Established firm 
(Start up sells IP) 
Indicators:    
 Product development Startup Other firms Other firms 
 Manufacturing and 
distribution 
Startup Other firms Other firms 
Examples of what might 







Mention of other firms that 
manufacture and distribute products 
based on startups technology 
Mention of other firms that 
manufacture and distribute 
products based on startups 
technology 
“Out-licensing” 
    
2) Ownership of property 
rights to the technology 
New firm 
 
Majority retained by 
inventor/university or a firm created 
by them to market the technology to 
established firms 
Established firm 
Indicators:    
Right to use technology Startup Startup retains right to use technology 
and to let others use 
Established firm – startup 
can no longer use in field of 
use covered by license 
Right to appropriate 
returns from technology 
Startup Startup returns primarily from fixed 
payments and/or royalties 
Startup returns primarily 
from milestone payments 
and royalties 
Right to change assets 
form or substance 
Startup Startup Established firm 
Examples of what might 








Multiple licensees in same field of 
use 
Focus on developing technology in 
same field of use 




Focus on developing 
technology in other fields of 
use or developing new 
technologies 
Other classifications: 
Hybrid – Commercialization of the technology involves the combined efforts of both the startup and an established 
firm(s). For example, the technology may have been commercialized through a joint venture or partnership with an 
established firm with the startup contributing manufacturing capabilities and the established firm contributing marketing 
and distribution capabilities to the joint venture.  
Development stage –Products based on the technology have not yet been put into commercial use.  
Multiple – In some cases, multiple methods of commercialization are used by the startup. In these cases, the method of 
commercialization used should be categorized based on the primary method used.  
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